Alex Bollfrass

🔎 New #IISS episode of "The Arms Control Primer": “Better know a non-nuke: Germany”. Dr @bollfrass.bsky.social talks with Prof Marina Henke& Dr Lutsch Andreas about Germany’s nuclear path, NATO sharing, the NPT & today’s deterrence debate amid Russia’s war. 🎧 tinyurl.com/3b9xezvz

South Africa is the only state to have built and then fully dismantled a nuclear arsenal. In the latest episode of The Arms Control Primer (#IISS), @bollfrass.bsky.social, Anna-Mart van Wyk and Robin Möser explore how and why it happened.
Listen: tinyurl.com/3n44fdbu

A color photograph of the mid-rise steel and glass building at Fifth and K Streets, NW, in Washington, DC, whose upper floors housed the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center. The building shared a block with Steuart Motor Company, a Ford dealership.

black and white photograph of one of the work areas inside the National Photographic Interpretation Center. Two different work stations, separated by a partition, are labeled on the wall above as "Low Altitude Reconnaissance Exploitation," and "High Altitude Reconnaissance Exploitation." Each station features multiple angled light tables to closely examine images on spools of film.

A declassified black and white aerial reconnaissance photograph taken by a U-2 surveillance plane on October 14, 1962 (but analyzed and annotated on October 15), showing a missile encampment at Los Palacios, Cuba (22-40N, 83-15W), with tents, 6 missile trailers, a truck convoy, and equipment labeled.

A declassified black and white aerial reconnaissance photograph taken by a U-2 surveillance plane on October 14, 1962 (but analyzed and annotated on October 15), showing a medium-range ballistic missile launch site at San Diego De Los Banos, Cuba (22-40N, 83-17W), with tent areas, 8 missile trailers, "4 probable erector/launcher equipment," construction, and equipment labeled.

Today in 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis formally began when President John F. Kennedy was briefed on photographs from an October 14 U-2 overflight—analyzed at the National Photographic Interpretation Center on October 15—showing clear evidence of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles on the island.

I was a guest on the IISS podcast "The Arms Control Primer" w/ @bollfrass.bsky.social & former @iaeaorg.bsky.social DG Hans Blix. We covered some lessons of the Iraq case for nuclear nonproliferation & verification. Check out the new episode: www.iiss.org/podcasts/arm...

🚨 NEW SEASON 🚨

🎙️ Season 5 of The Arms Control Primer by #IISS kicks off!

Host @bollfrass.bsky.social with Dr. Nicole Grajewski & Dr. Azadeh Zamirirad unpack #Iran’s nuclear programme—from the Shah to the JCPOA, the 2025 Israel–Iran conflict & what’s next.

🔗 go.iiss.org/4mDZYuV

Russia Launches Biggest Drone Assault of the War, Ukraine Says

We’ve become basically desensitised to successive record breaking air attacks by Russia against Ukraine. “Russia launched almost 500 drones and missiles at Ukraine overnight, Ukrainian forces said on Monday.” www.nytimes.com/2025/06/09/w...

French ambassador issues explicit nuclear security to NATO allies: “Our French vital interests also include the interests of our allies. In that perspective, the nuclear umbrella also applies to our allies and of course Sweden is among them.” www.svt.se/nyheter/loka...

🎧 The concluding episode of #IISS #TheArmsControlPoseur is here: Dr. @bollfrass.bsky.social & Zuzanna Gwadera reflect on nuclear strategy, global risk dynamics & the future of #ArmsControl.

Catch the highlights from Season 4👇
🔗 tinyurl.com/wzu6ap6d

#NonProliferation #EUNPDC

I'm thrilled that this @lawfaremedia.org piece is out! I trace how Mexico has tried to use international law to delegitimize a unilateral U.S. deployment of troops in Mexican territory vs cartels. I focus particularly on Mexico's rejection of the "unwilling or unable" doctrine of self-defense.

🎧 Tune in to the latest episode of #TheArmsControlPoseur by
#IISS featuring Dr @bollfrass.bsky.social, Dr Jingdong Yuan, Dr @dbsalisbury.bsky.social & @nktpnd.bsky.social on North Korea’s nuclear posture & what’s next for diplomacy. 🧵👇

🔗 tinyurl.com/2ja3b34z

#EUNPDC #NonProliferation #ArmsControl

"A cyber no first use agreement between India and Pakistan would serve as a foundational arms control measure [...]"

🎧 Listen to the latest #IISS podcast on #Pakistan with Dr @bollfrass.bsky.social, Dr @rabsaa.bsky.social & Dr
@mansoorahmed.bsky.social: tinyurl.com/4tvbufsp

#EUNPDC #ArmsControl

Host Dr @bollfrass.bsky.social is joined by experts Dr @rabsaa.bsky.social & Dr @mansoorahmed.bsky.social

Together they explore Pakistan’s nuclear history, evolving doctrine & the future of #ArmsControl in South Asia.

➡️https://tinyurl.com/4tvbufsp

#EUNPDC #NonProliferation

Taking the Pulse: Can Europeans Build Their Independent Extended Nuclear Deterrent? Confronted with a U.S. disengagement and the Russian threat, Europeans are reconsidering their stance on nuclear deterrence. Given the capabilities of the French and British arsenals, can Europe devel...

If you feel like taking your mind off the tariffs, Ulrich Kühn, @profonderco.bsky.social, @hfayet.bsky.social, @andrewfutter.bsky.social, James Acton, @paulvanhooft.bsky.social, @bollfrass.bsky.social, George Perkovich, and I have written about Eurodeterrence. carnegieendowment.org/europe/strat...

With host Dr @bollfrass.bsky.social & experts Dr Manpreet Sethi and Dr Jayita Sarkar.
🎧 Listen the full episode here ➡️ tinyurl.com/y45ewt5a

Europe’s Nuclear Trilemma The difficult and dangerous options for post-American deterrence.

New piece out in @foreignaffairs.com by @marksbell.bsky.social and me.

We argue that as the USA pulls back from Europe, including its nuclear arsenal, European leaders face a nuclear trilemma.

Access the full piece via this link:

www.foreignaffairs.com/europe/europ...

Short summary below:

1/x

Climate change may make it harder to spot submarines The sound of their engines will not travel as far

I wrote on some modelling & simulation looking at how climate change might affect anti-submarine warfare. On worst-case assumptions of change: “In the Bay of Biscay, off the French coast, a sub that could once be detected from 60km away will be spotted only at 20km” www.economist.com/science-and-...

What shaped India’s #NuclearWeapons programme, and what risks remain in South Asia’s strategic landscape?

In the latest #IISS podcast #TheArmsControlPoseur, @bollfrass.bsky.social speaks with experts Dr Manpreet Sethi and Dr Jayita Sarkar. 🎧

🔗 tinyurl.com/y45ewt5a

#EUNPDC #India

🎧 Tune into the latest #IISS podcast, where host Dr. @bollfrass.bsky.social is joined by leading nuclear policy expert Dr. Or Rabinowitz for an in-depth discussion on the history, strategic logic, and future of Israel’s nuclear programme.

tinyurl.com/ze9rjzp2
#EUNPDC #NonProliferation

🎙️New podcast episode: How is China’s nuclear posture evolving? In IISS’s #TheArmsControlPoseur, host @bollfrass.bsky.social talks with Dr Jingdong Yuan, Dr @tongzhao.bsky.social & Dr @fiona-cunningham.bsky.social on China’s nuclear expansion & its global impact.

🔗 Listen now: tinyurl.com/mr2acmx6

S4.E4: Better know a nuke: France Since the Cold War, France has charted an independent course in nuclear policy, without relying on external security guarantees. But what makes France’s nuclear strategy different from that of the Uni

🎙 New episode of the #ArmsControlPoseur

Dr. @bollfrass.bsky.social speaks w/@hfayet.bsky.social, Emmanuelle Maitre & Dr. @liviuhorovitz.bsky.social on France's #nuclear arsenal: its history, strategy & role in #EuropeanSecurity.

🎧 Listen now: 🔗 tinyurl.com/yc75dvmz

#ArmsControl #NonProliferation

Important reminder: long-range precision munitions are useless without accurate and real time targeting data - the geolocation of static targets or the tracking of mobile targets. We will see what it means in detail, definitively is going to shrink Ukraine capacity to fight.

US cuts off intelligence sharing with Ukraine Fresh blow to embattled government in Kyiv as Trump administration shifts on conflict

Bad, bad news. Unnecessary, punitive, vindictive. "The US has cut off intelligence-sharing with Kyiv in a move that could seriously hamper the Ukrainian military’s ability to target Russian forces, according to officials familiar with the matter." www.ft.com/content/c58f...

S4.E2 Better know a nuke: The Soviet Union and Russia How has the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics’ nuclear policy evolved into Russia’s current arsenal? How have arms control treaties shaped nuclear stability – or failed to do so? And how can fut

🎙️ NEW PODCAST: In this episode of The Arms Control Poseur from IISS, Dr. @bollfrass.bsky.social, @lydiawachs.bsky.social & @baklitskiy.bsky.social discuss how Russia’s nuclear arsenal has evolved from the Soviet era & what #Armscontrol means for global security today.
🎧 Listen : tinyurl.com/59bkpxsf

Better know a nuke: The Soviet Union and Russia The Arms Control Poseur · Episode

New podcast🚀
@baklitskiy.bsky.social & I join @bollfrass.bsky.social on IISS' 'The Arms Control Poseur' podcast to discuss the evolution of #Russia's #nuclear arsenal, arms racing & arms control⬇️ open.spotify.com/episode/6uYh...

Let’s be honest. Does anyone think that this president would honour Article Five? Presence of US military & nuclear sharing still has value to Europe, but its deterrent value is significantly reduced & falling. This is reckless, dangerous behaviour by the Trump administration.

Russian defence spending exceeds all of Europe combined, study finds IISS assessment lays bare challenges facing Europe should US cut back Ukraine military support

Russian defence spending exceeds all of Europe combined, study finds

https://www.ft.com/content/93d44b5a-a087-4059-9891-f18c77efca4b

Will Iran and Russia’s Growing Partnership Go Nuclear? Trump’s “maximum pressure” could push Tehran and Moscow even closer.

My piece with Or Rabinowitz in Foreign Affairs on Russia-Iran-Israel dynamics, Russia’s support for Iran’s nuclear program, and the options for US policy going forward www.foreignaffairs.com/russia/will-...

A table titled "Atomic Bomb Narratives," which compares the properties of three different narratives about the use of the atomic bomb during World War II. Each narrative is a column, with each row corresponding to one of 7 different narrative properties: "nature of the use decision", "motivation(s) for use of bomb", "outcome necessary for surrender?", "originators", "genre", and "message". The first narrative is labeled "orthodox/the decision to use the bomb." Nature: "moral deliberation." Motivation: "avoid invasion." Output: "ended war, saved lives." Necessary: "yes." Originators: "government officials who made/dropped bomb." Genre: "heroic." Message: "the ends justify the means." The second narrative is labeled "revisionist/atomic diplomacy." Nature: "diplomatic intrigue." Motivation: "flex on Soviets." Output: "began Cold War." Necessary: "no." Originators: "critics, Marxists." Genre: "tragic." Message: "don't trust the US government." The third narrative is labeled "consensus/bureaucratic inertia." Nature: "accumulation of assumptions." Motivation: "multiple, overdetermined." Output: "contributed to end of war (with Soviet invasion)." Necessary: "maybe, maybe not." Originators: "academic historians." Genre: "comedic (chaotic)." Message: "history is really messy."

I am fairly pleased with this table that I cobbled together for a guest lecture next week on the different narratives about the use of the atomic bomb in World War II, and creating an example of ways in which they can be compared to each other in an overarching way.

How North Korean diplomats illicitly acquired US helicopters for the Kim regime | NK News The North Korean Embassy in Berlin has been the site of sanctions evasion controversy in recent years, hosting a hostel found to have breached sanctions by paying rent of 38,000 euros a month to the D...

Great to share my latest historical piece for @nknewsorg.bsky.social — the story of how the DPRK used its embassy in East Berlin to illicitly procure 86 Hughes Helicopters in the mid-1980s. www.nknews.org/2024/11/how-...

A „[European] tripwire force would amount to an Article 5 guarantee by another name. Countries should not offer such a promise to Ukraine unless they are ready to honour it—as walking away under Russian fire would undermine them as members of NATO, too, perhaps fatally.“