András Tóth-Czifra

Fwiw, based on Szijjarto's words, one of them had dual citizenship, he says the other one had "Hungarian nationality" (in the European sense, so this doesn't imply citizenship).

He also called mobilization "an open season on people" so many times in a 1-minute video that I'm developing an aneurysm.

Right-wing Hungarian governments have always regarded themselves as protectors of Hungarians in the neighboring countries who also have voting rights.

This being said, this obviously is all part of Orban's pre-election anti-Ukrainian hysteria, along with the military checkups and the "open letter"

Evolution of Viktor Orbán's government propaganda:

2017: “Let’s not let Soros have the last laugh!”

2026: “Let’s not let Zelensky have the last laugh!”

By the way, can anyone guess the common feature that makes both such convenient scapegoats for a far-right government?

Put Iran on the blockchain

by Andrew Yang

Four years on The war between Russia and Ukraine enters its fifth year

The weekend is here and @bearmarketbrief.bsky.social is out!

Read about the Slovak and the Hungarian government holding up an EU loan to Ukraine, the latest on the Geneva talks, what impedes Siberia's development and more!

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open.substack.com/pub/bearmark...

Остатки средств на счетах выросли в 55 регионах По расчетам «Эксперт РА», по итогам восьми месяцев 2025 года объем остатков на счетах бюджета в органе Федерального казначейства и средств бюджета на депозитных счетах субъектов РФ вырос по сравнению ...

The report also mentions that regions (including Moscow) spent about one trillion rubles from their reserves in 2025 to cover expenditures. At the end of August, their reserves amounted to 3.3 trillion rubles, but 41% of this mount was held by Moscow.

bujet.ru/article/5110...

After almost a decade of decrease, driven by federal credit policy, the amount of more expensive bank loans in regional debt also started growing in 2024, and last year it tripled. More than 50% of the debt of 13 regions, including ones struggling with expenditures, now consists of market loans.

Рост регионального долга и дефицита бюджетов: итоги 2025 года | Эксперт РА Исполнение региональных бюджетов в 2025 году проходило в условиях сохраняющихся высоких процентных ставок, негативной динамики мировых цен на энергоресурсы, укрепления рубля, а также усиления санкцион...

Expert RA's analysis of the same data also lists regional debt growth - you can see that the debt burden of many the regions facing a sudden, large income drop, increased substantially in 2025, and not only in wealthier regions that are able to finance this debt.
raexpert.ru/researches/r...

Total* nonconsolidated regional expenditures: 9.1% ⬆️

Total own revenues: 4% ⬆️ (more than 10% ⬇️ in several oil regions, Kemerovo (coal), Vologda (steel))

Social policy expenditures: 19.4% ⬆️

Corporate income tax revenues: 8.8% ⬇️ (more than 20% ⬇️ in 17 regions)

*w/o occupied territories

Updated map chart based on the latest granular Treasury data for 2025.

Updated map chart based on the latest granular Treasury data for 2025.

Регионы закрыли бюджеты с рекордным дефицитом Мониторинг государственных финансов

Kommersant reviews AKRA's analysis, based on (likely more recently reviewed) Treasury data. The situation is basically the same as I described, with slightly different percentages - in the regions with the highest deficit, the numbers are even worse than in my count.
www.kommersant.ru/doc/8462688

The Trump effect, again?

I guess it makes sense for the RN to put a distance between themselves and Trump now -- there's a non-zero chance that someone tells Trump about the existence of French Guyana in the coming year, in which case Macron's coalition should have the 2027 election in the bag.

💥Here’s Viktor Orbán’s full statement on national security services warning of possible Ukrainian “attacks” on Hungary’s energy infrastructure — and his order to deploy the military.

Critics fear it could serve as a pretext for extraordinary and undemocratic measures before the April 12 election.

Over the past weeks, Orban has started to talk about his party's troubles in the polls with unusual candor - he would not say that Fidesz is so far behind, but he would remind activists that victory is not a given and that they are behind in many SMDs. A sign, perhaps, that he is aware.

Seriously, why would you even turn it on?

Putin’s defeat should ultimately be a proud, self-conscious and well-armed Ukraine integrated into the liberal institutions that the Kremlin so hates; and a society that, from top to bottom, is actively looking to replace the murderous old man who unleashed this calamity. We’re not far from this.

This would not only delay Russian rearmament, but may also very well incentivize Russians, both the elite and citizens, to actively think about the post-Putin future.

It however also needs European leaders to recommit to the foundations of their liberal democracies: states that can solve problems.

It’s unlikely that tanks are going to roll into Moscow and the EU will dictate the size of the Russian army; but the EU can and should use its regime as a permanent sword hanging over the head of Putin’s Russia, which however can turn into a carrot in some well-defined cases.

Following any sustainable ceasefire supported by security guarantees that enable Ukraine to continue arming itself and access the single market, there should and will be an investment boom in the country. There won’t be any in Putin’s Russia. It will be struggling with the consequences of the war.

The West should also paint a realistic picture not only of what Ukraine’s victory can and should look like but of what Russia’s defeat can look like.

In practical terms, this arsenal would include a realistic and short-term plan for Ukraine to access the single market, even without full EU membership, and produce high-quality weapons, but also to siphon off Russia’s best and brightest, and the money that Putin currently keeps in the country.

This is why I believe that the remainder of the West that is committed to liberal democracy has to use everything in its institutional arsenal: not only sanctions and weapons, but also institutional integration and its stability, wealth and attractiveness.

Currently, this broader war, fought in election booths, corrupt deals, propaganda outlets and sabotaged industrial establishments, is looking better for the Kremlin, but this mostly isn’t its own making. Putin’s hope though is that succeeding in one will help with the other. He’s right.

Second, perceptions matter internationally in the bigger conflict that the Kremlin has convinced itself (and many others) that it is actually fighting, against the Western-led liberal world and its institutions.

András Tóth-Czifra - Foreign Policy Research Institute

I wrote a lot about the decay of Russia’s economy, institutional arrangements and the understandings underpinning its domestic political stability (see e.g. my FPRI reports). Just because we don’t know exactly when things break does not mean they are infinitely strong.

www.fpri.org/contributor/...

Yet, maintaining the perception that in spite of this, Russia is winning this war because it can go on, is vital for the Kremlin for two reasons: first, perceptions matter domestically to maintain the necessary support & acquiescence through elite tolerance, social stability, and for recruitment.

On the most obvious level, it means a visible failure. The Kremlin sacrificed Russia’s economic and social development for decades, along with likely more than 400,000 Russians for one-fifth of Ukraine's territory, an unstable and (now) barren land, in an excruciatingly slow military advance.

Now a couple of thoughts about the state of the war.

Supposing that the Kremlin’s original war aim - the imperial domination of the whole of Ukraine - remains the same, and I think it does, Russia is not winning. On the contrary: it is losing. But we need to understand what this means.

Second, as The Guardian’s recent excellent article laid out, we should remember the warnings and how they went unheeded by most, from analysts (including, until relatively late, me) to Western and Ukrainian decision-makers. A lesson to (re)learn about the nature of imperial folly and dictators.