Mikhail Komin

3/ As I told The Economist, during last 2-3 years “all sources of power are war-related". In today’s Russia, political survival depends on how visibly you serve the war effort. Every ambition must wear or at least pretends to wear the camouflage.

2/ Figures like Anna Tsivilyova (Putin’s alleged cousin), media tycoon Konstantin Malofeev, and war veteran Artyom Zhoga now rise fast — symbols of a “wartime elite” built on loyalty, faith and combat experience. Old elite groups must find, how they can be usiful for Putin's war.

1/ The Kremlin’s hierarchy is shifting.
The new "The Economist" story with my small contibutions explains how the war in Ukraine has elevated a new class — ultra-conservatives, relatives, and "svp" veterans — while sidelining old groups and technocrats in particular
www.economist.com/1843/2025/1...

10/ The Kremlin’s plan is simple: summon these reservists for two-month “special training,” then deploy them to Ukraine — avoiding a politically risk. This legal tweak doesn’t just expand Russia’s capacity to fight — it expands its ability to pretend it hasn’t mobilized again.

9/ The known BARS battalions together count 25–30,000 fighters. Reports from regions between 2019–2021 mention 400–1,000 reservists each — a few dozen thousand nationwide. Even if we add everyone formally signed into the reserve, the real total is unlikely above 100,000 people.

«Чтобы там были все»: зачем власти хотят призывать резервистов на спецсборы Законопроект Минобороны, который устанавливает условия привлечения резервистов к выполнению задач в мирное время, нацелен на расширение "спектра применения этой категории личного состава". Об этом заявил RTVI глава комитета Госдумы по обороне Андрей Картаполов.

8/ Officially, the State Duma now cites 2 million reservists. But this number is fiction. rtvi.com/news/chtoby...

7/ After 2022, the Defense Ministry used BARS as a legal framework for volunteer recruitment outside Wagner. By 2023, BARS was largely replaced by regional volunteer battalions. Some elite Russians joined “showcase” units of БАРС, like "Каскад" to get the svo participant status.

«Армия на полставки». Кто управляет российскими нерегулярными формированиями, воюющими в Украине? Исследование Би-би-си - BBC News Русская служба Би-би-си рассказывает о том, как устроены система резервистов БАРС и ЧВК «Редут» — два главных рекрутинговых проекта Минобороны России, через которые на фронт отправляют ветеранов войны в Донбассе, казаков, ультраправых, депутатов, футбольных фанатов, экс-заключенных и простых россиян.

6/ By 2021, a new component in this system appeared — the Combat Army Reserve of the Country (БАРС) and some BARS units have fought in Ukraine already for years
www.bbc.com/russian/new...

5/ They keep civilian jobs but must report for duty in wartime (under Matila Law, not svo), receiving small monthly payments — 12–46,000 rubles (150-500 USD) depending on region. This system of these "reservists" was formalized in 2015, but the recruitment process was slow.

4/ The second category is so calle the "mobilization human reserve" — citizens who sign contracts with the Defense Ministry to stay on standby.
www.consultant.ru/document/co...

3/ "Resource group" was the pool used for the 2022 mobilization — at least on paper. In practice, draft notices were handed out at random, as the registry data was chaotic. The new “database” of all draft-eligible Russians was meant to fix this, but implementation remains patchy.

2/ The Ru MoD claims that Russia has “two groups of the reservists.” In fact, it’s closer to two and a half.

The first is the so called "mobilization human resource" — everyone who has ever served, trained at a milit. department, or fits minor legal criteria. Around 25 mil ppl.

В правительстве одобрили идею Минобороны о спецсборах для резервистов Правительственная комиссия по законопроектной деятельности поддержала идею Минобороны разрешить использовать резервистов в мирное время. Они смогут решать задачи за пределами России, отметил генерал

1/ Russia is quietly preparing a new way to send more men to war — without announcing another mobilization.
A new, announced today amendment allows special reservists to be mobilized without Martial law and been sent to fight abroad
www.rbc.ru/politics/13...

Отели запутались в мантии Прокуроры добиваются конфискации миллиардных активов у председателя Совета судей России

4/ Krasnov hasn’t hidden his frustration. His rush of lawsuits looks like an attempt to cement his legacy before the door closes. And as a consolation, Putin handed him a broad mandate to shake up Russia’s judiciary — beyond just targeting Viktor Momotov. www.kommersant.ru/doc/8060222

3/ But this success upset Putin’s balance of power. The Kremlin doesn’t want one security agency growing too influential. So Krasnov was moved to the Supreme Court —and replaced with the low-profile Alexander Gutsan, expected to restore the office’s modest role as it was under Yurii Chaika

2/ In 5 years as Prosecutor General, Krasnov turned a one of the weakest siloviki institution into a power player — thanks to sweeping new powers to seize assets after 2022. Over 500 companies lost property worth nearly 4 trillion rubles.

Изъятия на посошок. Как замена генпрокурора перебалансировала силовой блок Похоже, президент в последний момент решил не вознаграждать за эффективность принесшего бюджету триллионы рублей Краснова, а предпочел умерить его пыл и обезопасить систему от слишком вознесшегося молодого волка с товарищами в ФСБ.

1/ If you’re puzzled by the recent flurry of asset seizures from Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office — and why Igor Krasnov, on his way to a “promotion,” kept signing new expropriation suits — I unpack it in the recently published commentary for Carnegie carnegieendowment.org/russia-eura...

9/ By moving against Zapesotsky now, Krasnov signals that even long-time loyalists are not immune. Putin periodically rebalances his power system, curbing figures who have grown too entrenched — even those with personal loyalty stretching back decades.

Самый «воспитательный» вуз Рассказываем про Университет профсоюзов в Петербурге, где студенты вынуждены жить по книге ректора «Что такое хорошо и что такое плохо» В начале апреля студентке Санкт-Петербургского гуманитарного университета профсоюзов объявили выговор за пирсинг и поставили ее «на особый контроль». Но запрещено там не только это — в вузе нельзя ходить в кроссовках, пить воду на парах и опаздывать — даже на 30 секунд.

8/ Meanwhile, SPbGUP gained notoriety for scandals, harassment, and a personality cult. Yet in 2024 Putin still awarded Zapesotsky another medal www.groza.media/posts/samyy...

Не сотвори себя кумиром Подробнее на сайте

7/ Zapesotsky nurtured his image as close to Putin, publishing tributes like this 2013 ode portraying him as Sobchak’s true administrator: “When the mayor was absent, Putin ran the city… even when he was present, Putin often held the reins.
www.kommersant.ru/doc/2299344

Александр Запесоцкий: ученый, педагог, ректор 14 апреля день рождения отмечает бессменный руководитель одного из передовых университетов страны – СПбГУП - Александр Запесоцкий

6/ Sobchak lost that election, but the networks endured. Many in his team followed Putin to Moscow and advanced in politics. Zapesotsky stayed in St. Petersburg — yet maintained ties with Putin, who visited SPbGUP in 2008
www.kp.ru/daily/27489...

4/ By the 1996 election, Zapesotsky was effectively Sobchak’s field operator: mobilizing union branches and young voters. Formally just a “trusted representative,” in practice he acted as a political technologist shaping the campaign’s ground game.

3/ In the 1990s he was part of Anatoly Sobchak’s team. Though never holding an official post, he built Sobchak’s grassroots network through trade unions — and positioned himself as an expert on youth culture (even defending a dissertation on discos in 1986 www.gup.ru/uni/rektor/...

Военное поглощение. За три года прокуроры изъяли 411 компаний с активами в 2,6 трлн рублей — в разы больше, чем передали олигархам на залоговых аукционах. Исследование «Новой-Европа» и эксперта Ильи Шуманова — Новая газета Европа Изъятие бизнеса в пользу государства стало одним из главных трендов в российской экономике после начала полномасштабного вторжения в Украину. «Новая-Европа» совместно с антикоррупционным экспертом Ильей Шумановым изучила 100 исков о национализации, поданных прокурорами с начала 2022 года. Мы выяснили, что за это время государство изъяло активов почти на 2,56 триллиона рублей — это более 2% ВВП России за 2024 год.

2/ The money is minor (≈4.5 bn rubles, vs. Domodedovo airport: novayagazeta.eu/articles/20...
). But the choice of target matters: Zapesotsky is deeply rooted in the St. Petersburg elite and long loyal to Putin.

Прокуроры занялись профсоюзным обучением Генпрокуратура требует вернуть государству имущество гуманитарного университета

1/ Russia’s Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov, before moving to the Supreme Court, launched a new asset seizure — this time against SPbGUP, the fiefdom of Alexander Zapesotsky.
🔗 www.kommersant.ru/doc/8058267

3/ Even more fragile is Russia’s icebreaker program. The Kremlin dreams of building a super-icebreaker with a nuclear power unit. But deadlines now stretch to 2030 — and the odds of it ever sailing are close to zero.

2/ Sanctions rarely match early Western expectations, but in the Arctic they sting. Projects like Arctic LNG-2 were forced to pause production after 2024 sanctions on LNG carriers. Timelines keep slipping.

Битва за Арктику. Как Россия начала отставать в производстве ледоколов - BBC News Русская служба В России за последние три года сдали в эксплуатацию всего один атомный ледокол, хотя до начала полномасштабной войны с Украиной сдавали по судну в год. Российский ледокольный флот стремительно устаревает. Планы Кремля по покорению Арктики буксуют на фоне санкций и сложностей с поставками запчастей.

1/ New @bbcrussian piece with my comments on Russia’s icebreaker fleet and why sanctions hit especially hard in the Arctic.
🔗 www.bbc.com/russian/art...

From battlefield to ballot box: Why Russia is drafting war veterans into politics The rising prominence of veterans of the war in Ukraine will widen Russia’s elite coalition pushing for continued confrontation with the West…

Continued my annual tradition of writing for @ecfr.eu on Russia’s local elections. The Kremlin uses these votes to test what may happen in the real campaigns
In 2025 we saw the growing role of war veterans—now entering regional parliaments and expected to fill the Duma in 2026
ecfr.eu/article/fro...

From battlefield to ballot box: Why Russia is drafting war veterans into politics The rising prominence of veterans of the war in Ukraine will widen Russia’s elite coalition pushing for continued confrontation with the West…

The rising prominence of veterans of the war in Ukraine will widen Russia’s elite coalition pushing for continued confrontation with the West, writes Mikhail Komin @ecfrpower.bsky.social
https://bit.ly/41ZOv1o