Arthur Leichthammer

Excluded French reactions as that really is no surprise hahah

Poland could be interesting to see how strong they go against tbf though!!

Decision @ec.europa.eu to go ahead with provisional application #EU #Mercosur is the right one. Many in @europarl.europa.eu agree.

We are in an exceptional situation where EP can only vote after ECJ. At the same time, international trade rules are constantly being violated by others. 1/2

So the Telegraph is taking this well

Is that true? The way I understand it, the Council already empowered COM to provisionally apply in January, so no second vote needed?

Statement by President von der Leyen on the EU-Mercosur agreement Yesterday, Uruguay and Argentina became the first countries to ratify the EU-Mercosur Agreement. Brazil and Paraguay are expected to follow soon. And it is such good news. Because it shows the trust a

EU provisionally applies Mercosur, as set out in the Council decision last month: ec.europa.eu/commission/p...

EP reactions will be interesting.

What's Plan B? Options the Trump Administration Could Pursue if the Supreme Court Strikes Down Tariffs If the Supreme Court rules President Trump cannot levy tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), his administration may look to alternatives to levy new tariffs and/or continue collecting revenue from imports that could include: Law/Framework Details Limitations Sec. 232 tariffs Limited to imports deemed a threat to national security. Requires investigations, which may take months. Sec. 301 tariffs Allows for tariffs against countries USTR determines are engaged in unfair trade practices. Each tariff is limited to a particular country. Requires investigations and consultations with foreign governments, which may take months. Sec. 122 tariffs Allows for tariffs to address "balance-of-payment" deficits, which can include trade deficits. Can only last for up to 150 days, and are limited to a 15% ad valorem rate. Sec. 338 tariffs Allows for tariffs when the president finds a foreign country is disadvantaging or discriminating against U.S. commerce. Generally limited to 50% of the value of the goods. There is a 30-day delay after a presidential proclamation before tariffs are triggered. Sec. 201 tariffs Allows for tariffs to address harm to U.S. domestic industries. May only last for up to 8 years (initial 4 years plus optional 4-year renewal), and are limited to a 50% ad valorem rate. After 1 year, tariffs must phase down "at regular intervals." Requires investigation from ITC. Reclassify as "licensing fees" President Trump suggested that if SCOTUS strikes down lEEPA tariffs, he may reframe them as licensing fees. If the same or substantially similar to lEEP tariffs, any lEEPA licensing fees" may be subject to further legal challenges. Congress codifies tariffs Congress could codify some or all of President Trump's tariffs in statute. Unclear if there are majority votes in either chamber to codify tariffs. Bilateral trade agreements Presid…

Incredibly helpful table from @andrewlautz.bsky.social

To me unclear what possible litigation processes will look like in practice - could be an expensive bill

Trump tariffs live: US Supreme Court rules Trump exceeded powers in imposing tariffs Top court delivering ruling on the legality of sweeping tariff regime

www.ft.com/content/d00d...

No rest for the wicked, muted market reactions to ruling

Don't get your hopes up too high for big tariff policy changes, Trump's lawyers will have prepared for this outcome but could mean increased uncertainty for businesses over the next weeks/months

The Industrial Accelerator Act, aimed to boost energy-intensive industries and clean tech, faces another delay. Meanwhile, energy-intensive industry continues to struggle.

I looked into the data. First, overall poor performance espc. for the chemical industry - although a small recent uptick (1/3)

No I don’t think so either. My comment was more related to the fact that the EPP is only scutinizing non-EPP/non-ECR countries.

Their targeting of Spain has different roots I think and is also not new, see e.g. the derailing of Riberas hearing for Commissioner by EPP MEPs

Trump being the reason though? idk about that

Europe is chasing the wrong fix for its growth crisis The continent’s old growth model no longer works in today’s world. And EU leaders need a plan that matches the scale of this shift.

Tomorrow’s summit is a chance for EU leaders to stop chasing the wrong fixes — and finally sketch a response that matches the scale of Europe’s economic challenge.

Here, lucasguttenberg.bsky.social, @sandertordoir.bsky.social and I lay out what that could look like.

www.politico.eu/article/euro...

EU to extend suspension of US retaliatory tariffs for six months - Borderlex - European trade policy The European Commission announced it will "soon" table a proposal to prolong the suspension of retaliatory tariffs against the United States by six months, spokesperson Olof Gill said.

Commission to table prolongation of the suspension of retaliatory tariffs against the US for another 6 months. Current suspension expires on 7 Feb. EC also says it hasn't yet taken a decision on whether to provisionally apply the Mercosur pact borderlex.net/2026/01/23/e...

‼️🩸A bloodbath for the German auto trade with China in 2025:

📉70% drop in mid-sized saloon car exports
📉38% drop in large engine cars
📉39% fall in small ones
📉54% drop in small station wagons
📉23% for larger ones

You may have missed it amidst the chaos of the last few days, but there is a new high-level EU report in town: A Franco-German task force led by Jörg Kukies and Christian Noyer presented recommendations to tackle the scale-up financing gap.

Here is what it says and why you should care about it.

Europeans after managing to prevent the collapse of NATO for another 1-2 weeks…

#Europe #Rutte

Everyone is talking about the EU’s supposed trade bazooka -but understanding how it would actually work is a different matter.

For those who want to dig into the details, Arthur has you covered with a brilliant thread.

I'm with you - actually I believe the comitology procedure makes it even more difficult to pass Council QMV vote

Having said that, in an evolving conflict there cannot be fixed previously decided measures and it is illusory to think COM would move strongly against MS consortium in response measures

9️⃣ What should the EU do now?

If Trump doubles down and imposes tariffs on 1 Feb in response to troops stationed in Greenland, the EU should invoke the ACI. The instrument does not mandate escalation but it anchors future responses in a framework that allows for flexibility as the conflict evolves

8️⃣Where does this leave us?

The ACI is not a silver bullet. Compared to foreign policy via TruthSocial, it is slow and procedural. But once in place, it widens the EU’s credible response space beyond tariffs, while raising strategic uncertainty for the third country from the moment it is launched

7️⃣ Political reality
So legally, blocking measures at that stage requires an active negative QMV. At the same time, COM is committed to seeking the widest possible MS support.

In short: hard to block legally, but politically designed to move with Member States sentiments.

Under the Comitology Regulation, the Commission may:
– submit an amended draft for a new opinion, or
– refer the same draft to the appeal committee

Only if the appeal committee delivers a negative opinion (QMV against) is the Commission legally prevented from adopting the measures.

6️⃣ How hard is it for Member States to block?
If the committee delivers no opinion (neither QMV in favour nor against), the Commission cannot immediately adopt the act.

But this is not a veto.

5️⃣Adoption of response measures
These measures are adopted via Comitology Regulation (Reg. 182/2011) and source of the most confusion I've seen.

Instead of the Council, member states give their view in a committee, either accepting or blocking the proposed measures via QMV.

4️⃣ Response measures
If coercion persists, COM may adopt response measures.

And here is where it gets interesting. In contrast to classical trade defense measures, the ACI can pull *a lot* of different levers from targeting services/IP protection to excluding firms from public procurement.

3️⃣ Mandatory nice talk
Once coercion is determined, the Commission must first seek cessation:
– consultations, negotiations, mediation, arbitration
– no fixed duration, but this step is legally required

2️⃣ Council determination
If the Commission concludes there is a case of economic coercion, member states must confirm: the Council votes on this via Qualified Majority Voting.

- Regulation gives the Council a soft time limit of 8-10 weeks
- legally no minimum duration

1️⃣ Initiation & investigation
The Commission can start an investigation into the existence of economic coercion on its own accord or following a request & initiate an examination
- Regulation sets a maximum of 4 months
- legally no minimum duration

🧵 Trump’s Greenland brinkmanship puts the EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument back on the table. Few cases fit economic coercion more cleanly.

But the ACI is often misunderstood. It’s not a bazooka, but a slow-loading cannon, able to fire anything from heavy shells to hot air. Here’s how it works ⬇️