Matej Rafael Risko

Ukrainian Special Forces Operations drones destroyed a Russian 9C19 Ginger radar station and an S-300V air defense system near Mariupol overnight, using domestically produced FP-2 drones with 100kg warheads. #Ukraine

My deep condolences, very sorry to hear that

In conclusion - the direct inbound within the forward sector is typically the most favourable geometry because it preserves altitude margin and footprint continuity. Offset and overflight geometries erode altitude margin, and therefore the footprint.
FIN
16/16

Kinematics then compound the issue. Offset engagements demand more cross-range correction. As time-to-go falls, lateral acceleration required to “reach” the PIP grows rapidly, further narrowing the feasible altitude corridor for hit-to-kill
15/16

Launcher geometry contributes. Patriot doesn't have a 360dgr instantaneous coverage from a fixed emplacement. Rear-hemisphere or highly offset engagements can be practically constrained even when a theoretical PIP exists.
(hopefully LTAMDS will solve this)
14/16

Radar geometry drives this.A sector-limited fire-control radar is most effective when the track remains within its primary engagement sector. Edge-of-sector or rear-sector situations increase track uncertainty and can inflate the GIP box,worsening delay
13/16

Overflight and “over-the-shoulder” are worst cases for altitude margin.If tracking or engagement is delayed until target has passed overhead the remaining opportunities are inherently later and lower,and may also fall into rear-sector limits
(MPQ-53/65 has 120-160dgr FOV Field Of View)
12/16

...commitment and pushing intercept lower.
Late launch is not just a timing inconvenience: it forces the PIP down the trajectory. Lower intercept altitude reduces time-to-go, increases required manoeuvre, and can leave no altitude window between minimum altitude,KOA and MIA
11/16

...to obtain a higher-altitude PIP, which sustains a larger defended footprint. An offset aimpoint (for example 5 km away) can place the launcher near the edge of the GIP box/KOB interaction. Small errors or manoeuvre can move the box in and out of the boundary,delaying...
10/16

If that altitude band is not achievable in time, the footprint collapses even if raw kinematic reach remains.
A direct inbound to the launcher usually keeps the GIP box centred on the defended point. Threat declaration is stable, allowing earlier commitment and more time...
9/16

Think of the defended footprint as the set of threat trajectories/impact regions for which the fire unit can generate at least one intercept solution meeting required Pk within the allowed intercept-altitude band (min altitude/KOA/MIA) and system geometry constraints.
8/16

Because the target is descending, the “earlier” you can engage, the higher the feasible intercept altitude tends to be. That altitude margin is what expands the practical defended footprint; lose it and the footprint contracts sharply
7/16

Once threatening, the system searches for a Predicted Intercept Point (PIP) within an allowed altitude window: above minimum intercept altitude, below maximum intercept altitude (MIA), and consistent with keep-out altitude (KOA) constraints
6/16

Patriot TBM engagement is gated by predicted Ground Impact Point (GIP) and a GIP uncertainty box.Keep-out boundaries (KOBs) are defined around assets when the GIP box intersects a KOB,the track is treated as threatening
I’m oversimplifying here,but for the sake of simplicity
5/16

For PAC-3 MSE (TBM defence in general), the defended footprint against TBM threats is primarily altitude-driven. Engaging TBM at greater slant range generally means engaging it earlier in descent, therefore at greater altitude, late engagements mean lower-altitude intercepts
4/16

TBM footprints depend on TBM type and range, Patriot interceptor, the minimum probability of kill needed to achieve the required footprint, and keep-out altitude
3/16

FM 3-01.85 is explicit that Patriot TBM defended areas are not simple circles. It defines a lower-tier defended area (LTDA) as a two-dimensional, multisided area whose shape varies with geometry and employment.
2/16

Cross-posting it here from Twitter

TL/DR - yes, a lot:)

Interception geometry matters for endo-atmospheric TBM defence. A MaRV headed straight at the launcher is a different engagement from one aimed a few kilometres aside, particularly once overflight and rear-sector cases arise.
1/16

Interesting paper. One anchor point in the discussion that I am curious about is this, regarding selection effects & US ED. "I find no evidence that the US...extended its nuclear deterrence to states that were particularly more likely to be targeted by the Soviet Union's military challenges."

Something I couldn't possibly comment on, but would like to pull the pin on the discursive hand grenade for anyway, is more granularity when we talk about nuclear latency. There is a spectrum from "we have some plutonium somewhere" to "I have one cable left to plug in before launch". Details matter!

CC @midlifesuezcrisis.bsky.social

Interesting paper.
There are also other reasons for expansion than just the credibility of extended deterrence, but it is definitely worth reading and food for thought.

Anyway, the total destabilisation is not desirable either so there’s the problem (it’s btw a common problem with application of air power to achieve strategic goals such as regime change).

…support limited operation designs or the idea of limited wars in general. In any case, the military is an instrument of politics but this discrepancy (that goes to the core of what the war is) exists.

Anything less than this would be highly questionable in terms of whether it would meet strategic objectives (and it is questionable whether such a limited design would meet them all tbqh). In literature, this is known as a Korean problem discussed by Kissinger - military logic does not necessarily…

While this is indeed a limited scenario, it will be very difficult to convince the Iranian leadership that this is not a total war against the Islamic Republic, which could lead to entanglement and increased risk for US and Israel, as the IRI will retaliate, even asymmetrically.

Incidentally, it is deliberately designed as a limited operation to study what effects can be achieved in such a format, as this is apparently what the administration is considering. It is not what I would consider reasonable, and the number of sorties is at the lower end of what is realistic.

2) Risks associated with limited operation such as one described above are higher than the ones associated with an operation aimed at the complete collapse of the Islamic republic regime.

3) In addition to PGM strikes described above, most of the effort would rely on direct attack ammo

FIN
12/12

Notes:
1) The US is capable of establishing air superiority very quickly due to the wear and tear of Iran's IAMD (nothing has ever been integrated there btw, I'm just rigorous in my use of terms).
11/12

Force regeneration:
Rapid MRO (maintenance) at dispersed sites
Rotations to sustain tempo
CCAs for reducing pilot & logistics burden
10/12