Morgan Michaels

It may depend on just how farcical regime elections are. If ethnic parties contest and polls are held in 160 townships, maybe ASEAN accepts. But no ethnic parties and polls only in 80 townships, maybe not a sufficient display of 'credibility'

Just a guess.

See response beginning at 26:25

He says elections are not the priority but rather peace and security, humanitarian assistance, and dialogue.

My read is that ASEAN can accept a vaneer of legitimacy, but that elections that fail to achieve a minimum threshold of believability may not be accepted.

YouTube video by The International Institute for Strategic Studies IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2025 | Special Address by Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim, PM of Malaysia

I'm not so sure that ASEAN would support the elections, depending on how they play out. See PM Anwar's comments at SLD a few days ago.

youtu.be/lZ4OU52mxog?...

The regime carried on with its brutal air campaign while opposition forces continued assaults on their distracted enemy, leading to several strategic gains.

New report details patterns of violence in the immediate aftermath of the 28 March earthquake in Myanmar.

myanmar.iiss.org/updates/2025...

Multi-faceted test for the TNLA taking shape:

-Regime beginning to reverse TNLA gains
-Tensions flaring with the KIA and SSPP
-TNLA's main partner, the MNDAA, has dropped out of the fight (for now)
-Growing public outcry over TNLA policies and behavior

Critical days ahead.

Myanmar’s desperate condition: fragmentation, drugs, money-laundering and more | The Strategist Myanmar was a key global site for criminal activity well before the 2021 military coup. Today, illicit industry, especially heroin and methamphetamine production, still defines much of the economy. No...

Accurate appraisal of the grim situation in Myanmar.

More violence will exacerbate these problems, not solve them.

www.aspistrategist.org.au/myanmars-des...

The Tatmadaw launched limited counter assaults in Mandalay, Shan, and Kachin with units from the LIDs and MOCs. It appears these divisions have been rebuilt using conscripts. The operations have achieved some success so far, especially against the TNLA at Taung Hkam in Shan State.

There is a line of thinking that mounting opposition gains will eventually force the Myanmar military to negotiate for its own survival. But as I argue here, the regime is just as likely to go down with the ship, taking the state with it.

myanmar.iiss.org/updates/2025...

The small portion of Karen where the KNU tours foreign journalists tells us little about the rest of the country. Solar is not coming to all 55 million people in Myanmar anytime soon. Starlink operates unofficially and can be turned off by Elon Musk at a whim.

These things are bandaids, not cures.

These services may exist on a scale that can support armed groups and their activities, but not millions of everyday people or a formal economy. Karen State is also largely at the mercy of Thai policy. The outlook is poverty and violent instability punctuated by partial ad hoc solutions for a few.

New report asks what's next for Myanmar's ethnic armies now that they control the borderlands. Military victories haven't brought greater stability and there's no clear way to remedy this. More pressure on the centre won't necessarily push the regime to the table.

myanmar.iiss.org/updates/2025...

Rohingya civilians recall alleged Arakan Army abuses The most well-known armed group taking on Myanmar’s ruling junta faces renewed accusations of rape, night raids, and murder.

The Arakan Army (AA) is undoubtedly one of the most successful rebel forces fighting the junta in Myanmar. Unsurprisingly, the group has countless admirers amongst the country’s revolutionaries and some outside observers. 1/3

www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature... (@newhumanitarian.bsky.social)

Eight months for the AA to capture the final lone outpost in northern Rakhine State. The snowball theory of Tatmadaw collapse is demonstrably false. Instead we see a reverse snowball effect, with remaining regime bases/assets significantly harder to overcome.

Kokang army executes six alleged criminals in town under its control One of the condemned was a woman found guilty of killing her husband by MNDAA authorities in Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang Special Region in northern Shan State

The news that the MNDAA has carrier out 6 executions is deeply troubling. It is proven that the death penalty does not improve justice but its inhuman and cruel. myanmar-now.org/en/news/koka...

Myanmar's conflict may become 'ripe' for dialogue if the regime wins back territory and the EAOs realize they've hit a limit.

A lot could happen to prevent this scenario, but the point is that, for the first time since 2021, dialogue is no longer inconceivable.

myanmar.iiss.org/updates/2024...

Beijing offers Myanmar's parties to conflict with both opportunities and costs/limits. For the junta, the benefit is baseline survival. For the EAOs, relations with China have granted increased territory and military-politico power that was inconceivable 2 years ago.

Analyses that paint China only as a villain in Myanmar ignore basic reality. The stunning advances of Operation 1027 were won with Chinese weapons. China has and will still lobby the regime to recognize the authority of the Brotherhood groups over their vastly expanded territories.

Kicking things off on Bluesky with some photos from my recent trip to Karen State in Myanmar.

In April, the Karen National Liberation Army overran a major Myanmar military base, seizing control of Thin Gan Nyi Naung town and a stretch of the Asian Highway, a vital trade artery with Thailand.

A very digestable analysis of the complex current situation in Myanmar by IISS's @morganmichaels.bsky.social

myanmar.iiss.org/updates/2024...