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Ariel Levy

@arielevy.bsky.social

PhD student at Harvard Department of Psychology

55 Followers  |  121 Following  |  1 Posts  |  Joined: 03.12.2023
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Posts by Ariel Levy (@arielevy.bsky.social)

Congrats!!!

26.11.2025 01:20 β€” πŸ‘ 1    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 0    πŸ“Œ 0
Sydney Levine - Open Positions Graduate Students (PhD program) I will be accepting PhD students through the NYU psychology department for the current application cycle (for admission in Fall 2026). My lab is joint between the Co...

I'm recruiting a grad student! My lab at NYU (psych dept) studies the computational basis of moral cognition and aims to build AI systems that are aligned with human values. Now admitting a PhD student for Fall 2026. Apps due 12/1. sites.google.com/corp/site/sy...

14.11.2025 02:18 β€” πŸ‘ 38    πŸ” 21    πŸ’¬ 1    πŸ“Œ 1
Summary of design and results from our three studies. (A: Design) Each study used a similar experimental design, measuring both positive and negative demand in an online experiment, with three commonly-used task types (dictator game, vignette, intervention). Our experiments had ns β‰ˆ 250 per cell. (B: Results) Observed demand effects were statistically indistinguishable from zero. The plot shows means and 95% confidence intervals for standardized mean differences derived from frequentist analyses of each experiment and an inverse variance-weighted fixed-effect estimator pooling all experiments (solid bars). Prior measurements of experimenter demand from a previous dictator game experiment (de Quidt et al., 2018; standardized mean difference from regression coefficient) and a meta-analysis primarily including small-sample, in-person studies (Coles et al., 2025; Hedge’s g statistic) are also shown for comparison (striped bars). The main text includes Bayesian analyses that quantify our uncertainty.

Summary of design and results from our three studies. (A: Design) Each study used a similar experimental design, measuring both positive and negative demand in an online experiment, with three commonly-used task types (dictator game, vignette, intervention). Our experiments had ns β‰ˆ 250 per cell. (B: Results) Observed demand effects were statistically indistinguishable from zero. The plot shows means and 95% confidence intervals for standardized mean differences derived from frequentist analyses of each experiment and an inverse variance-weighted fixed-effect estimator pooling all experiments (solid bars). Prior measurements of experimenter demand from a previous dictator game experiment (de Quidt et al., 2018; standardized mean difference from regression coefficient) and a meta-analysis primarily including small-sample, in-person studies (Coles et al., 2025; Hedge’s g statistic) are also shown for comparison (striped bars). The main text includes Bayesian analyses that quantify our uncertainty.

We often hear from reviewers: "what about demand effects?" So we developed a method to eliminate them. Something weird happened during testing: We couldn’t detect demand effects in the first place! (1/8)

15.09.2025 17:18 β€” πŸ‘ 86    πŸ” 40    πŸ’¬ 3    πŸ“Œ 6
figure 2 from our preprint, reporting the results from two experiments 

we measure moral judgments about dividing money between two parties and manipulate the degree of asymmetry in the outside options each party has

we find that moral judgments track predictions from rational bargaining models like the nash bargaining solution and the kalai-smorodinsky solution in a negotiation context

by contrast, in a donation context, moral intuitions completely reverse, instead tracking redistributive and egalitarian principles

preprint link: https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/3uqks_v1

figure 2 from our preprint, reporting the results from two experiments we measure moral judgments about dividing money between two parties and manipulate the degree of asymmetry in the outside options each party has we find that moral judgments track predictions from rational bargaining models like the nash bargaining solution and the kalai-smorodinsky solution in a negotiation context by contrast, in a donation context, moral intuitions completely reverse, instead tracking redistributive and egalitarian principles preprint link: https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/3uqks_v1

the functional form of moral judgment is (sometimes) the nash bargaining solution

new preprintπŸ‘‡

20.05.2025 15:08 β€” πŸ‘ 24    πŸ” 7    πŸ’¬ 1    πŸ“Œ 2

Despite the world being on fire, I can't help but be thrilled to announce that I'll be starting as an Assistant Professor in the Cognitive Science Program at Dartmouth in Fall '26. I'll be recruiting grad students this upcoming cycleβ€”get in touch if you're interested!

07.05.2025 22:08 β€” πŸ‘ 143    πŸ” 24    πŸ’¬ 17    πŸ“Œ 4