April forecast: exit OrbΓ‘n, enters Radev, its Bulgarian edition
Viktor OrbΓ‘nβs long grip on Hungary may end after the 12 April elections, but the political model he refined inside the EU is not necessarily receding with him. A similar governing playbook β sovereigntist in tone, centralising in instinct and sceptical of liberal institutions β is now taking clearer shape in Bulgaria around former president Rumen Radev.
Having stepped down early from his second term, Radev is preparing an entry into party politics with ambitions for executive power. If successful, Brussels may soon discover that the βOrbΓ‘n problemβ is not ending, but relocating.
A defining moment came with Radevβs first speech after leaving the presidency. Participants at the Sofia Economic Forum saw a Bulgarian politician on the rise who spoke with marked approval of the economic and industrial policies of Russia and China, while also echoing the logic of Donald Trumpβs isolationist strategies.
For years, Radev operated from the presidency as a figure formally above day-to-day politics, yet deeply embedded in Bulgariaβs power struggles. Unlike OrbΓ‘n, who built dominance through a disciplined party machine, Radev cultivated influence by presenting himself as a corrective to the party system itself.
He is portraying parties as compromised, exhausted and incapable of governing. In a country that has held eight elections in five years and cycled through nine governments, only three of them regular cabinets, that message has found a receptive audience.
The political terrain OrbΓ‘n once used in Hungary with itβs institutional fatigue, distrust of elites and a promise to restore national direction, and now this exists in Bulgaria in even more acute form.
Institutional power, not ideology
The key parallel between OrbΓ‘n and Radev is not ideological branding but institutional intent. OrbΓ‘nβs consolidation of power began when a parliamentary supermajority allowed him to rewrite Hungaryβs constitutional architecture, bringing the judiciary, media regulation and key oversight bodies under lasting political influence. The European Parliament later described the system that emerged as a βhybrid regime of electoral autocracyβ.
Radev has signalled ambitions that point in a similar direction. He has long spoken of constitutional change and now openly links his political future to judicial reform. In Bulgaria, however, judicial reform is not merely a governance issue; it is a question of control over the concrete institutions and ultimately the Supreme judicial council β who appoints the judges and chief prosecutor.
A parliamentary majority large enough to reshape the Supreme Judicial Council would also shape the selection of the next chief prosecutor, one of the most powerful figures in Bulgariaβs institutional landscape. Previous reformist coalitions collapsed over this very issue. Radev appears to believe he can succeed where party governments failed β an ambition that, if realised, would place long-term leverage over the stateβs coercive instruments in political hands aligned with him.
This is precisely the institutional lever OrbΓ‘n mastered.
Populism without labels
Where OrbΓ‘n openly champions βilliberal democracyβ, Radev avoids ideological labels altogether. He declines to position himself as left, right or centre, a classic populist strategy designed to widen electoral reach while reducing accountability to a defined programme.
Yet his rhetoric consistently follows the template common to Europeβs sovereigntist current: emphasis on national identity, suspicion of liberal elites, and the claim that existing political intermediaries no longer represent βthe peopleβ. Since opposing the Istanbul Convention in 2018 on the grounds of protecting children and national values, his cultural positioning has been clear even if formally unacknowledged.
The message is less about doctrine than about authority: the state has been captured by oligarchic interests, parties are discredited, and only a leadership claiming direct legitimacy from the nation can restore order. OrbΓ‘n used the same argument to justify centralisation. The language differs; the logic does not.
Executive power and the EU
Radevβs record during Bulgariaβs prolonged political crisis further illustrates this governing instinct. Through a succession of caretaker governments appointed by the presidency, the executive branch expanded its role well beyond organising elections.
Senior security officials were replaced, and long-term strategic decisions, including a 13-year energy agreement with Turkeyβs BOTAΕ, were taken with limited parliamentary oversight and little transparency.
Such moves are not directly linked to Hungary, but they reflect the same governing philosophy OrbΓ‘n advanced: strategic state decisions framed as matters of national interest, taken through the executive, with scrutiny presented as obstruction.
For the EU, this matters less at the level of rhetoric and more at the level of alignment. On Russiaβs war against Ukraine, Radev has repeatedly criticised military support for Kyiv and warned that arms deliveries risk dragging Bulgaria into the conflict.
Like OrbΓ‘n, he frames sanctions as harmful to national interests and argues for a rapid end to the war through political means. While he has been more cautious than the Hungarian prime minister in direct clashes with Brussels, the underlying positioning is similar: national calculation takes precedence over collective European strategy.
A second sovereignist pole?
OrbΓ‘n long functioned as the EUβs internal enemy, a leader willing to test the limits of the Unionβs tolerance for democratic backsliding. If Radev translates presidential popularity into strong parliamentary power, Brussels could face a more complex scenario: not an isolated case, but a second system-level actor operating within the same political grammar.
That would not mean identical regimes. Bulgariaβs institutions, party fragmentation and economic structure differ significantly from Hungaryβs. But the direction β concentration of authority justified through national legitimacy, institutional redesign framed as reform, and selective alignment with EU policies β would be familiar.
For European policymakers, the issue is no longer whether OrbΓ‘nβs model is eroding the Union. It already does. The question is to what extent OrbΓ‘nβs bad example is contagious.
Caption: Bulgarian President Rumen Radev (R) welcomes Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban during their meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria, 20 December 2024. EPA/VASSIL DONEV
