GrapheneOS

There aren't currently any non-Pixel devices meeting our hardware requirements (grapheneos.org/faq#future-d...). We're actively working with a major OEM towards their future devices meeting our requirements and providing official GrapheneOS support. No more current devices will be supported.

The post you replied to is now here: bsky.app/profile/grap.... We had to remove it in order to fix a mistake we made in typing one of the previous posts since Bluesky didn't have edits. Decided it made sense to fix since it was the 3rd post from the end with the issue and none of those had reposts.

Many CalyxOS users have been exposed to a lot of inaccurate information about GrapheneOS and fabricated stories about our team. Our team is heavily targeted with harassment. We're open to forgiving and unbanning people who participated in this in the past if they're going to stop and do better.

For CalyxOS users considering moving to GrapheneOS, you should know it's not only much more private and secure but also has broader app compatibility and is very easy to install. eylenburg.github.io/android_comp... is a high quality third party comparison. You'll likely be more than happy with it.

www.sec.gov/Archives/edg... is the SEC filing for shares issued in February 2024 by a for-profit telecommunications company founded in 2019. The owners of the company are Nicolas Merrill, Louis Rossmann and Steve Gelmis. This raises a lot of questions, as does other publicly available information.

Primarily people who have been banned from our chat rooms or blocked on these social media platforms for participating in harassment towards our team based on fabrications. We're offering to let people come back who were misled into participating in it if they can accept it was wrong and stop.

CalyxOS was never a hardened OS. It was always more of a security downgrade than an upgrade. GrapheneOS doesn't support current non-Pixel devices due to none existing with a reasonable level of security combined with proper support for another OS. It will support non-Pixel devices in the future.

Calyx should publish information on why Nicolas Merrill was previously demoted and what's happening with the signing keys and other infrastructure he controls. CalyxOS users deserve to know whether he's refusing to hand over keys, domains, IPs, ASN, etc. and if Calyx considers the keys compromised.

CalyxOS never incorporated privacy or security features comparable to GrapheneOS. It was always a non-hardened OS far more similar to LineageOS and /e/. Despite being in a different space, Nick and Chirayu worked hard to undermine the continuation of our open source project alongside Copperhead.

Chirayu Desai was a full time employee of Copperhead. The CEO intended for him to be lead developer of a new closed source OS forked from our project. Nicolas Merrill was in active contact with Copperhead and wanted an OS made for Calyx. When the takeover failed, he hired Chiyaru to make CalyxOS.

GrapheneOS was founded as an open source project in 2014. In 2018, there was a takeover attempt on the project by Copperhead which was a for-profit company founded in late 2015. Copperhead was meant to be sponsoring the project and making it sustainable. Both Nick and Chirayu were involved in this.

CalyxOS has never been in the same space as GrapheneOS due to not being a hardened OS providing major privacy and security enhancements. Recommend looking at the high quality third party comparison at eylenburg.github.io/android_comp.... It doesn't have comparable privacy or security features.

Verified boot signing keys can't be rotated. Their plan to change all of the signing keys will require reinstalling the OS to continue receiving updates. Nicolas Merrill was the sole person with access to CalyxOS signing keys. Either he isn't handing over the signing keys or they don't trust him.

Android has quarterly major releases. Android 16 QPR1 is coming in September and changes more overall than Android 16. Providing full AOSP patches requires the latest release since only High/Critical severity AOSP patches are backported. It's also needed for the Pixel driver and firmware updates.

CalyxOS is stuck on the 2025-06-01 patch level. The missing patches include 2 remotely exploitable Exynos cellular radio vulnerabilities fixed for Pixels in June along with many High severity issues for other components. There are a huge number of AOSP patches scheduled for disclosure in September.

CalyxOS posted an announcement about the departure of both the founder of the organization (Nicolas Merrill) and lead developer of CalyxOS (Chirayu Desai):

calyxos.org/news/2025/08...

According to their post, it will likely be around 4 to 6 months before they resume updates with new signing keys.

Forum discussion thread:

discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24772-grap...

Release 85 · GrapheneOS/Camera Notable changes in version 85: downgrade CameraX library back to 1.5.0-beta01 from 1.5.0-beta02 due to a regression breaking the video recording mode in some cases A full list of changes from the...

GrapheneOS Camera app version 85 released:

github.com/GrapheneOS/C...

See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.

#GrapheneOS #privacy #security #camera #android

Forum discussion thread:

discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24769-grap...

GrapheneOS Camera app version 84 released:

github.com/GrapheneOS/C...

See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.

#GrapheneOS #privacy #security #camera #android

Banking Applications Compatibility with GrapheneOS Maintained Compatibility List for International Banking Apps This list includes banking apps that have been tested, submitted, reviewed, and verified as compatible. LIST | SUBMIT | UPDATE | POSSIBLE W...

Most banking apps work on GrapheneOS. A subset of banking apps ban using any non-Google-approved device or any non-stock OS. Check privsec.dev/posts/androi....

Use an eSIM to have it stored on the phone's own eSIM secure element. eSIM secure element in the phone is much more secure than most physical SIM secure elements. If you care about the security of your subscription, an eSIM is definitely the way to go. Physical is nice for switching phones though.

Release 6 · GrapheneOS/Info Notable changes in version 6: support some relative URLs in changelogs remove cryptocurrency fee recommendations to match current donation page rename Release Notes to Releases where applicable en...

GrapheneOS Info app version 6 released:

github.com/GrapheneOS/I...

See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.

Forum discussion thread:

discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24741-grap...

#GrapheneOS #privacy #security

That will likely be available in GrapheneOS when we move to Android 16 QPR1 in September. We're preparing for that already but we aren't sure how hard the migration is going to be yet.

GrapheneOS releases Official releases of GrapheneOS, a security and privacy focused mobile OS with Android app compatibility.

GrapheneOS version 2025080600 released:

grapheneos.org/releases#202...

See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.

Forum discussion thread:

discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24736-grap...

#GrapheneOS #privacy #security

Privacy invasive code isn't related to compatibility with Google services. Our privacy features including the improved app sandbox and permission model apply to every user installed apps. Sandboxed Google Play run in the same app sandbox as other user installed apps which is the point of the design.

They were the main ones to spread it and turn it into a massive fake news cycle. These cycles happen multiple times a month about Android related topics. We regularly debunk ones relevant to GrapheneOS which we get asked about but a tiny number of people see our response compared to the fake stuff.

Important to note that GrapheneOS does not come with sandboxed Google Play but rather users can choose to install those as regular sandboxed apps. They run in the standard app sandbox with our significant improvements to the app sandbox and permission model applying as much to those as other apps.

It does not cover all the ways /e/OS reduces privacy and security beyond patch delays and breaking standard Android security protections including verified boot. The sources we provided above do a better job of covering that, particularly the ones from the security researcher who created DivestOS.

eylenburg.github.io/android_comp... is a high quality third party comparison between alternate mobile operating systems. The comparison has a privacy and security focus. It covers differences in privacy/security protections and patch delays. Also covers how standard Android services are handled.