Daniele

By mistake I did not share the link to the main article, here it is:

tochnyi.info/2026/02/ukra...

We all dream a nice car park for trips to the Artic. Thank you for sharing it I will put in my website to keep checked!

2026-Q1 | Ukrainian 🇺🇦 long-range strikes on Russian 🇷🇺 infrastructures | Created with Datawrapper

Great article 👍
I also update weekly a map of long range strikes : www.datawrapper.de/_/EUS5j/
Our datas seem to be consistent.

There is a concept, of shift in momentum. Sometime when there is a stalemate or situation is uncertain a strong shift can be triggered by an external factor. My guess is that Ukrainian force tried to us long range strikes to do this, and they succeeded, at least partially.

Yes, weather has an impact on drone range and operational capabilities. We are talking about drones that have to fly relatively low and therefore are more affected by bad weather. However, there are also a more strategic reasons in hitting certain targets in certain moment.

As always, I would like to thank the entire team at @tochnyi, and if you would like to read the entire research find us at:

x.com/hartreefock/...

end/ Summer 2025 demonstrated how deep strikes are critical and effective.

Future trajectory depends on:
• Sustainability of Ukrainian long-range drone production.
• Effectiveness of Ukrainian new long-range missiles.
• Russian industrial repair resilience.

8/ Strategic consequences:
Air defence redeployment away from other theatres

Increased infrastructure hardening costs, anti-drone nets over substations and fuel depots.

Logistical friction along entire operational depth.

the Psychological erosion of rear-area immunity

7/ Logistical interdiction expanded geographically.
Bridge strikes: 8 confirmed in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod. Rail sabotage: 30+ incidents in Crimea & Melitopol–Tokmak corridor. 9+ relay cabinet sabotage actions. In several cases, the attacks occur on the entire train line.

6/ Air defence strikes followed a pattern.
Low activity in June–July → sharp escalation in August–September.
The key objectives of this can be summarised as:
Degrade defensive envelope
Enable follow-on infrastructure strikes
Force redistribution of AD assets from frontlines

5/ A few documented strikes:

Novoshakhtinsk refinery (Aug 21), satellite imagery confirmed strike location and tank damage.

Early September, Slavyansk Eko Oil suspended production entirely following a combined drone/missile attack.

4/ Target distribution indicates priority on fuel logistics.
Oil depots were the most frequently targeted category by mid-September. Depots provide immediate operational leverage: destruction disrupts the frontline supply rapidly.

3/ Total confirmed strikes (June–early October):
• 44 oil refinery strikes
• 40+ oil depot strikes
• 30+ oil facility strikes
• Sharp rise in S-300/S-400 air defence strikes
• 8 bridge strikes (Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod)
• 30+ railway sabotage/drone in occupied Ukraine

2/ The analysis in depth can be found on our website link below:

x.com/hartreefock/...

1/ Ukrainian Summer Offensive: Assault on the russian hone front

At @tochnyi.info we investigated Ukraine’s June–October 2025 deep-strike campaign, which represented a structured operational shift from tactical interdiction to systemic infrastructure targeting.

No UK won't use M777 but US and other are going to benefit from it. Plus BAE has also other product lines which depends on gun barrel production. This initiative is going to create several opportunities.

End. This preliminary release aims to underscore the enduring importance of long-range strikes, whether through missiles, drones, or sabotage operations. Ukraine has demonstrated that even when facing a theoretically superior opponent, airspace can remain highly vulnerable.

4/4 Investigating the aftermath of long-range strikes or sabotage is very challenging because a large fireball in footage does not always lead to conclusive evidence from satellites. In some cases, despite the fire and explosion, the damage remains limited.

3/4 The team analysed most of the operations, focusing on those more relevant, such as air defence attrition, particularly in the Occupied Ukrainian Territories. From an initial analysis, we have strong evidence of a correlation between AD destruction and LRS.

2/4 We have been analysing reports from various sources, including Telegram, VK, Russian news outlets, and Ukrainian channels. The data collection is mostly manual, but processing uses coding to filter relevant statistics for our analysis.

1/4 🗺️ Kinetic Operations in Russia & Occupied Ukrainian Territories

With my colleagues at @tochnyi.info , we are pleased to release today the first density map of all Long-Range Strikes, Short-Range Missile attacks, and Sabotage activity since June 2025.

An honour for me to be there and speak with such an eminent and competent person. Come and stay with us tonight, lot to discuss and unpack always with facts in one hand and coffee in the other!

Thank you!

End. Finally, a big thank you to the entire @tochnyi.info team for their support.

6. Disrupting nodes like Alabuga is not simple. But understanding its ecosystem and the vulnerabilities hidden within it is essential to countering Russia’s drone surge. Especially when one of the key components of Shaed is still hand-made.

5. But here’s the paradox: Alabuga’s “self-sufficient” war industry depends on fragile supply chains.
Carbon fibre production is impossible without an adequate flux of oxygen & nitrogen, once supplied by Air Liquide’s infrastructure.

4. Inside the plant, workers hand-layer carbon fibre for Shahed airframes. That carbon fibre comes from Alabuga-Fibre (UMATEX), acquired by Rosatom, aiming to hit 10,000 tonnes per year by 2030.

3. Alabuga has expanded quickly: new production halls, dormitories, and workshops. Thanks to tax breaks, customs benefits, and state investment, it has turned it into one of Russia’s most important industrial clusters.

2. Over the past 5 months, Russia has tripled its use of Shahed-type drones, now averaging 103 launches per day. Ukraine hasn’t had a single day without attacks. In April 2025, Russia launched 2,485 Shaheds. By July, 6,297. That’s a 1,378% increase compared to July 2024.

1. If you’d like to dive straight into the full investigation, you’ll find the link below. But for those following along here, this thread offers a summary of our main findings. tochnyi.info/2025/08/alab...