Sinem Adar

Tweet on X by Amir Kiyae reads: Strikes on Iran appear to have hit the home where opposition leaders Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard have been held under house arrest - both are reported safe, but their residence was damaged. Former President Ahmadineiad's home was also targeted. Israel has stated it is targeting Iranian leaders "past, present, and future." This follows previous Israeli strikes on Evin Prison. Draw your own conclusions,

Home of reformist opposition leaders from 2009 Green Movement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard was also hit by Israeli/US strikes. They have been under house arrest by the regime for over a decade.

Some immediate thoughts on possible implications of the current US/Israel-Iran war for Turkey:

1) For Turkey, the security and economic risks of a prolonged war are significant. These include rising energy prices amid ongoing domestic economic fragility, potential declines in tourism revenues,

International Reactions to Military Strikes on Iran: A Tipping Point for the UN Charter? Can the legal cornerstone of the current international order that is designed to maintain peace and security hold following Iran strikes?

The trouble is, the long-term cost of giving up on Art 2(4) of the UN Charter may be even higher."

www.justsecurity.org/132773/us-ir...

And for the European Union, with an aggressive Russia on its doorstep and a defense system that will take many years to wean itself off U.S. dependency, the costs of standing up for the UN Charter at this moment are high.

"In the face of Trump’s wide-ranging threats and actions against any who oppose him (tariffs, territorial seizure, invasion and leadership abduction), it is hardly surprising that States like Canada might pull their punches.

The war on Iran likely brings a new oil price shock and windfall profits.

So, who stands to win?

Our research shows: Last time around (2022), the US reaped the largest fossil fuel profits of any country ($377bn). 50% went to the top 1%, only 1% to the bottom 50%. A🧵

This is a real source of anxiety for the regime in Turkey. It didn't start with Iran but the situation in Iran amplifies it.

Interesting.

One way to think about this, like Ukraine, is that Turkey's main geopolitical asset is its geography--which is also its main geopolitical weakness

Thread 👇🏾👇🏾👇🏾

Excellent and comprehensive thread about the implications for Turkey 👇

👌Very sharp overview of how close the US/Israel-Iran war hits NATO member and thawing EU candidate Turkey. Energy, security, regional leverage - this matters far beyond the region. Curious to see her deeper take on what it means for #TürkiyeEU relations. #EurSky 🇪🇺 #iran

7) Ultimately, the trajectory of Turkey–Israel competition - or accommodation - may become a defining variable not only for the evolving regional order, but also for Turkey’s domestic political trajectory. External geopolitical alignments and internal regime debates are increasingly intertwined. END

He framed Turkey as a key actor in any emerging regional order, linking this vision to a Gaza ceasefire, renewed momentum behind the Abraham Accords (potentially including Syria), and improved Turkish–Israeli relations.

6) Washington appears to understand well the importance of a functional TR–ISR relationship. In an interview with Anadolu Agency, Tom Barrack emphasised the need for deeper U.S.–Turkey strategic coordination in shaping a post-war regional architecture.

The Next Strategic Shift in the Middle East How Iran's weakness is creating Turkey's opportunity

See the piece at the link here: generalyoavgallant.substack.com/p/the-next-s....

Interestingly, Turkey’s foreign minister has recently indicated that Ankara would be open to repairing ties with Israel, provided there is meaningful progress on the Palestinian issue.

Reflecting this concern, former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has publicly argued for reconsidering the strategic logic of the bilateral relationship within a more structured “spheres of influence” framework.

If the Iranian regime were to undergo serious destabilisation, Turkey–Israel competition would likely assume greater regional significance.

At the same time, Turkey and Israel have demonstrated a capacity to manage friction pragmatically, including through deconfliction mechanisms in Syria.

Israel, by contrast, has often preferred fragmented or decentralised neighbouring environments that limit the emergence of hostile centralised power structures. Recent tensions over developments in the Horn of Africa illustrate these diverging approaches.

Despite the similarities in the logic underlying their threat perceptions, the two countries appear to favour different regional orders. Turkey generally supports strong central authorities and political inclusion of Sunni actors in post-conflict settings.

Conversely, Turkey has deepened coordination with Arab and Gulf states - especially Saudi Arabia - while recalibrating its regional posture amid Iran’s relative weakening and the absence of a political resolution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Israeli officials increasingly view Turkey as an unpredictable actor, particularly in light of Ankara’s support for Hamas and political backing of Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated movements.

Although Turkey and Israel enjoyed close defence and intelligence cooperation in the 1990s, mutual trust has eroded significantly since the late 2000s.

5) A second structural inflection point concerns the trajectory of Turkey–Israel relations. A further weakening of Iran could sharpen existing tensions and strategic competition between the two.

While Turkey’s political system differs substantially from Iran’s, the broader regional lesson - how regimes manage elite cohesion and leadership transitions under external pressure - may attract close attention in Ankara.

Under the existing constitutional framework, he cannot seek another term unless there is an early election called by parliament or constitutional revision. Discussions about succession, once largely taboo, have become more visible in political discourse.

Speculation about Iran’s leadership future - particularly in scenarios involving leadership decapitation or regime destabilization - naturally resonates beyond Iran. In Turkey, President Erdoğan’s current term is set to end in 2028.

4) The current war increases pressure on Ankara in two structural ways. First, it inevitably raises questions about regime durability and political succession across the region.

For Turkey, the ‘New’ Middle East Is Cause for Concern Israel’s war with Iran signaled the latest shift toward a new regional order that Turkey finds undesirable. Ankara is responding accordingly.

(I discussed these dynamics in more detail here👇 )

www.worldpoliticsreview.com/turkey-middl...