Holger Roonemaa

Episode 9: Understanding Russia’s Growing Campaign of Sabotage We explore the growing threat of sabotage attacks across Europe and the technological tools used for financing and recruitment.

In a recent #RUSI podcast, @holgerroonemaa.bsky.social and I discuss how Russia's security service conducts sabotage in the Baltics. My investigation was based on court documents; Holger's team went undercover.

Listen and read here: rusi.org/podcasts/sus...

It is almost certain that RU will not be able to destroy UA's energy system to the extent that it significantly affects the war by the end of winter. There will be no catastrophe.

❗However, RU does not have enough ballistic missiles to cause a complete blackout of UA’s electrical system. Such attacks might lead to temporary restrictions on electricity use, but the hits are not that massive, and UA is able to restore power supply.

UA's energy infrastructure is holding up. Interruptions occur, but RU’s attacks are not frequent enough. UA handles cruise missiles well, but ballistic missiles pose more challenges except where air defenses are very strong.

Even there, the consequences of the attacks were quite limited. A prolonged collapse of energy systems, like the one at the beginning of 2023, did not occur.

Last week, there were warnings of a new Oreshkin attack, but it did not materialize. Instead, there was a missile attack on Western Ukraine and its energy infrastructure, where UA’s air defense is weaker.

‼️Oreshkin is being hyped far beyond its actual importance. It is largely about playing on Western fears, just like RU’s entire nuclear deterrence narrative. It does not have a substantial impact on the course of the war.

Some say that it exploded before hitting ground and failed to demonstrate any significant destruction power. It is also uncertain whether Oreshkin would reach a target in areas with UA's best air defense systems. This may be why Dnipro was chosen as the target.

The Oreshkin missile is purely a propaganda tool. RU certainly does not have many of these missiles. They are also certainly not capable of putting Oreshkin into serial production at this time. It is not even clear how successful this one launch was.

This would be an absolute loss of RU prestige. It demonstrates that RU's resources are far smaller than it has managed to project. However, the events in Syria do not have a direct impact on the war against UA.

Now, it is worth observing what happens to RU’s bases in Syria. Will RU leave them completely? The naval base in Tartus has been in their possession since 1971 and is RU's only base in the Mediterranean.

From the moment relatively small units moved out of Idlib, the regime collapsed in ten days. While RU’s operation to capture Kyiv in three days and UA in two weeks failed, Turkey and HTS succeeded in Syria.

The process that began on October 7, 2023, led to a situation where IRN and its allies were so weakened that they could not ensure Assad's survival. TUR recognized this and strongly supported opposition movements.

For RU, a noteworthy event is the collapse of Assad's regime. This demonstrates the classic weakness of dictatorships. Two weeks earlier, no one believed this could happen. TUR did perceive the weakness of RU and IRN.

❗We are still planning procurements for 2028 rather than for March 2025. I do not sense a shift in routine. True, GER's defense industry has significantly increased its pace, but the French and British industries have not done so to the same extent.

(Regarding Rutte's warnings about an approaching war and the need to prepare for it.) I am not confident that Rutte's words are having effect in Europe. EUR defense budgets are gradually increasing, but I do not see the arms industry experiencing significant acceleration.

Another issue is that it would be very dangerous to undertake this without the U.S. If such security guarantees are to be provided to UA, they must include the U.S. to some extent. This is also in EUR's strategic interest.

If Europe must eventually take on this role, it will be a significant challenge. EUR ground forces are not particularly strong, and a peacekeeping mission would rely heavily on ground troops.

There is much talk about sending EUR peacekeepers to UA, but this is not a relevant topic right now. It can only be discussed if some kind of peace or ceasefire is in place, and we are far from that. At present, this discussion only creates confusion.

The GER chancellor is playing a very domestic political game. Statements from Scholz, such as the need to communicate with RU and that it should not be left solely to Trump, will likely emerge before elections. This is aimed at keeping the party's left wing on his side.

Signals from people who have met with Trump's circle indicate a message of "peace from the position of strength." This theme runs through many discussions. It is an adequate approach. RU can only be forced into peace from a position of strength.

That said, Trump's statement was unnecessary. It emboldens RU. In theory, Trump could reverse this decision, but he can control UA only if he offers something in return.

(About Trump's criticism of Biden allowing UA to use missiles on RU territory.) I think it more reflects opposition to Biden rather than Trump's true thoughts. Previously, several of Trump's close associates criticized Biden's administration for not making this decision.

‼️I think U.S. aid to UA will continue as it does today, and there will not be a complete cessation of aid. The war will continue in its current form for a considerable time.

The key is to ensure that if RU responds with a rigid "no," the U.S will punish RU, not UA. There is a risk that it might be easier to pressure those who are more easily influenced. This was also the downside of the Minsk negotiations: GER and FRA put more pressure on UA than on RU.

The question then becomes what Trump will do next. If he wants to force RU to negotiate, he will need to provide significantly more military aid to UA. Whether he does this, whether aid to UA increases slightly, decreases slightly, or remains at its current level, is unknown.

But RU will continue its rhetoric about revising the entire European security structure and returning to its December 2021 ultimatum. This position is a nonstarter, and no one will negotiate on it. RU itself understands this as well.

I believe that Trump’s administration will try to present some sort of plan within a month of taking office. What follows will depend on the reactions of the parties involved. UA will at least take it into serious consideration.

Another Kursk-style offensive is unlikely. Further developments depend on what plan Trump proposes and how long it takes him to do so. Currently, Trump does not have a comprehensive plan ready.

❗The current war dynamics are such that what happens on the battlefield is far less important than the political game surrounding it. Militarily, there is no reason to believe that the front lines will see major surprises in the next 3–4 months.