matheus valente

Someone born blind and deaf suddenly regains vision and hearing at the same time. The doctors ensure that one’s first experiences are of a red patch presented simultaneously to a stable-pitch tone. Can you immediately distinguish the colour from the sound? Can you tell which is which? #philsky

Philosophy is the only x such that 'What is x?' is a meaningful central question within x. A form of inquiry whose rules beg to be twisted around themselves in a way that normally would be self-defeating or at least paralysing, but instead, in this case, leads to the deepest of enterprises. #philsky

Generally speaking, I certainly don't care for LLM chatbots in anything like the way I care about real people (only exception being that time when I said 'hey claude' to ChatGPT and felt like the sleaziest kind of cheater).

Catchiest summary of my research project, casually found in the inner cover of The Fall’s 1990 record “Extricate!”.

The Sleeping Beauty problem divided philosophers into many camps, but one promising original theory has never been explored. In this paper, I address that gap by arguing that Beauty ought to have 1/3 confidence that the fair coin will come up Heads before the experiment even starts. #philsky

Dener is to football what Gareth Evans is to analytic philosophy.

A link between the Axiom of Choice, Haecceitism, Singular or De Se Thought, Random Selection, and Arbitrary Reference: all allow for the singling out of particular things even if they'd otherwise be indistinguishable from others. #philsky

What's for dinner? For carbs: Rice or Pasta. For protein: Tofu or Beans.

So, P(RT)=P(RB)=P(PT)=P(PB)=1/4.

Chef tells you: "If there's Rice today, then it'll be Rice&Beans cause the Tofu we bought today gets sour mixed w/ Rice. Sorry, no Rice&Tofu today!"

Do you now have P(RB)=1/3 or P(RB)=1/2?

Great to see the first papers out in the Special Issue on themes from the philosophy of José Luis Bermúdez, now live in the journal Theoria.👇👇👇

Co-edited with @mthsvlnt.bsky.social & Valentí Simpson.

All open access. More on the way!

If I apriori know p, then p is evidentially inert for me. So, I cannot use the fact that I exist as evidence for objective hypotheses. But this fact isn't a priori for you: it's relevant contingent information. Thus, you and I might be maximal peers but still differ in what our evidence supports.

YouTube video by ShoutFactoryMusic Devo - Uncontrollable Urge (Live On Fridays)

Your response got my inner radio playing this incessantly: www.youtube.com/watch?v=XTNG...

It is SUPPOSED to, but I think that's an inevitably relevant issue to raise! Do you think it works? Other issues might include: epistemic permissivism, the objectivity of deep disagreements, first-person attitudes and their peculiarities...

The original question: if you and I are in a state of maximal doxastic/belief agreement (and we're ideally rational), could we nonetheless fail to be in a maximal state of non-doxastic/desire agreement? [e.g. I want to have a beer but you "disagree", i.e. you don't want me to drink tonight]

Hey! Suppose I desire a beer (surely that's not actually true!). There's two ways for you to "share my desire". (1) You also desire a beer. (2) You desire that I have a beer. I'm interested in (2) cause it lends itself to a more robust concept of non-doxastic agreement.

If you and I completely agree with each other in all of our beliefs, could we nonetheless differ in our desires? Suppose I'm thirsty but you're not. So, I desire to drink water but you don't desire yourself to drink water. Fine. But my question is: could you not desire *me* to drink water?