˚*𓈒𓏸𑁍 Kaori Fujisawa ‎ꕤ

From the METI/ANRE “Japan Energy 2024” chart:

Middle East: ~95.3% (Saudi 40.8%, UAE 39.6%, Kuwait 9.0%, Qatar 4.7%, Oman 1.2%)

www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/...

95% of Japan’s crude is Middle East-sourced, Japan is unusually exposed to Hormuz risk vs. Europe/US (even if Japan has stocks for the “immediate” window). 

I concern is about flow fragility, not tank storage.

They are managing public panic risk.

Under Japanese law, the government can authorize collective self-defense if an attack on a close partner—like a blockade of Taiwan—poses a clear danger to Japan’s national survival. PM Sanae Takaichi recently underscored that a naval blockade of Taiwan could "by all means" reach this threshold.

if an adversary controls that water, they control the literal faucet of Japan’s energy and food imports.

It’s hard to stay out of a fire when your kitchen is the one burning.

The issue isn't whether Japan wants to join in; it's that Japan is physically part of the theater. If the Strait falls, the 'First Island Chain' is severed.

but because
Japan imports nearly all its energy. Control of the sea lanes is us literal lifeline.

It means long-term loss of strategic autonomy if sea access becomes contingent on an adversary’s discretion.

I get the skepticism, but 'survival' in this context isn't just about avoiding an invasion of Tokyo. It’s about the total loss of strategic autonomy. If Japan loses access to those sea lanes, it becomes a tributary state by default because it can't keep the lights on without permission.

Will China use the opportunity to take Taiwan?No

The US is the security anchor, but Japan’s reaction isn’t delegated to Washington.

If the Taiwan Strait becomes unstable or hostile-controlled, that directly impacts Japan’s energy imports and sea lane security.

There’s A difference between:1/Alliance cohesion being US-led and 2/Allied national survival depending on US initiative

Japan’s reaction calculus is not:What is the US doing?

It is:

Is our sea access, energy supply, and strategic buffer collapsing?Those are independent variables.

One anonymous diplomat expressing “girding” sentiment doesn’t equal imminent invasion signals. It reflects uncertainty, not necessarily operational indicators.

x.com/larisamlbrow...

Sending images of Dead rat is unacceptable and Anyone who does so will be blocked without further discussion.

You’re free to criticize me or disagree with my ideas. Speak directly — I welcome serious debate.

But sending images of dead rat is harassment, not argument. Anyone who does so will be blocked immediately.

If you disagree with my Two tweets, say so. Act like an adult.

I've been busy preparing for the challenge these past few days,
so I'll be spending less time under the bluesky.

x.com/baldingsworl...

You keep saying policy hasn’t changed.
Deterrence isn’t preserved by unchanged PDFs.

If Beijing now believes Taiwan is negotiable in broader diplomacy, the equilibrium has already moved — whether you admit it or not.

The argument that 'words don't matter' cuts both ways. You claim Trump is sending a message by showing off other targets (Iran, Venezuela), but by treating Taiwan as a variable in a group chat with Xi, you’ve signaled that Taiwan's security is negotiable.

Defenders rely on 'intent' (what they meant to say), while adversaries rely on 'effect' (what they see). Strategic signaling is a two-player game

if your adversary believes a trade is possible, then for all intents and purposes, the board has already been flipped."

by the way Many defenders say:

“There is no intention to trade Taiwan.”

Intent is irrelevant. this is Conflating Intent with Effect

Strategic signaling isn’t about what you meant.
It’s about what your adversary now believes is possible.”

The 'Policy Unchanged' stance is an illusion if the adversary’s perception has shifted. Once Taiwan is perceived as a line item in a transactional negotiation, the deterrent equilibrium is gone. You don't need to change the memo /policy to change the reality.

Hidden Assumption

Because the 🇺🇸formally makes arms decisions Independence, they are insulated from external influence

But

If the timing and scale of arm sales are modulated to facilitate a broader trade deal with 🇨🇳, the policy is de facto contingent, regardless of its de jure sovereign status.

I know Christopher. We don’t align on everything — and that’s fine. Respect doesn’t require agreement; it requires seriousness and good faith. On that standard, he meets it.

Regarding this tweet, I'd like to share my thoughts.

Kendo Dojo

The children train with great dedication.

#剣道 #体験入門 #フットワーク

Nothing says "I want to run a war but I don't want to ruin my weekend or miss the buffet" like having a non-compliant T-SCIF at the most surveilled club in the world.

from:

“We sell because it is our law and policy”

to:

“We sell depending on leader-level dynamics or broader bargaining context”

even without textual policy changes, the deterrence equilibrium weakens.

So the destabilization comes from:Perception of conditionality, not formal revision.

White House reassurances don’t negate a direct breach of the Six Assurances. Consulting Beijing on Taiwan arms sales is explicitly prohibited. You can’t undo a violation with a talking point.

thank you😊

Security violations

This is like the knowledge check on annual security training

x.com/lundukejourn...