J. Scott Holladay

ATTN ECON JMCs: We are searching for a postdoc through to work with Steve Billings, Ludo Gazze and myself on a project to better understand impacts of lead exposure and potential benefits of remediation using linked administrative data in Colorado. Details here: jobs.colorado.edu/jobs/JobDeta...

That’s fair, but we don’t tackle that in this paper. This region doesn’t move the needle on the solar industry. Uptake of panels isn’t that high and utility scale is small relative to places like California. Plenty of room for follow up work.

We do take into account the falling price of solar panels, but the TVA region is too small to drive the type of learning-by-doing that can reduce panel costs world wide. As panel prices fall, more households from every income group install. Obviously, there is a larger impact on higher income hh's.

The solution isn't obvious. Two-part tariffs or fixed grid access fees could eliminate cost-shifting. But policymakers must grapple with who pays for grid infrastructure in an era of distributed solar. Clean energy transitions require equitable design—this paper shows why.

BUT: the death spiral has a silver lining in most areas. Higher rates incentivize MORE low-income solar adoption. If LMI adoption were 6.3pp higher, the cost shifts would reverse & lower LMI bills. The question: Can we make solar accessible to those who need it most?

We use agent-based modeling + choice experiments (2,307 TVA customers) to simulate this "utility death spiral." The result? $7.8M in additional annual electricity bills ($9.86/customer) for low-income non-adopters by 2051. That's equity destruction disguised as clean energy.

Here's the problem: utilities recover fixed grid costs through per-unit electricity rates. When wealthy customers install solar & reduce their consumption, utilities spread those fixed costs across fewer customers—disproportionately burdening low-income households who can't afford solar.

New paper in PNAS NEXUS: When high-income households go solar, who pays the price? We show high-income solar adoption raises electricity bills for low-income households by ~10% in the Tennessee Valley, a region with some of the highest poverty rates in the US.
academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/ar...

The Federal Trade Commission is hiring PhD Economists (very late, because shutdown)!

Please repost/quote so JMCs can see.

- no experience: www.usajobs.gov/job/851497400
- some experience: www.usajobs.gov/job/851497300
- much experience: www.usajobs.gov/job/851496000

#Economics #EconSky

🚨 Postdoctoral opportunities! 🚨

Hello #econsky! We are hiring 2 postdocs in the department of economics at UCalgary for those working in *electricity economics*

Term: 2 years
Pay: $80,000/yr + benefits + $10k research allowance
Start: July 2026

Details in next two posts 👇

Patronage and pollution abatement Recent research suggests that personalized, reciprocal ties within political hierarchies, often described as patronage connections or patron-client ne…

Find the full paper here. www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...

We show reciprocity: Connected city leaders who achieve stronger emissions reductions receive more promotions & fiscal transfers—but only in high-target provinces. Suggests patronage ties sustain cooperation through mutual benefit recognition.

Firms in connected cities reduce SO2 emissions ~10% more than those in unconnected cities post-2006. Effect concentrates in private/foreign firms in Eastern China & increases with provincial abatement targets. Reductions driven by lower emissions intensity, not firm exit.

We use 245k firm-year observations from China's environmental database (covers ~85% of pollution), linked to official biographies & administrative data on 325 cities. We also validate using satellite SO2 concentrations and real-time monitored firms.

We study China's 11th 5 year plan (2006-2011), which assigned SO2 targets to provinces but not cities. We measure patronage using past promotions. Using relative tenure as an IV, we identify causal effects by exploiting frequent leader reshuffles & variation in provincial abatement targets.

New paper joint with Yin Chu and Xian-Liang Tian in this month's Journal of Public Economics. When provincial leaders leverage informal patron-client ties, do subordinate local officials deliver on secondary policy goals like pollution control? 🧵