Andrew Richmond

Lisa Tessman has a couple books on this (her answer is yes, because of some real-world cases like the ones in the other comment: you should do A, you should do B, but doing one precludes doing the other).

Basically, there’s a clear logic by which things like Swampman are informative about the real world/real kinds. So Millikan and Dennett and the rest might be right: these creations aren’t good *examples* of scientific kinds. But they're a well-grounded *methodology* for inquiring into those kinds.

Awkward news for us empirically-minded philosophers of science: it turns out that wildly unrealistic thought experiments are good, actually. If you want an excuse to stop scrolling for a bit, I just had a paper published on Swampman & co. — link below!

#philsci #philosophy #philmind

AI and the Pedagogical Relationship As AI is being developed to serve educational roles, we should think about the human and social aspects of education, and whether AI can replicate them.

Some thoughts on AI Ed tools and what they do to the pedagogical relationship #edusky #philtech

(1) Swampmen and crazy thought experiments. I resuscitate Swampman and give a logic for thought experiments like him, show how they can be informative even when they’re ridiculously unrealistic.

Squat > deadlift? Huge red flag

... are you supposed to use it as a noun?