NEP-GTH: Game Theory

Sharpening Shapley Allocation: from Basel 2.5 to FRTB: Marco Scaringi; Marco Bianchetti

When Environmental Protections Backfire at Home and Abroad

Clerks: Daniel Fershtman; Kfir Eliaz; Alexander Frug

Allocating Communication Time in Electoral Competition: Alexandre Arnout; Gaëtan Fournier

Unlocking Collective Action: The Role of Communication and Peer Effects on Performance in Threshold Public Good Games - Results from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Vietnam

Private From Whom? Minimal Information Leakage in Auctions: Eric Gao; Eric Tang

Peace Talk and Conflict Traps: Andrei Gyarmathy; Georgy Lukyanov

A Note on Tanneries in Kanpur, Water Pollution in the Ganges, Taxation, and Tax Shifting

Reactive Marketing and the Co-Production of (In)Authenticity: Preyas S. Desai; Jessie Liu

Collusion-proof Auction Design using Side Information: Sukanya Kudva; Anil Aswani

Fair cost sharing for infrastructure development: A cooperative game-theoretic approach

Mean Field Analysis of Mutual Insurance Market: Bohan Li; Wenyuan Li; Kenneth Tsz Hin Ng; Sheung Chi Phillip Yam

Bayesian Persuasion without Commitment: Itai Arieli; Colin Stewart

Non-symmetric discrete Colonel Blotto game

Public Goods Games in Directed Networks with Constraints on Sharing: Argyrios Deligkas; Gregory Gutin; Mark Jones; Philip R. Neary; Anders Yeo

Recommendation Power and Competition: Martin Peitz; Anton Sobolev

Classification in Equilibrium: Structure of Optimal Decision Rules: Elizabeth Maggie Penn; John W. Patty

Reputational Bargaining with an Omniscient Type

Cognitive Biases and the Evolutionary Origins of Zero-Sum Norms: Isaak Mengesha; Meiqi Sun; Debraj Roy

Intergroup cooperation and reputation for honesty in an OLG framework: Li, David; Lukyanov, Georgy

Linguistic Indirectness in Public Cheap-Talk Games: Liping Tang; Michiko Ogaku

The Coarse Nash Bargaining Solutions: Satoshu Nakada; Kensei Nakamura

A general definition of perfect equilibrium: J\'anos Flesch; Christopher Kops; Dries Vermeulen; Anna Zseleva

Mutual Reputation and Trust in a Repeated Sender–Receiver Game

Nash Equilibria for Dividend Distribution with Competition: Tiziano de Angelis; Fabien Gensbittel; Stéphane Villeneuve

Comparison of Oracles: Part II: David Lagziel; Ehud Lehrer; Tao Wang

Anonymous voting in a heterogeneous society: Konan Hara; Yuki Ito; Paul S. Koh

Evolving Rules: Imitation and Best Response Learning in Cournot Oligopoly: Xiaomeng Ding; Simon Weidenholzer; Boyu Zhang

Simultaneous Bidding in Sealed-bid Auctions

Collusive Behaviour, Efficiency and Cheap Talk Negotiation in Repeated Games: Okada, A.; Sabourian, H.