Marcin Wroński

We will soon share the statistical database. We plan to write a monograph on the Polish economy in the interwar period in the comming year.

Since Statistics Poland provides the most reliable data on agriculture, we have also simultaneously published a technical paper on agricultural development.
wne.uw.edu.pl/application/...

Link to the paper: wne.uw.edu.pl/application/...

The economic development of Recovered Territories (former German lands) in 1938 was three times higher than in the regions annexed by the Soviet Union. The GDP within current borders was 45% higher than within the interwar borders.

We also present the estimates of the GDP per capita within the current Polish borders. While Poland is seen by some people as "sold at Yalta Conference), the country was major economic victor of the war!

he improvement of agricultural productivity in eastern regions was the major force supporting the regional convergence. The agricultural output in the best developed Western land stagnated (loss of the German market undermined the investment).

The output per capita in Tarnopol expanded by 4.6%, in Wołyń it grew by 4.0%. Wielkopolska and Silesia (former German lands) experienced the slowest economic growth. These regions faced several competitiveness problems and suffered from the lost German market.

Polish economy achieved impressive regional convergence. The speed of convergence was higher than in the communist era, similar to Western Europe during its best (1950s, 1960s), at least in the terms of convergence.

We also present estimates on the regional level. In Silesia the output per capita was similar to Germany, in Warsaw to Czechoslovakia, in Krakow to Romania. In the poorest Tarnopol region GDP pc was similar to Nigeria.

In their canonical work on the interwar Polish economy, Landau and Tomaszewski question whether Poland's output in 1938 exceeded that of 1924. Our findings indicate that it was significantly higher—by 27%—with particularly strong growth in the former Russian territories.

On the other hand, Polish economy converged with Czechoslovakia (55-62%), Italy (48-55%) and France (32-38%)

The economic growth in Poland was lower than in Latvia and Bulgaria, similar to Hungary. Polish GDP pc eqauled ~40% of the German level. The countries diverged in the studied period, mainly due to the stronger economic revival in Germany.

We convert our estimates to 1990 GK$ and discuss why Maddison estimates for Poland (similarly to other CEE countries, see chapters by M. Morys and Łazor & Murgescu) should not be trusted.

However, economic growth in the 1930s was largely jobless. Employment outside agriculture declined from 5.0 million in 1928 to 4.0 million in 1933. By 1938, it remained slightly below the 1928 level, largely due to rapid population growth (1.6% per year).

The slow recovery began in 1933 and gained momentum in the late 1930s. During this period, GDP per capita grew at an annual rate of 6.3%, with the most significant expansion occurring between 1935 and 1938.

In the years 1928 - 1933 output per capita dropped by 25%, that's outcome smilar to other commodity-based economies like Australia (-20%), Canada (-23%), Cuba (-25%) and Chile (-30%).

The Great Depression in Poland was not so deep as according to the previous estimates, but still among the deepest in the world. In the years 1929 - 1933 output per capita declined by 14%, which is comparable to the US (17%) and much worse than other CEE countries.

Between 1924 and 1928, Poland experienced its own "Roaring Twenties," with an impressive growth rate of 8.5%. Rising commodity prices boosted agricultural output, while industry and services initially contracted in the first two years, largely due to the tariff war with Germany.

We demonstrate that Polish GDP per capita in the years 1924 - 1938 expanded by 2.3% annually.

Both Polish and international historiography present a bleak assessment of the economic performance of CEE countries in the interwar period. Similar to several recent contributions (e.g. research on Baltic countries, review chapter by M. Morys) our results challange this census.

Our research on the economic growth and regional convergence in interwar Poland has just been published. This thread presents our most important conclusions ;-).

The Roots of Populism in Poland Do Uneven Economic Development, Social Transfers, Inequality and Migration Explain the Success of Populist Parties? In this paper, we investigate the socio-economic factors affecting the electoral outcomes of the populist parties in Poland. According to estimation results, the re-election of Law and Justice in 201...

From the election in 2019, "Contrary to Western Europe, the effects of immigration and inequality on the outcomes of populist parties in Poland are not statistically significant."

by Olejnik and @mwronski.bsky.social

onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...

(PDF) Intergenerational Mobility over Nine Generations: Evidence from Poland, 1800-1984 PDF | In this paper, we utilize the mass genealogical data to measure social mobility in Poland over the last two centuries. To do so we digitized the... | Find, read and cite all the research you nee...

WP is here:
www.researchgate.net/publication/...

What was the best way to join the elite for people born outside the elite? Religious institutions were a major force of upward mobility. More people from lower strata joined the elite as bishops than as politicians, businessmen or professors.

We measure the kinship up to the 6th degree and document that measures of mobility based on the direct links (e.g. father-son) overestimate the degree of social mobility. We document changing mobility prospects of different occupational/social categories based on micromodels.

Family formation played a key role in preserving social status. Both parents' standing was crucial for children. Women more often inherited and passed on social advantages than men. Outsiders who married well fared better than old elite members who did not.

Mobility was low and stagnant in the 19th century, but gradually increased in the 20th. Assortative mating was in decline already in the early 1800s. The elite was ready to incorporate the successful outsiders.

Our research is based on the full sample of Polish Biographical Dictionary. We use mass genealogical data to study the family links between different generations of Polish elite. In the 19th century ~40% of the top 0.01% were relatives of the top 0.01% of the previous generation. In 1984 still 17%.

Excited to present my research on intergenerational mobility in Poland at the upcoming CNEH meeting! We examine mobility and elite openness over nine generations, from 1800 to 1984. Contrary to the recent research on the surname status, we find that there is no "law" of low and constant mobility.

Marcin Wroński About me I am an assistant professor at the Collegium of World Economy SGH Warsaw School of Economics. I am a fellow of the World Inequality Database (Paris School of Economics, France), the Global La...

You can learn more about my profile on my website: sites.google.com/view/marcin-...