More great news! Simon Finster joined us as Assistant Professor of Economics this semester 🎉
His research focuses on Economic Theory and applications to:
- Auctions
- Market Design
- Energy Economics
- IO
Simons's website: www.simonfinster.com
Danke. Bis Jahresende lässt sich die Liberalisierung allerdings nicht ändern. Zumal sie mit EU-Richtlinien verbunden ist.
26.09.2025 06:41 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0Können Sie bitte erläutern, wie das gemeint ist?
22.09.2025 17:17 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0
I have leftover funding for a PhD student for one year (ideally Sept '25 - Sept '26). Might be a good fit for someone wanting to delay going on the market. Please send interested students my way!
18.08.2025 10:12 — 👍 13 🔁 14 💬 0 📌 1
@franzsinabell.bsky.social und ich haben ein Kommentar über dynamische Netzentgelte im @derstandard.at geschrieben www.derstandard.at/story/300000...
31.07.2025 16:08 — 👍 1 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
📝 Apply via JKU system:
🔗 karriere.jku.at/hcm/jobexcha...
💬 Feel free to DM me or email if you have questions!
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🧠 Requirements:
• Master's degree in economics or related field
• Strong theory background
• Very good English (C1)
• Programming in Python/R a plus
• German not required
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📌 Topics:
• Microeconomic theory
• Market design
• Game theory
• (Optional) Experimental econ or structural econometrics
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👨🏫 Work with me on the DFG-funded project:
“Strategic Uncertainty in Market Design”
You'll also have time for your own research, with the option to enroll in our structured PhD program.
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🚨 Job Opening: Join us at Johannes Kepler University Linz! I'm hiring a Pre-Doc / PhD-track Research Assistant in microeconomic theory with a focus on market design & game theory.
Perfect for those considering a PhD or looking for a 1–2 year RA position.
👇
The Hausdorff Center at Bonn will host the Trimester Program on “Advances in Mechanism Design” next summer. Students and postdocs are invited to apply for extended stays during the program or summer school participation. Funding for travel and accommodation is available.
26.05.2025 15:35 — 👍 11 🔁 5 💬 1 📌 0Be a theorist. At worst, your theorem is wrong and everyone thinks you're a moron... Still better than everyone discovering you're a fraudster and a cheat.
17.05.2025 17:05 — 👍 6 🔁 2 💬 0 📌 0
80 Jahre.
05.05.2025 08:10 — 👍 166 🔁 42 💬 0 📌 3We're hiring! The Econ Department in Linz is looking for a full professor in Labor Economics. Feel free to reach out if you have any questions about the position or our department! @jku-economics.bsky.social
08.05.2025 09:29 — 👍 1 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0Excited to join JKU Linz and WIFO Vienna as a Professor of Energy and Environmental Economics! Looking forward to connecting with colleagues and sharing new ideas. @jku.at @jku-economics.bsky.social @wifo.bsky.social
07.05.2025 20:30 — 👍 7 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 0
Exciting news! As of May 1st, @b-kasberger.bsky.social has joined our department!
Bernhard is Professor of Energy & Environmental Economics at JKU and WIFO. His work dives into:
⚡ Market & auction design
🌿 Energy + environmental econ
🏭 Industrial org
🎲 Game theory
Website: kasberger.github.io
Thanks, Alex 😊
23.04.2025 08:07 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
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🧠 Conclusion: A new model of behavior in multi-unit auctions under strategic uncertainty. Our paper expands the toolkit for auction theory and contains much more
📄 Read more: doi.org/10.1016/j.je...
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Design implication: Depending on the competitiveness, the auctioneer might want to steer bidders’ information towards the informational extremes of maximal uncertainty or BNE.
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Policy twist:
📈 In competitive markets, BNE outcomes yield higher revenue.
😬 But in low-competition settings, BNE can result in collusive equilibria with zero revenue.
😮 Minimax-loss bidders, unaware of such collusive schemes, don't coordinate — and often generate higher revenue in these cases.
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🧪 Experimental evidence aligns:
– In PAB, BNE says to bid the same on both units, but real bidders often bid less for the second unit.
– In UPA, BNE predicts a zero bid on the second unit, yet subjects consistently bid positive amounts.
✅ These behaviors are what minimax-loss bidding predicts.
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Key result: Even with multi-dimensional private values, optimal bids can be computed efficiently. In pay-as-bid (PAB) auctions, the minimax bid is unique. In uniform-price (UPA) auctions, unique only if bidders are constrained in the number of bid steps (as in many practical auctions).
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Minimax-loss bidders don’t guess opponents' behavior. Instead, they protect against the worst-case regret.
💡 They ask: "What bid minimizes the maximum money I might leave on the table, no matter how others bid?"
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In real-world auctions like electricity markets or Treasury debt sales, bidders often lack common priors and reliable beliefs on rivals' strategies ➡️ The traditional Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) assumptions break down. Enter: prior-free, regret-minimizing bidding.
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🚨 Excited to share a new paper just out in Journal of Economic Theory: "Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions Under Limited Information" by @B_Kasberger & Kyle Woodward.
What happens when bidders in multi-unit auctions don’t know what others might bid? Let's break down our approach 👇 #EconSky
BBVA Foundation award to Olivier Blanchard, Jordi Gali, and Michael Woodford. Congratulations! www.frontiersofknowledgeawards-fbbva.es/noticias/fro...
25.02.2025 15:19 — 👍 40 🔁 13 💬 0 📌 1
Thrilled to announce our return next Monday!
We have an exciting line-up of speakers: Andrea Galeotti (LBS), Ravi Jagadeesan (Stanford), Mallesh Pai (Rice University), Lea Nagel (Stanford) and Peter Troyan (University of Virginia).
All information is here: virtual-md-seminar.com 📉📈 #EconSky
Only a few days left to apply for our postdoc position 👇
28.01.2025 13:39 — 👍 3 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 0
