NEW! How should Labour respond to the two key issues to voters of the economy and immigration and what are the electoral stakes this week of the budget?
Read on for our answer...
@nprcoxford.bsky.social @jrf-uk.bsky.social
@zackgp94.bsky.social
Postdoctoral Researcher at the Nuffield Politics Research Centre (Uni of Oxford). I research public opinion and party competition in Europe. Especially interested in political implications of AI + tech change; ethnic fragmentation; the environment.
NEW! How should Labour respond to the two key issues to voters of the economy and immigration and what are the electoral stakes this week of the budget?
Read on for our answer...
@nprcoxford.bsky.social @jrf-uk.bsky.social
See link above for full working paper if interestedโฆWould love to hear feedback if you have it: zack.grant (@)nuffield.ox.ac.uk . If in Oxford, follow @mhaslberger.bsky.social for details about an upcoming conference on the politics of AI, held at Nuffield College in November.
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 1 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 0 ๐ 0Supports research on broader societal considerations about impact on prices, healthcare, democracy, others' employment etc. While exposed workers a flashpoint, perhaps they're just at forefront of public awareness about potential for AI to reshape society/econ in many ways beyond just own job. 15/16
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 0 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0But, personal AI job fears not the sole/main factor. a) % support for regulation > the % feeling negatively exposed; b) support for reg > opposition even among personal AI-optimists; c) subjective exposure doesn't mediate entire link between regulation demand & objective workplace exposure. 14/16.
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 0 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0Overall, paper suggests high demand for gov. AI regulation that could rise further as workplace rollout continues, as even โAI-winnersโ are not partic. libertarian. The politics may be different from past techno-shocks, as the labour market consequences are not confined to routine workers. 13/16
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 0 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0We also look at small sample of U.S. workers. Essentially no effects of AI exposure on demand for regulation in full U.S. sample, BUT higher support among liberals expecting personal harm. No such interaction in Britain. Makes sense: support for โbig govโ generally more widespread in Europe. 12/16
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 0 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0Panel model looks at new/updated exposure experiences on regulation support, controlling for prior attitudes/exposure. Suggest a short-term (reactive?) adjustment in demand for AI reg. in response to perceiving greater threats at work. So potential for demand for gov reg. to rise in futureโฆ 11/16
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 0 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0Link between AI regulation support and obj. workplace exposure + subj. AI-pessimism robust to controls. Trad. automation (RTI) exposure, while widely used in polsci, does not predict attitudes. Note obj. AI exposure still predictive net of โsubjectiveโ beliefs about personal AI cost/benefitsโฆ 10/16
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 0 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0Among those *feeling* pos / neg exposed, an interesting asymmetry. While net support highest among those saying AI worsens own job prospects (+59), there is no diff. between those expecting no impact (+38) vs. those expecting benefits (+41). Even AI optimists do not oppose idea of gov. reg. 9/16
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 0 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0But how important is personal AI job exposure? First, letโs look at support by quartiles of โobjectiveโ AI exposure. Net support rises from around +31 to +51 points from least (Q1) to most (Q4) exposed. Not much techno-libertarianism among those at AI forefront. Again, robust to D/P controls. 8/16
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 0 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0How popular is gov. regulation of AI in general? Quite! If we look at *all* British workers, net support (support minus opposition) rose from +35 to +43 points between Oct 2024 and Spring 2025 โ though many people remain ambivalent/undecided. 7/16.
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 0 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0Workers arenโt clueless about likely AI impacts either. Use Felten et al. (2021) to map exposure of 364 jobs (from budget analysts to dancers), we find that ~50% of those in the most AI-exposed jobs (Q4) think itโll affect them v 1/5 in least-exposed (Q1). Robust to demog/polit (D/P) controls. 6/16
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 0 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0First: how do current workers *feel* that AI will affect them? Interestingly, while nearly half of workers think that it wonโt make a difference, rising numbers feel personally threatened by AI (from 23 to 28%, 2024-2025). Personal AI-optimists are a much smaller group (1-in-10 in all waves). 5/16
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 0 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0Ofc, AI could raise hiring/earnings through productivity gains. But currently highly uncertain, so crucial to see how the most affected perceive things + if potential AI โwinnersโ+โlosersโ are mobilising politically. Strong anti-AI coalition could make it harder to realise AIโs potential gains. 4/16
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 0 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0An important Q! Traditionally, tech replaced routine, working-class, non-graduate jobs. Now, the roles most exposed to AI โ e.g. budget analysts, actuaries, graphic designers, paralegals โ are professional. If econ. insecurity spreads to the middle classes, could upend politics. 3/16
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 0 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0We link data on what job tasks AI can actually do (from @edfelten.bsky.social and others) with new 2024โ25 survey data on how British workers feel AI will affect them (good/bad/neither/DK). Then we see if both real and perceived exposure to AI shapes support for government regulation of AI. 2/16
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 0 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0๐คNew Tech, New Threat?๐ค New working paper w/ @profjanegreen.bsky.social & Geoff Evans asks: Are AI-exposed workers demanding more gov. regulation? In Britain, it looks like yes. Though not the only factor, AIโs workplace rollout matters politics. LINK: advance.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.... 1/16
28.10.2025 11:35 โ ๐ 2 ๐ 2 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0To try to be restrained and persuasive:
1) Academic work (like most things) is of varying quality
2) There is an enormous leftward ideological skew to the lowest-quality work
3) 1 + 2 makes it hard for credentialed "expertise" to be credible even when most experts are good
How much credence do you give the theory that pollsters' samples of the youth electorate are fairly underrepresentative (even w/ common weights)? I've heard response rates among males without degrees under 30ish tend to be pretty abysmal, and you would expect those to be more right-leaning?
07.09.2025 02:06 โ ๐ 5 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 0 ๐ 0Very strong start to the conference!
26.06.2025 10:55 โ ๐ 1 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 0 ๐ 0Most interesting thing for me: a majority of Lib Dems back the sentiment, and almost half take no issue with the language. Supports @jamesbreckwoldt.bsky.social's research emphasising how poorly understood Lib Dem voters are. Not nec. true that Labour losses there are disaffected social liberals.
13.05.2025 18:39 โ ๐ 2 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 0 ๐ 0BJPolS abstract discussing the financial and political polarization, the support for government spending on welfare measures, and the struggles of younger individuals and families in managing economic hardships, possibly in the context of British assets and family-centric economical approaches.
NEW -
Family Matters: How Concerns about the Financial Wellbeing of Young Relatives Shape the Political Preferences of Older Adults - cup.org/3Gny1bz
- @zackgp94.bsky.social, @profjanegreen.bsky.social & Geoffrey Evans
#OpenAccess
Oldshoremore?
27.02.2025 23:18 โ ๐ 0 ๐ 0 ๐ฌ 1 ๐ 0