Syria Direct

How olive oil exports exacerbate Syria’s water crisis Even as Syria suffers an acute water crisis, thousands of cubic meters of groundwater are flowing into the global market in the form of olive oil, an export that represents both national pride and a s...

How olive oil exports exacerbate Syria’s water crisis

✍️ Simav Hesen and Ranim Khalouf

This investigation was prepared as part of a project by the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM), with support from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

This investigation examines the water loss associated with olive oil exports from Syria, exploring how oil has become an undeclared carrier of water out of the country, even as towns and villages struggle to secure their daily water needs.

This pattern of invisible water leakage exacerbates water insecurity in the absence of clear resource management policies and the alignment of agricultural production with limited water resources.

Every ton of olive oil represents thousands of cubic meters of water consumed in cultivation, pressing and transportation, which effectively leaves the country upon export.

Most Syrian crops—primarily olives and wheat—rely on rainwater, but declining rainfall and the expansion of irrigated areas have increased reliance on surface and groundwater sources, intensifying pressure on national water reserves.

The water footprint of producing olive oil is significant. Each kilogram of olives requires around 5,000 liters, while producing a liter of oil requires 4-6 kilograms of olives—approximaterly 20,000 liters of water.

Olive trees on Abdullatif Boubki’s land in the Idlib countryside city of Salqin, northwestern Syria. It is a cloudy day, and rows of olive trees can be seen growing from reddish earth. Water has collected in a number of ruts in the ground.

🧵 Even as Syria suffers an acute water crisis, thousands of cubic meters of groundwater are flowing into the global market in the form of olive oil, an export that represents both national pride and a silent depletion of resources.

🔗 bit.ly/4sbh7zi

Shutdown of Deir e-Zor’s informal refineries upends a hazardous local economy As the Syrian government shuts down Deir e-Zor's informal oil refineries, a local industry faces collapse even as nearby communities are likely to reap health and environmental benefits.

Shutdown of Deir e-Zor’s informal refineries upends a hazardous local economy

✍️ @natachadanon.bsky.social

With Damascus set to sign an MOU with a consortium of US and Saudi firms to resume oil extraction and exploration, it remains to be seen whether those who worked at Deir e-Zor’s informal refineries will find a place in the formal industry that replaces them.

While the arrival of foreign companies could mitigate some harms, scientific studies have documented enduring health and environmental repercussions from formal oil refineries as well.

‘A ticking time bomb’: Hellish work at northwestern Syria’s makeshift oil refineries In northwestern Syria, hundreds of makeshift refineries have mushroomed in the past five years, employing thousands of people. With no regulation, their impact on health, life and the environment is ...

Informal oil refining is not limited to Deir e-Zor. Over the past decade, makeshift oil burners proliferated in the opposition-held northwest as well, with similar impacts on workers and the environment, as Syria Direct reported in 2022.

“The smoke falls to the ground—as a result the earth is black, even the sheep are black,” said Dr. Khalid Walid al-Hussein, who manages Jadid Baggara Hospital, located next to al-Omar. He treated four patients last year who suffocated from toxic fumes and died.

“So much of the oil-related pollution in recent years has been a byproduct of the conflict with poorly equipped, sometimes insufficiently trained workers refining fuel in whatever way they could,” said Peter Schwartzstein, a climate and environmental security researcher.

“Informal refineries will be relocated…to mitigate health and environmental impacts, then shut down once foreign companies start production,” a source at the Ministry of Energy said.

In early February, shortly after taking control of Deir e-Zor from the SDF, Damascus ordered all informal oil refineries in the province to shut down, citing health and environmental concerns.

For years during the war, makeshift refineries—which transform crude oil into a low-quality type of diesel known as mazot—proliferated in and around northeastern Syria’s oil fields as foreign oil companies ceased their operations.

In late January, al-Omar—Syria’s largest oil field, located eastern Deir e-Zor province—was almost entirely deserted. Only a handful of informal refinery workers remained, standing listlessly in the bright desert sun.

Smoke rises from makeshift refineries on the outskirts of al-Omar oil field in Syria’s eastern Deir e-Zor province, 28/1/2026. The landscape is flat and dry. Behind a row of telephone poles, columns of dark smoke rise on the horizon into a pale blue sky.

🧵 As the Syrian government shuts down Deir e-Zor’s informal refineries, a local industry risks collapse even as nearby communities are likely to reap health and environmental benefits.

🔗 bit.ly/4aVv3GW

Hasakah at a crossroads: Real integration, or recreating ‘security squares’? As Damascus and the SDF inch towards integration, is northeastern Syria heading for unified state institutions, “complementary integration,” or a revival of divided influence?

Hasakah at a crossroads: Real integration, or recreating ‘security squares’?

✍️ @walid-alnofal.bsky.social and Salam Ali

syriadirect.org/hasakah-cros...

For some in northeastern Syria, waiting to see if the deal will hold and what merging with Damascus means in practice, the task ahead is both fraught and simple. “Find a solution, let us live in peace,” 18-year-old Elin* said. “We’re tired of this situation.”

Conflicting visions and realities on the ground reflect “pending issues that have not yet been finally resolved,” Ibrahim Murad said. In the meantime, each side provides its own reading, “commensurate with its vision and interests.”

Multiple sources echoed the idea of a “complementary integration” between Damascus and SDF-affiliated institutions. “Integration will take time,” Qamishli co-mayor Berivan Omar said. “Integration does not mean elimination—it could be a complementary form of relationship.”

“The current situation cannot be compared to the security squares in the days of the [Assad] regime,” military researcher Rashid Hourani said. “The cooperation that currently exists…is complementary, and differs from the hostility and vigilance between the SDF and the defunct regime.”

“Despite the mutually positive rhetoric on integration” there is a “lack of trust” linked to “past experiences that saw violations in other parts of Syria,” political researcher Ibrahim Murad said. “Political memory makes any new agreement need guarantees.”

“We don’t feel the state has come in,” one Arab resident of Qamishli said. “We feel let down by our government—it sold us out,” he added, as the SDF remains in control of most parts of the city and “arrests and harassment” continue.

Damascus and the SDF are still “testing intentions,” researcher Samer al-Ahmad said. Despite "surface-level" progress, "the core of the agreement—integration, removal of PKK elements from Syria and the strong, effective entry of the state—has yet to begin.”

Realities on the ground in Hasakah, however, point to something more complex than a smooth transition of power. The two sides continue to show differing understandings of the agreement, and Damascus’s forces are limited to the same “security squares” that existed under Assad.

Agreeing on a Hasakah province governor, bringing some government security forces into cities and withdrawing from front lines, Damascus and the SDF are showing more practical commitment to integrating under the January 30 deal than under any past agreement.

Syrian government security forces enter Qamishli city in Syria’s northeastern Hasakah province, 3/2/2026. A military vehicle drives down a street, flying a Syrian flag. A group of people stand on either side as it passes, carrying cameras and filming.

🧵 As Damascus and the SDF inch towards integration, is northeastern Syria heading for unified state institutions, “complementary integration,” or a revival of divided influence?

🔗bit.ly/4qDb3OP

No guarantees: What do Kurds think of the Damascus-SDF agreement? Kurds in northeastern Syria are cautiously waiting to see what comes next as Damascus and the SDF take their first steps towards a fraught integration.

No guarantees: What do Kurds think of the Damascus-SDF agreement?

✍️ Salam Ali