Lukas Schwengerer

🥁🥳🍾It’s finally out! 📣💃🏻🎉 Needless to say, it’s on a very relevant and timely topic 😉, featuring contributions from EXPERTS in epistemology and philosophy of science.

Exciting news: today marks the official launch of my ERC Advanced Grant, KNOW-HOW. I’ll soon be advertising the first of several postdoctoral positions. The initial post — a 24-month postdoc based at Cogito—will begin in Spring 2026.
👉 ⁦https://www.knowhow-research.com⁩
Lots more to come—stay tuned!

Dario Mortini, Evidentially Hedged Assertions and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion - PhilPapers Speakers make evidentially hedged assertions when they weaken commitment to what they assert in virtue of disclosing imperfectly reliable sources of evidence in their assertions. A novel and increasin...

For those who might be interested: I have a new paper forthcoming in Erkenntnis. It's about whether linguistic data on hedging support the popular knowledge norm of assertion (spoiler: it's not so clear that they do).

philpapers.org/rec/MOREHA-6

Inferential collective self-knowledge - Asian Journal of Philosophy I develop an inferential account of collective self-knowledge. Starting with the assumption that groups have (at least propositional) attitudes I look at desiderata for any account of collective self-...

New open access paper on collective self-knowledge:

link.springer.com/article/10.1...

#philsky

In this paper, I suggest this works well for groups. However, it is worth exploring for self-knowledge in general. Individuals won't have an internal group discussion, but they can still predict what attitude they most likely form in a given situation based on their general belief-forming processes.

For instance, start with a group internal deliberation process - e.g. some sort of internal group discussion that leads to forming a group belief. The idea is that this internal discussion can be used as a basis to predict what belief the group most likely has after the discussion.

I suggest that the group case gives us reason to think about inferential self-knowledge much more like a prediction. Start out with members acting within the group and infer what attitude a group with that internal behaviour most likely forms. That prediction is then used to ascribe an attitude.

Commonly, inferential accounts of self-knowledge start out with some behaviour, inner speech or mental imagery (or more) and then ask what attitude is the most likely cause for that. It works backwards and infers the cause based on the effects.

I explore how groups can know their own attitudes by inferring them from their belief-formation processes. This isn't only interesting for looking at group self-knowledge, but I think the idea is a twist on inferential accounts of self-knowledge in general.

Inferential collective self-knowledge - Asian Journal of Philosophy I develop an inferential account of collective self-knowledge. Starting with the assumption that groups have (at least propositional) attitudes I look at desiderata for any account of collective self-...

New open access paper on collective self-knowledge:

link.springer.com/article/10.1...

#philsky

I explore how groups can know their own attitudes by inferring them from their belief-formation processes. This isn't only interesting for looking at group self-knowledge, but I think the idea is a twist on inferential accounts of self-knowledge in general.

My initial intuition is the same here. I'd also read this as "I know" making it stronger.

Robin McKenna, Sophistry on Steroids? The Ethics, Epistemology and Politics of Persuasive AI - PhilPapers This paper examines the ethical, epistemological, and political implications of persuasive AI technologies. Recent research suggests that AI is roughly as persuasive as humans in many contexts. Should...

New paper in AI & Society on why we should be worried about persuasive AI technologies even if you are, like me, sceptical that we are about to enter a world of AI "hyper-persuasion".

philpapers.org/rec/MCKSOS-2

Thinking Together AbstractWhat would it be for one person to think with another? How should we understand the idea of people thinking together and so sharing their thinking

Thinking Together, freshly published version. academic.oup.com/book/60759/c...

Joshua Habgood-Coote, Asking a Question is a Proposal in Shared Inquiry - PhilPapers What is it to ask a question? We might think about asking a question as the expression of an interrogative attitude towards a question that articulates the speaker’s aim of resolving ...

New paper on what it is to ask a question.

TLDR: teachers' asking, self-directed asking, and shared agenda-setting asking require us to rethink what it is to ask a question.

philpapers.org/rec/HABAAQ

Where conspiracy theories come from, what they do, and what to do about them Philosophers who study conspiracy theories have increasingly addressed the questions of where conspiracy theories come from, what such theories do, and what to do about them. This essay serves as a...

www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
Now with page numbers!

#philsky

Congrats!

Congrats!

I'm happy to hear that your protest worked and I fully agree with you: sometimes a protest is called for and good editors will recognise that.

Guido Tana, Innkeeper! Is the Wine Good Here? Phenomenal Conservatism and the Arbitrariness Problem - PhilPapers Phenomenal Conservatism is an internalist theory of justification that upholds the idea that justification arises from a distinct picture of epistemic warrant based on seemings. Recently, it has enjoy...

I have a new paper accepted in Grazer Phil Studies, you can find the accepted draft here: philpapers.org/rec/TANIIT-5

This was accepted after I protested the initial verdict after two rounds of reviews. When you think the referee hasn't done their job properly, it's totally ok to protest

The cover for the Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, featuring a detail from an impressionist painting of a busy Paris Boulevard by day by Camille Pissaro.

I’m leaning far back in my chair, looking bemused, while a copy of the Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology takes up most of the shot in the foreground. There’s a bookcase with some other books stacked just behind my head.

It's publication week for the Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, edited by Jennifer Lackey and myself, in the UK and in the rest of the world aside from North and South America (where it was available in May)

Dogmatism and Easy Knowledge: Avoiding the Dialectic? This paper analyzes and objects to the anti-skeptical strategy endorsed by Epistemological Dogmatism. Dogmatism is a theory of epistemic justification that holds perceptual warrant for our beliefs is....

onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...
This got published in the early view section of Analytic Philosophy.
It took two years, but finally it's out, and I'm pretty happy with it.
No OA because IUSS Pavia doesn't have agreements in place now, but drop me a line if you need a published copy.

Let me know what you think when you do. Details are different, but I think it's in the same spirit. And you'll (hopefully) be pleasantly surprised how we independently ended up with some very similar examples.

#philski #philmind
My piece (with Zuzanna Rucinska and Thomas Fondelli) on introspection and radical embodiment is finally out on Topoi - you can read it for free below rdcu.be/ez3Wu

Congrats! I like the paper a lot and I think it's quite in line with my own thoughts on looking at self-knowledge/introspection as something that is often not a 'purely inner activity'.

Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Special Issue Call for Abstracts: The journal Midwest Studies in Philosophy is putting together a special volume on Political Epistemology. The issue will feature invited contributions from scholars such as Alex Gu...

Michael (@michaelhannon.bsky.social) and I are putting together a Special Issue on Political Epistemology for Midwest Studies. Deadline for the CFA is October 31, 2025.

More details here! philevents.org/event/show/1...

Please share with others who might be interested :)

Call for Applications: Truth, Lies & Democracy 2025 Call for Experienced Game Developers

Call for Game Developers!
Join the Truth, Lies & Democracy 2025 game jam (Sept 26–28, Vienna) to create interactive video games addressing a big challenge for democracies today — disinformation.
Apply by Aug 15
👉 More info:

This is how the book opens:

RSE awards over £724K to boost Scotland’s vibrant research sector We are pleased to announce that 72 exceptional research projects were selected at the spring 2025 Research Awards open call.

I'm delighted to be able to announce that Crispin Wright, myself, and others at Stirling/Edinburgh have been awarded a Research Collaboration Grant by @royalsoced.bsky.social for a project called 'Responsible Trusting Without Prejudice':

Congrats, Aidan!

In persuasion, ignore style at your peril Exploring the changing nature of public debate

For my birthday, a short piece out on one of my favorite topics: style and persuasion, with a gratuitous dig at astrology queers and so-called rationalists. blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/openfordebat...