Bayesian Persuasion without Commitment: Itai Arieli; Colin Stewart
02.12.2025 04:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0@repec-nep-des.bsky.social
The latest working papers from RePEc. NEP report DES (Economic Design) https://nep.repec.org/
Bayesian Persuasion without Commitment: Itai Arieli; Colin Stewart
02.12.2025 04:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Rating Government Procurement Markets: Deryugina, Tatyana; Zaldokas, Alminas; Fedyk, Anastassia; Gorodnichenko, Yuriy; Hodson, James; Sologoub, Ilona
02.12.2025 03:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Matching Under Preference Uncertainty: Random Allocation, Informativeness, and Welfare
02.12.2025 02:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Zoned Out: The Long-Term Consequences of School Choice for Wealth Segregation: Georgy Artemov; Kentaro Tomoeda
02.12.2025 01:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences for Conditional Expected Utility Maximizers
02.12.2025 00:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Private From Whom? Minimal Information Leakage in Auctions: Eric Gao; Eric Tang
01.12.2025 23:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Peer Selection with Friends and Enemies: Francis Bloch; Bhaskar Dutta; Marcin Dziubi\'nski
01.12.2025 22:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Complete Exchange Mechanisms: Minoru Kitahara; Hiroshi Uno
01.12.2025 21:45 β π 1 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Collusion-proof Auction Design using Side Information: Sukanya Kudva; Anil Aswani
01.12.2025 20:45 β π 1 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Auction house pricing dynamics in the market for thoroughbred yearlings β a unique modelling approach: Humphreys, David; O'Donovan, David
24.11.2025 19:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Automated Market Making for Goods with Perishable Utility: Chengqi Zang; Gabriel P. Andrade; O\u{g}uzhan Ersoy
24.11.2025 18:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Fraud-Proof Revenue Division on Subscription Platforms: Abheek Ghosh; Tzeh Yuan Neoh; Nicholas Teh; Giannis Tyrovolas
24.11.2025 17:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Group Obvious Strategy-proofness: Definition and Characterization: Alejandro Neme; R. Pablo Arribillaga; Jordi MassΓ³
24.11.2025 16:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Automation and Task Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
17.11.2025 22:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Rating Government Procurement Markets: Tatyana Deryugina; Alminas Zaldokas; Anastassia Fedyk; Yuriy Gorodnichenko; James Hodson; Ilona Sologoub
17.11.2025 21:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0The Coasean Singularity? Demand, Supply, and Market Design with AI Agents: Peyman Shahidi; Gili Rusak; Benjamin S. Manning; Andrey Fradkin; John J. Horton
17.11.2025 20:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences and Single-Peaked Preferences
17.11.2025 19:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0A characterization of strategy-proof probabilistic assignment rules: Sai Praneeth Donthu; Souvik Roy; Soumyarup Sadhukhan; Gogulapati Sreedurga
17.11.2025 18:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Mechanism Design with Information Leakage: Samuel H\"afner; Marek Pycia; Haoyuan Zeng
17.11.2025 16:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Matchings Under Biased and Correlated Evaluations: Amit Kumar; Nisheeth K. Vishnoi
10.11.2025 23:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Non-induced Preferences in Matching Experiments: Sarah KΓΌhn; Papatya Duman; Britta Hoyer; Thomas Streck; Nadja Stroh-Maraun
10.11.2025 22:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Information Transmission Under Privacy Concerns: Zhang, Qiaoxi; Azacis, Helmuts; Ray, Indrajit
10.11.2025 21:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0From Best Responses to Learning: Investment Efficiency in Dynamic Environment: Ce Li; Qianfan Zhang; Weiqiang Zheng
10.11.2025 20:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Information-Credible Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information
10.11.2025 19:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0