DE-CONSPIRATOR

🔍 DE-CON Glossary Series #16: Cognitive Warfare

Cognitive Warfare describes China’s information and psychological warfare, framed by People’s Liberation Army as “cognitive domain operations”, using AI and big data to shape perceptions.

📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).

📢 D2.4 Coding and Classification Document: explores how the DISARM framework can be strengthened to better capture Russian and Chinese #FIMI tactics.

Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval

Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/

🔍 DE-CON Glossary #15: Post-Truth

Post-Truth describes a condition where shared standards for establishing facts are weakened. By blurring distinctions and amplifying uncertainty, it becomes harder to distinguish fact from manipulation.

📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).

📢 D2.3 – Capturing FIMI in Strategic & Military Doctrines of Russia and China: analyses how #FIMI is embedded in their strategy & military plans, supporting informed responses to manipulation.

Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval

Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/

🔍 DE-CON Glossary #14: Kompromat

Kompromat is a Soviet-origin tactic involving the collection and use of compromising information to discredit, blackmail, or manipulate targets—and today extends far beyond Russia.

📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).

DE-CONSPIRATOR M24 Annual Consortium Meeting in Istanbul - DE-CONSPIRATOR The DE-CONSPIRATOR project successfully held the Annual Consortium Meeting on 17 - 18 of December 2025, hosted by our Project Coordinator, Akin Unver, at Özyeğin University in Istanbul.

🔄 Recap of DE-CONSPIRATOR Annual Consortium Meeting

On 17–18 December 2025, the consortium gathered at Özyeğin University, Istanbul, and brought partners together to align priorities as the project enters its final year.

🔗Read the the full article on our website: deconspirator.eu/de-conspirat...

Plamen Tonchev on the U.S.–China power shift and the coming age of uncertainty - GeoTrends Interview with Plamen Tonchev on U.S.–China rivalry, global power shifts, strategic uncertainty, and leadership prospects

🔎 Interview Highlight | US–China Power Shift

Plamen Tonchev, Head of Asia Unit at IIER & DE-CONSPIRATOR NoI member, examines US–China rivalry, global power shifts, and the risk of a “Kindleberger Trap”, linking geopolitics to information environments.

🔗Read the interview here: lnkd.in/dNSX3wKR

Data Collection Notice for DE-CONSPIRATOR - DE-CONSPIRATOR Dr. Bharath Ganesh from the University of Amsterdam has prepared a Data Collection Notice for DE-CONSPIRATOR’s WP3 research, collecting public social media data on Russian and Chinese FIMI to map infl...

📢 Data Collection Notice for DE-CONSPIRATOR

Prepared for the upcoming WP3 research activities on Russian & Chinese #FIMI mapping misinformation networks across social media. Data collected will be pseudonymised & and securely stored.

🔗 Read the full article here: deconspirator.eu/data-collect...

🎙️Upocoming webinar on 28 January

Graphika analysts will reveal China-linked inauthentic domains mimicking media, spreading pro-China narratives, and using complex corporate networks.

🔗 Read info and register here: launch.graphika.com/when-pr-look...

📌Day #2 | DE-CONSPIRATOR Annual Consortium Meeting

The 2nd day of the Annual Consortium Meeting was held on 18 December 2025 at Özyeğin University, Istanbul.

Partners advanced research, and policy work, aligned next steps, and shared insights with NoI members and the Ethics Advisory Board.

📌Day #1 | DE-CONSPIRATOR Annual Consortium Meeting

The 1st day of the Annual Consortium Meeting was successfully held on 17 December 2025 at Özyeğin University, Istanbul.

Partners reviewed progress, discussed outputs, aligned priorities for the final phase, and shared insights with NoI members.

Open models and practical diffusion: China’s strategy for AI dominance AI competition between the United States and China has been presented as a race that will be won by whoever has the most advanced models. Nevertheless, Ch

New article by @jborrasarumi.bsky.social, core research DE-CONSPIRATOR member, examines how China’s AI strategy prioritises open-source models and large-scale diffusion over the AGI race, with implications for standards, governance, and FIMI dynamics.

🔗 Read the full article here: lnkd.in/dAc3fgph

🔍 DE-CON Glossary #13: Three Warfares

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) concept combines Psychological Warfare, Public Opinion Warfare & Lawfare, across domains to shape perceptions, influence narratives, and constrain decision-making.

📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).

📢 D2.2 - Concepts/Definitions Literature Review Document: A glossary of TTPs linked to FIMI, supporting a shared framework for analysing complex manipulation tactics

Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval

Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/

🔍 DE-CON Glossary #12: Flooding the zone

Flooding the zone is a Russian disinformation tactic that drowns facts in noise, spreading confusion and weakening trust in democratic dialogue.

📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).

📢 D2.1 - Project Concept Workshop Note: establishes a shared understanding of FIMI, defining key concepts, strategies & challenges to enhance Europe’s information resilience.

Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval & may be revised.

Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/

🔍 DE-CON Glossary #11: Discourse Power

Discourse Power is China’s strategy to shape global narratives through media, diplomacy and soft power by using information control to expand influence and protect regime stability.

📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).

🔍 DE-CON Glossary #10: Botnets

Botnets shape narratives by amplifying divisive content, distorting debate, and faking consensus. In the information space, reach equals power. Combating them is vital to defending against FIMI.

📌 Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).

How can the EU maximize cooperation with Taiwan?

A recent EU study, co-authored by our partner Aurelio Insisa (IAI), explores lessons from the US, a twin-track of diplomacy & deterrence, and ways to counter FIMI via strategic comms & EEAS expertise.

🔗 Read more: lnkd.in/de3JmGkZ

🔍 DE-CON Glossary #9: Information Warfare

Information warfare blends influence ops, disinformation & tech disruption. Russia & China frame it in distinct ways, but both show how it fuels FIMI by shaping perceptions, narratives & data.

📌 Full definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).

With our third edition coming soon, subscribe to the DE-CONSPIRATOR Newsletter! Be the first to receive:

✅ Project updates.
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DE-CON Glossary #8: Cyber Attacks

From Ukraine’s 2015 grid hack to the Viasat breach & DDoS hits on EU elections, cyber attacks keep testing democratic resilience. The EU fights back with sanctions, NIS2 & the Cyber Solidarity Act.

📌 Full definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).

🔍 DE-CON Glossary #7: Interference

Interference seeks to disrupt & destabilize. Often tied to elections, it uses disinfo, cyber-attacks & covert ops - such as the Russian-attributed Doppelgänger campaign & GPS jamming in the Baltics.

📌 Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).

📢 New #Deliverable publicly available! D8.2 – Dissemination & Communication Plan v2.0, led by White Research.

It reviews year-one dissemination & engagement activities, showing strong impact from social media, events & collaborations. Full deliverable available here: bit.ly/45ZAGB4

🔍 DE-CON Glossary #6: Censorship

From selective controls in authoritarian regimes to digital takedowns & limits on sharing info, censorship raises key questions for democracy.

EU guidelines on freedom of expression: bit.ly/4mNz6ck

📌 Full definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).

📢 D3.1 - Methodology Working Paper: presenting a framework to identify & analyse domestic actors that support or amplify FIMI campaigns in Europe. The methodology includes typology, data collection, & network analysis.

Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/

DE-CON Glossary #4: Conspiracy Theories

Beliefs that multiple actors secretly control events. They thrive in uncertain times & offering false clarity. EC guides show why they spread & how to counter them: bit.ly/3J2SV12

📌 Flashcard definition comes from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).

📢 D7.3: "FIMI Policy Brief v1.0: Diverging Policy Approaches to FIMI by Russia and China - a tour d'horizon" by EDAM.

Russia & China use digital disinfo & FIMI to challenge democracies. The EU, US & NATO can respond with media literacy, cooperation & AI tools.

Full deliverable at the link below.

DE-CON Glossary #4: Fake News

Fake news isn’t new: false stories have long fueled fear, division & violence. 83% of Europeans see it as a threat to democracy. History shows why trust in reliable information is vital.

📌 Our flashcard definition comes from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).

How the West lost the war it thought it had won - Coda Story On the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has reason to celebrate. He has scripted a new ending to the Cold War by exploiting the gap between Western democratic ideals a...

Natalia Antelava’s article, “How the West lost the war it thought it had won,” reveals how Russia’s mix of military force and info campaigns exploited Western complacency, reshaping global power. Coordinated action to defend democracy is crucial.

Read more at the link below.