Oskar Pietrewicz

Here is my brief take on the new president of South Korea.
➡️ What factors determined Lee Jae-myung's election?
➡️Who is the new president?
➡️What can the election results mean for South Korea’s domestic politics and its foreign policy?

👉 pism.pl/publications...

Many challenges and uncertainties lie ahead for 🇺🇸🇰🇵 relations.

➡️ unclear vision of 🇺🇸 policy towards the DPRK
➡️ 🇰🇵 has been strengthened by its alliance with Russia
➡️ the global and regional situation is much more complicated than in 2018

Find out more in my recent analysis 👇

pism.pl/publications...

My short take on the decision made by South Korea’s Constitutional Court, which upheld the parliament’s decision to impeach President Yoon Suk-yeol for illegally declaring martial law last December.

pism.pl/publications...

If we take opposition to Yoon's impeachment as a measure of authoritarian political attitudes, there are some observations we can make and hypotheses, some competing, that we can consider. 👇

South Korea, US should go beyond rhetoric, get real on Taiwan contingency: report Allies should clarify expectations for role of alliance in event of US-China conflict South Korea and the United States should initiate concrete, practical — and largely nonexternal — discussions on t...

S. Korea and US should initiate concrete, practical — and largely nonexternal — discussions on the intractable, long-avoided question of their alliance’s role in a Taiwan contingency, moving beyond rhetorical alignment on peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
www.koreaherald.com/article/1045...

Spring issue of Global Asia has just dropped, with a cover package on Martial Law in South Korea-- a topic that should get more global attention IMHO
www.globalasia.org/latest-issue...

Polls, peril and partnership: Why South Korea and the EU are natural allies South Koreans and Europeans agree that Russia is a threat, Ukraine needs support and that the new US administration is trouble. As Trump shakes the global security order, their shared concerns could…

South Koreans and Europeans agree that Russia is a threat, Ukraine needs support and that the new US administration is trouble, writes @alexlipke.bsky.social @ecfrasia.bsky.social

Read his new commentary:

For example, China can use an economic carrot to keep North Korea within its sphere of influence. The North Korean authorities are happy to eat this carrot, but they will not allow Chinese influence to turn into control.

Of course, an important piece of the puzzle remains China, which will not be passive in this situation. The experience of the 2018-2019 U.S.-DPRK talks shows that China may intensify contacts with North Korea for fear of being left out.

with the Americans again, hoping that this will lead, for example, to a weakening of the U.S. alliance with South Korea. Would they use Russian support to achieve this? Absolutely. Would they let themselves be led by the Russians? Definitely not.

diminish with the rebuilding of the Russian military. Moreover, I believe that both the Koreans and the Russians are aware that, depending on how the situation evolves, they may trade themselves in talks with the U.S. I think that at some point the Koreans will try to negotiate

the U.S.; 2) demand more political, economic, military-technological support from Russia in exchange for military support. However, there is no certainty that such close cooperation between Russia and North Korea will continue after the war in Ukraine - the DPRK’s importance may

remain passive and fully align itself with the Russian idea. But the fact remains that it has been reaping tangible benefits from cooperation with Russia since 2022. As long as it can, North Korea will 1) use Russian support to strengthen its position in possible talks with

From Russia’s point of view, it would be necessary to convince the U.S. that its talks with the DPRK would help the process of weaning partners/allies away from China.

I do not believe that North Korea coordinates all its actions with Russia. I also doubt that North Korea will

development of a new security architecture in Northeast Asia - initially as a state guaranteeing, for example, a nuclear and missile arms control agreement between the U.S. and the DPRK. If I were Russia, I would adapt my proposal to the American idea of a 'reverse Nixon'.

Thanks to the increased cooperation over the past three years, Russia can present itself to the U.S. as an important player on the Korean Peninsula, ready to bring North Korea to the negotiating table and play an indirect role in it. And perhaps be willing to participate in the

with the U.S., and then to offer to withdraw North Korean forces.

Second, the Russian proposal to engage in negotiations between the U.S. and the DPRK. The Russian ambassador in Pyongyang has already supported the idea of resuming talks between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un.

North Korean troops are crucial to the success of the Russian counter-offensive in the Kursk Oblast. It would therefore be in Russia’s interest first to retake the Kursk Oblast with the support of North Korean troops, which would strengthen Russia’s negotiating position in talks

First, Russia’s proposal to withdraw North Korean troops from the frontline as a concession. This would require an explicit acknowledgement that such forces are fighting at all, which Russia and North Korea have so far denied. At the moment, such a proposal seems unlikely because

North Korea is playing a bigger role in Russia’s war on Ukraine than one might think. And it may turn out to be one of the pieces in the larger puzzle of U.S.-Russian talks on a ceasefire in the war in Ukraine. I would consider several possibilities 🧵🇰🇵🇷🇺🇺🇸

pism.pl/publications...

In my recent analysis for the Polish Institute of International Affairs, I argue that the evolution of 🇰🇷 domestic situation, the definition of the terms of the alliance, 🇰🇷 stance on 🇺🇸🇨🇳 rivalry, and the coordination of policies towards 🇰🇵 will be crucial for South Korea’s alliance with the U.S. 👇

When Ishiba met Trump Some initial thoughts on their first summit

Ishiba’s first meeting with Trump is over, and, at first glance, it appears that Ishiba returns to Tokyo with what he needed. Some initial thoughts here:

open.substack.com/pub/observin...

Here's the English text of the joint statement.

www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/...

1/ I've obtained the 101-page indictment against President Yoon Suk Yeol detailing the December 3, 2024 martial law incident. He's charged with leading an insurrection (내란우두머리).

Here's a breakdown of the allegations:

US SecState Rubio’s call with his ROK counterpart does not mention denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. A signal to Kim Jong Un? www.state.gov/secretary-ru...

South Korea’s Ever-Closer Relations with NATO Intersecting and Varying Motives of South Korea’s Moon Jae-in and Yoon Suk-yeol Administrations

New SWP policy paper analyzing the motives driving South Korea's ever-closer relations with NATO.
👇
www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/...

Democratic Regression and Resilience in South Korea: Lessons from the Martial Law Crisis

Democratic Regression and Resilience in South Korea: Lessons from the Martial Law Crisis globalasia.org/forum/democr...

'내란 우두머리' 혐의 尹 대통령 구속…헌정사상 처음(종합2보) 尹 직접 출석해 입장 밝혔지만…법원 "증거인멸 우려" 서울구치소 수용동 이동…수형복 입고 머그샷·지문 채취 12·3 비상계엄을 선포해 내란 우두머리 혐의를 받는 윤석열 대통령이 19일 구속됐다. 현직 대통령 구속은 헌정사상 처음이다. 비상계엄 선포 47일만,

1/ Breaking: South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has been formally detained after a Seoul court approved full detention warrant, marking an unprecedented moment in the country's history.

The decision came at 3am after a 5-hour court hearing. www.news1.kr/society/cour...