@markagerton.bsky.social
🎓 Excited to share our 2025-26 job market candidates from UC Davis Agricultural & Resource Economics!
Please consider them for your open positions!
are.ucdavis.edu/phd/job-cand...
#EconJobMarket #Economics #PhD
@wenjie-zhan.bsky.social
@thjchen.bsky.social
@rachelejones.bsky.social
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: effects are complex and depend on gov't objectives. Revenue goals points one way, but there are other considerations: #environmental protection, #energysecurity, recreational access, etc. Small #auction design changes can have large, counterintuitive effects.
16.07.2025 19:45 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0THE BIG INSIGHT: Secondary noncompetitive sales undermine reserve prices as a revenue tool BUT the net effect depends heavily on post-sale revenues (royalties, rentals). These only occur if leases are actually sold, and generate most revenues - not the initial sale
16.07.2025 19:45 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0
OUR FINDINGS (TABLE 7):
Montana/Dakotas: Eliminating noncompetitive leasing would:
• ✅ Increase auction revenue: $3.1M → $3.2M (+$97K),
• ❌ Decrease rental revenue: $4.1M → $3.7M (-$346K),
• ❌ Decrease royalties: $792M → $773M (-$19.2M),
• 📉 NET EFFECT: -$19.4M
THE EMPIRICAL CHALLENGE: We can't directly observe bidder valuations, so we combine auction theory with data on outcomes (no sale/noncompetitive sale/competitive auction) to structurally estimate bidder behavior using data on BLM auctions, then simulate different auction formats.
16.07.2025 19:45 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0
THEORY PREDICTS AMBIGUOUS EFFECTS: Noncompetitive pricing can either increase or decrease revenue depending on whether reserve prices are high or low (see Figure 3). When reserves are high, noncompetitive options increase overall sales; when low, they cannibalize auction revenue
16.07.2025 19:45 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0THE ECONOMIC PUZZLE: This creates a #commitment-problem. When bidders have a 2nd chance at lower prices, they strategically withhold bids even when their valuation exceeds the reserve. Bidders only enter auctions if their value exceeds a threshold 2-10x higher than the reserve.
16.07.2025 19:45 — 👍 1 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0THE SETUP: Until 2022, if no bids met the reserve price at #BLM auctions, leases were sold via #noncompetitive sales (lotteries) at lower prices. The Inflation Reduction Act #IRA eliminated this. The 2025 One Big Beautiful Bill Act #OBBA just brought it back.
16.07.2025 19:45 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0🧵 NEW RESEARCH with Eric Lewis and @dioenescfg.bsky.social!
What happens when #auction sellers can't credibly #commit to their reserve prices? Our new paper examines this classic question in the context of federal #BLM auctions of #oil & #gas #leases.
PAPER: dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn...
JMCs at #AAEA2025 - @wenjie-zhan.bsky.social @thjchen.bsky.social @rachelejones.bsky.social
and also future job candidates @ayeshahmed.bsky.social @mspitzerbrooks.bsky.social
@ucdavis.bsky.social Dept of #AgEcon is excited to announce our '25-26 #jobmarket candidates. These 16 #PhD students are doing great research in #agriculture, #development, #environment, #energy, #health, and #labor. Many presenting at #AAEA2025 in Denver July 27-29! are.ucdavis.edu/phd/job-cand...
15.07.2025 21:35 — 👍 3 🔁 4 💬 1 📌 0
