Theoretical Economics

Standard dynamic preference models cannot simultaneously satisfy the properties of time consistency, the separation of time and risk preferences and the ability to accommodate an indifference to the timing of when risk is resolved econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

What is the efficient provision of public information in frictional search markets?
I characterize the constrained-efficient market segmentation when agents use it to direct their search econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

The Executive Committee of the Econometric Society has approved an increase in the publication fees for papers in its two Open Access journals, Quantitative Economics and Theoretical Economics. Read more www.econometricsociety.org/society/news...

How does information shape monopoly outcomes under interdependent values? We characterize payoff sets across three classes of information structures. With no restrictions, buyers can obtain the entire surplus even though the seller chooses a price econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

We extend Bayesian persuasion to dynamic environments with Markovian states. Optimal info disclosure trades off current vs. future discounted payoffs. We discuss optimal strategies and characterize when the asymptotic value hits its upper bound econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

Under which conditions do Bayesian equilibria exist in Bayesian games with general type spaces? The paper shows the existence of a Bayesian equilibrium when information is nested, provided the sets of actions are finite econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

How does one optimally design mechanisms in contexts where evidence is stochastic, possibly because it must first be aquired? econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

A model a non-Bayesian agent who adjusts estimates based on past data but misattributes selection bias as systematic error. This naive calibration leads to pessimistic choices, reinforced by feedback loops. Applied to auctions & project selection econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

Do partners always benefit from a more profitable partnership? Not necessarily. This paper shows that higher profitability can prompt strategic exits by partners, leaving all partners strictly worse off econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

Theoretical Economics Volume 20, Issue 3 (July 2025) is now online econtheory.org

How do sequential information choices affect the extent of coordination failure? We show that in the context of global games, the likelihood of coordination failure is invariant to precision, cost, and availability of information econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

Florian Brandl (University of Bonn), Eduardo Dávila (Yale University), Tommaso Denti (NYU), Kevin He (University of Pennsylvania), Nicolas Sebastien Lambert (USC), Annie Liang (Northwestern University), Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn (UCLA), & Colin Stewart (University of Toronto) 2/2

TE is fortunate to have thoughtful and committed Associate Editors who are essential for the smooth running of the journal. We are pleased to announce the following people joined our team starting July 1st 2025 1/2

We are thrilled to have Pablo Kurlat (University of Southern California) join the editorial board as Co-editor, starting July 1st, 2025. He will be handling papers in a wide range of topics, including dynamic general equilibrium theory, and monetary economics.

We are thrilled to have Mira Frick (Princeton University) join the editorial board as Co-editor, starting July 1st, 2025. She will be handling papers in a wide range of
topics, including decision theory, game theory, and the theory of learning.

On June 30, 2025 Todd Sarver and Pierre-Olivier Weill stepped down as Co-editors. We are very grateful to them for their contributions. The journal has greatly benefited from their expertise, thoughtfulness, and efficient handling of papers

We are thrilled to have Federico Echenique (University of California, Berkeley) join the editorial board as Editor, starting July 1st, 2025. He will be handling papers in a wide range of topics, including matching, mechanism design, and decision theory.

On June 30, 2025 Simon Board stepped down as Editor. We are very grateful to him for his contribution. The journal has greatly benefited from his hard work and thoughtful editorial decisions.

Choice or competition? We show that every "good" matching mechanism fails the monotonicity requirement that no individuals be hurt by integration econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

Can participants detect an authority straying from its announced rules? Transparency trades off with strategy-proofness, stability, and efficiency. Yet the paper finds partial guarantees: stability can be enforced, while efficiency usually cannot econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

Can time inconsistency lead to chaotic equilibria or complex cycles? I explore this question using a simple model of dynamic policymaking. #TimeInconsistency #ChaosTheory #EconTheory econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

How best to incentivise prompt disclosure? We formalise this question and show that the answer has a deadline structure. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

Theoretical Economics Volume 20, Issue 2 (May 2025) is now online econtheory.org

Search-and-matching models often assume a steady state. We prove that a non-stationary equilibrium exists, with search pool populations evolving. A key tool: we generalize Schauder’s fixed-point theorem to address discontinuous value functions econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

TE congratulates founding member and first Editor Martin Osborne for being awarded the 2025 Sonnenschein Service Prize in recognition of outstanding service to the profession and the Society in the tradition of Hugo Sonnenschein. Read more here www.econometricsociety.org/prizes/sonne...

In markets with budget-constrained buyers and divisible goods, competitive equilibria aren’t always utilitarian efficient—but they are constrained utilitarian efficient, and revenue-optimal for linear values and zero-cost sellers econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

In verifiable communication the receiver is skeptical: he partially attributes incomplete disclosures to the sender concealing unfavorable evidence. This paper characterizes more skeptical receivers as those that believe the sender has more evidence econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

A principal interacts with two agents vying for project selection. How to adapt to new information while still fostering cooperation? The optimal selection rule has two phases: First compete, then collaborate econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

We develop an ex-post approach to sufficientarianism and prioritarianism based on prospect independence for the unconcerned. Our paper provides axiomatic characterizations econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...

Keeping players in the dark about past outcomes opens new contractual possibilities in repeated agency problems and games. But can it accelerate convergence to efficiency when players are patient? This paper shows that it cannot econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...