Sinem Adar

Also add to this the positive remarks of the TR consul general to Erbil about the positive role played by N.Barzani in the rapprochment between Ankara and Ocalan.

Accordingly, I will approach the photographs of the Barzanis and Abdi appearing in the same frame and the talk about possible Kurdish unity within the broader context of competition among Kurdish political actors for representation.

They want to give it a chance to stand on its feet and develop. We want the same thing, same approach for our forces, for northeast Syria and Rojava.”

www.rudaw.net/english/kurd...

I tend to take Mazloum Abdi's words below as a sign of frustration:

"“A new Syria is being built. The international community and many countries have turned a new page in order to give the new Syria a chance, disregarding many things.

It looks like the visit might indeed happen.

🙏🏻 you are being generous.

The earlier post should read:

I don't think Ankara will release Demirtaş (no matter how unlawful this decision may be)&simultaneously give the green light to the parliamentary commission's visit to İmralı. With his message today, Demirtaş has placed the second at the top of the list of priorities.

It looks like the visit might indeed happen.

The Tipping Point: An Emerging Model of European Security with Ukraine and without Russia This joint study by the SWP and the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM, Paris) starts from the premise that Ukraine’s and Russia’s visions...

My colleague @aydin2025.bsky.social and I also have a chapter about the Turkish perspectives and policy in this highly recommended edited volume on the future of European security:

www.swp-berlin.org/en/publicati...

In case the co-optation (also read: domination) test once again fails to yield the desired outcome (as it did in the case of legal efforts to annul the CHP congress), the indictment provides legal justification for a possible closure.

This earlier assessment about what the tactical retreat could mean turns out to be misleading. The indictment against İmamoğlu concerns not only İmamoğlu but also the CHP. Although I do not hold party closure likely at present, the indictment aims to move the CHP leadership away from İmamoğlu.

With the Imamoglu indictment, political competition ("establishing an organization for the purpose of raising funds to nominate a presidential candidate") is now officially criminizalized.

In case the co-optation (also read: domination) test once again fails to yield the desired outcome (as it did in the case of legal efforts to annul the CHP congress), the indictment provides legal justification for a possible closure.

This earlier assessment about what the tactical retreat could mean turns out to be misleading. The indictment against İmamoğlu concerns not only İmamoğlu but also the CHP. Although I do not hold party closure likely at present, the indictment aims to move the CHP leadership away from İmamoğlu.

he certainly does, what I wondered is who the intended audience is :)

The point has already been made by journalists since Imamoglu's imprisonment in March; however, it is significant that this allegation is included verbatim in the indictment.

With the Imamoglu indictment, political competition ("establishing an organization for the purpose of raising funds to nominate a presidential candidate") is now officially criminizalized.

İmamoğlu indictment does not disappoint, the first paragraph describes his alleged criminal organization as having “the arms of an octopus”

Am I the only one who finds it strange that there was no announcement yesterday (unless I missed it) about Damascus joining the international coalition against ISIS, given that this was how the meeting was initially promoted?

Am I the only one who finds it strange that there was no announcement yesterday (unless I missed it) about Damascus joining the international coalition against ISIS, given that this was how the meeting was initially promoted?

*that, of course.

I would love them.

I find Ankara's eagerness to send troops to Gaza as part of the international stabilization force as bold of a move as its positioning in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings.

I find Ankara's eagerness to send troops to Gaza as part of the international stabilization force as bold of a move as its positioning in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings.

In the immediate aftermath of Assad's fall, Turkey first suggested that Ankara&Damascus should together take the responsibility of anti-ISIS campaign. Later this idea turned into setting up a regional coalition - including TR, SYR, LEB, JOR and Iraq - against ISIS.

What I find most fascinating is that even though the general contours of the envisioned plan were already laid out as early as May this year by journalists in pro-government as well as Kurdish media, it seems to have gained, as of this week, a new status beyond what could possibly be propaganda.

Reuters reported this week that Turkey is getting ready for legal arrangements for the return and integration of PKK fighters. Accordingly, a diversified approach is envisioned, depending on the involvement in crime and the degree of seniority.

www.reuters.com/business/med...

yes, this was also a point that I had made in the FP piece back in July.

also: www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/abd...

(Some earlier discussions about the plan: www.rudaw.net/turkish/midd...

www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/mud...

www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/yah...)