Rafael Loss

Welches Dach über Europa? Bodengebundene Luftverteidigung nach der Zeitenwende Russlands Einsatz von Raketen und Marschflugkörpern gegen die Ukraine zeigt, dass Europas Flug- und Raketenabwehr umfassend gestärkt werden muss. Wie das gelingen kann, und was es mit der von Deutschl...

PSA: mein @baks.bund.de Arbeitspapier zur bodengebundenen Luftverteidigung nach der Zeitenwende liefert Einordnungen zu Grundlagen und Funktionen, die auch mit Blick auf #EpicFury relevant sind:

www.baks.bund.de/de/arbeitspa...

Some quick thoughts on Macron‘s speech and the announcement of deploying parts of the French Strategic Air Force an allied territory. 👇

Suspicious minds: Why Europeans are considering their post-America nuclear options – European Council on Foreign Relations With America’s credibility eroding, Europeans are looking for alternatives to US extended nuclear deterrence. Leaders should find confidence in electorate suppo

This is very much in line with my call to evolve the French and UK nuclear postures in their hardware and software as the core of a future European strategic deterrent—amidst structural changes in US defence strategy and Trump-specific hits to US credibility:

ecfr.eu/article/susp...

Macron and German Chancellor Merz also unveiled their plans today to deepen cooperation on deterrence, including through "consultations regarding the appropriate mix of conventional, missile defence and French nuclear capabilities" and German participation in French nuclear exercises.

Who's next?

Déplacement sur la base opérationnelle de l’Ile Longue. Le Président de la République s'est rendu sur la base opérationnelle de l’Ile Longue le lundi 2 mars 2026.

French president Macron delivered his highly anticipated address on nuclear deterrence today. What he outlined concretises and operationalises the "European dimension" of French deterrence:

... une nouvelle étape de la dissuasion française : la « dissuasion avancée » www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-mac...

In the spirit of their close partnership as set out in Article 4 of the Treaty of Aachen, France and Germany have decided to enter into closer cooperation in the field of deterrence in response to the evolving threat landscape. France and Germany have established a high-ranking nuclear steering group that will act as a bilateral framework for doctrinal dialogue and the coordination of strategic cooperation, including consultations regarding the appropriate mix of conventional, missile defence and French nuclear capabilities. France and Germany have agreed to take first concrete steps beginning this year, including German conventional participation in French nuclear exercises and joint visits to strategic sites as well as development of conventional capabilities with European partners. France and Germany will also increase their ability, as Europeans, to manage escalation beneath the nuclear threshold – in particular in the fields of Early Warning and Air Defense and Deep Precision Strike.

This Franco-German cooperation is based on the shared understanding that the nuclear dimension of deterrence remains a cornerstone of European security, relying on US extended deterrence, including US nuclear weapons forward-deployed to Europe, and on the independent strategic nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom, which have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. This Franco-German cooperation will add to, not substitute for, NATO’s nuclear deterrence and NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, to which Germany contributes and will continue to contribute. France and Germany will continue to comply with their obligations under international law including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In light of their strong commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and Art. 42 (7) of the Treaty on European Union, Franco-German cooperation aims at strengthening the systems of collective security both countries belong to. It aims at enhancing Europe’s security as a whole. Special attention will be given to coordination with the United States, the United Kingdom, other Allies and NATO.

Joint declaration of President Macron and Chancellor Merz on closer Franco-German cooperation in the field of deterrence in response to the evolving threat landscape of 2 March 2026

www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/such...

Any French forward nuclear deployments would be temporary. France will set up consultative mechanisms with European allies similar to the existing UK-France Nuclear Steering Group.

Effort complemented by enhanced early warning, conventional strike and air-defense capabilities.

To sum up the gist of Macron's nuclear speech: he is offering to forward-deploy the air leg of French nuclear forces to the territory of European allies. Decision-making will remain with the French president, and the arrangement will exist outside of NATO.

He call this "forward deterrence."

Franco-German Cooperation on Nuclear Deterrence Needs to Start Now The nuclear question is the key one for European defense integration. The good news is that the Europeans seem ready to tackle it.

And for a bilateral Franco-German angle, see @shahinvallee.bsky.social, @josephdeweck.bsky.social, Elias Ricken, and Jacob Ross for @ipq.bsky.social:

Franco-German Cooperation on Nuclear Deterrence Needs to Start Now ip-quarterly.com/en/franco-ge...

With America’s credibility eroding, Europeans are looking for alternatives to US extended nuclear deterrence.

In this context, French president Emmanuel Macron’s address on nuclear deterrence, which is due to take place on Monday, is sure to draw particular scrutiny.

My latest for @ecfr.eu 👇

New Reuters: Russia "fired the 9M729 at Ukraine twice in 2022 and 23 times between August and October last year,

… fired at least four more of the missiles at Ukraine on February 17 [2026], …

There have been other uses since October too".

www.reuters.com/business/aer...

Suspicious minds: Why Europeans are considering their post-America nuclear options – European Council on Foreign Relations With America’s credibility eroding, Europeans are looking for alternatives to US extended nuclear deterrence. Leaders should find confidence in electorate suppo

Suspicious minds: Why Europeans are considering their post-America nuclear options ecfr.eu/article/susp...

The ticking clock: Why NATO’s deterrence against Russia is under pressure – European Council on Foreign Relations Putin has long wanted to extract concessions from NATO. The three factors deterring Russia from an attack—a war in Ukraine, military capacity, and NATO strength

Putin has long wanted to extract concessions from NATO. The three factors deterring Russia from an attack—a war in Ukraine, military capacity, and NATO strength—are under unprecedented strain, write @menkiszakm.bsky.social and @mprochwicz.bsky.social

👉Full text: https://bit.ly/4aRstCO

Them’s the rules, yes.

A German General Prepares His Country for War—and the Clock Is Ticking Could Russia launch a war across Europe? The Germans aren’t waiting to find out.

Nice tribute to Germany's military chief in the @wsj.com. We're lucky to have allies like Germany.

This episode of @markhleonard.bsky.social's World in 30 Minutes podcast features a live recording of a conversation with US undersecretary of war for policy, Elbridge Colby, which took place during the Munich Security Conference 2026.

ecfr.eu/podcasts/epi... @ecfr.eu

Running to Stand Still: Russian Nuclear Modernization after New START John Maynard Keynes once wrote, “The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones,” an apt depiction of the current discourse

"There is a school of thought that assumes an arms race will ensue any time the US does something with its arsenal [...] but changes to US forces are unlikely to engender a major departure from the current path of Russian force modernization."

warontherocks.com/2026/02/runn...

After the rupture: Middle powers and the construction of new order – European Council on Foreign Relations As American leadership wanes, middle powers are stitching a patchwork order through new approaches to conflict mediation, connectivity and development. Although

The liberal, rules-based international order has served Europe well, but clinging to it risks marginalisation.

What to do? Study and engage with the strategies of middle powers 👇

After the rupture: Middle powers and the construction of new order ecfr.eu/publication/... @ecfrpower.bsky.social

Sachstand zur geplanten Stationierung US-amerikanischer weitreichender Waffensysteme in Deutschland

Regierungspressekonferenz vom 11. Februar 2026 www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktu...

"Man [suche] für Litauen Freiwillige für 1.971 Dienstposten, bisher aber hätten sich [...] nur 'rund 10%' der nötigen Freiwilligen gemeldet."

Die Fantasie, unattraktive Teile des Soldaten-Dienstes nicht als Teil des Jobs, sondern als gut vergütetes Zusatz-Engagement zu verkaufen, ist gescheitert.

NATO’s Military Committee confirms www.nato.int/en/news-and-...

“It's also staff mass, specialist depth, C2, secure comms, deployable capability, etc” — for sure!

But that’s less of a UK/Italy-specific problem than a challenge for the whole “European-led NATO” effort — hugely challenging but urgently necessary.

Italian generals have previously led JFC Brunssum and British admirals have been in charge at MARCOM for some time—there are capable officers in both nations’ and other European armed forces.

POLITICO reports that the US is looking to back out of several NATO commands: UK to lead NATO’s Joint Force Command in Norfolk, Va. and Italy to staff JFC Naples. Both are currently led by US officers. (US takes MARCOM instead.) subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2026...

Called for this last Oct 👇

YouTube video by Reuters LIVE: US arms control official delivers disarmament statement in Geneva

At the Conference on Disarmament today, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security (T) Thomas Di Nanno hinted at the expansion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and accused China of conducting a low-yield nuclear test in 2020.

“Russia … may have exceeded the deployed warhead limit … during portions of 2024. Therefore, this constitutes a serious compliance concern.” 2021-2025.state.gov/2024-report-...

You can’t in good faith agree to continue to observe limits which you didn’t observe in the first place.

Good.

The U.S. and Russian Federation agreed to reestablish high level military-to-military dialogue www.eucom.mil/pressrelease...

Germany's Armoured Brigade 45 assumed command of NATO's Multinational Battlegroup Lithuania. The brigade's two other battalions were formally assigned last week; they will arrive in Lithuania by the end of 2027.

For context and outlook, see: ecfr.eu/article/blue... @ecfreuropeansec.bsky.social

Freue mich sehr auf diesen Abend. Die Böll-Stiftung hat mich eingeladen, mein Buch vorzustellen. @annakatrein.bsky.social hat eingewilligt, mit mir dort darüber zu sprechen. Großes Danke an beide! Alle sind sehr herzlich eingeladen. 👇👇👇