π’Excited to announce: EC'26
π
When: July 6β10, 2026
π Where: Rome, Italy
General Chair: Stefano Leonardi
PC Chairs: Alex Teytelboym & Matt Weinberg
Hope to see as many of you there!
@acmsigecom.bsky.social
#ACMEC26
@michal-feldman.bsky.social
Professor of Computer Science, @TelAvivUni | @ACM SIGECOM Chair | Research areas: Econ&CS, Algorithmic Game Theory, Market Design
π’Excited to announce: EC'26
π
When: July 6β10, 2026
π Where: Rome, Italy
General Chair: Stefano Leonardi
PC Chairs: Alex Teytelboym & Matt Weinberg
Hope to see as many of you there!
@acmsigecom.bsky.social
#ACMEC26
Couldnβt have done this with better coauthors @PaulDutting @michal-feldman.bsky.social!
Also indebted to the experts who provided early feedback, including (on π¦) @jose-correa.bsky.social @gkatzelis.bsky.social @timroughgarden.bsky.social π
Looking forward to the discoveries Algorithmic Contract Design will bring in 2025! π«
07.01.2025 20:49 β π 1 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Section9οΈβ£focuses on ambiguous contracts, where the principal deliberately introduces ambiguity to gain utility.
Applications for social good are in Sectionπ, and scoring rules/no-money delegation/information design appear in Section 11.
π
Sections 7οΈβ£and 8οΈβ£are about machine learning and contracts:
Section 7 is about ML for contracts: learning contracts from samples.
Section 8 is about contracts for ML: connecting strategic classification and contract design, and ML task delegation (e.g., data collection).
π
In Section 6οΈβ£, we consider a model generalizing both contract and auction design: contracts with typed agents. π
07.01.2025 20:49 β π 1 π 0 π¬ 1 π 0In Section 5οΈβ£, we explore all (known) ways contract design becomes combinatorial and computationally complex: a single principal-agent pair with a combinatorial action/outcome space, multiple agents forming a team, or multiple principals sharing an agent.
π
It starts out with the principal-agent problem setting (Section 2οΈβ£) and LP formulation (Section 3οΈβ£).
Section 4οΈβ£ is dedicated to the beloved class of linear contracts - their approximation guarantees relative to optimal contracts, and their max-min optimality.
π
Just wrapped up this project: 2+ years in the making!
Why so long? Rapid advances in Algorithmic Contract Design made it hard to stop adding material!
Huge thanks to the amazing researchers whose feedback took this to the next level.
So, what's in the survey?π
πNew Survey alert: Algorithmic Contract Theoryπ
Thrilled to share our survey, co-authored with @PaulDutting & @inbaltalgam.bsky.social, on a topic close to our heart
Check it out:
πarXiv: arxiv.org/abs/2412.16384
πFnTTCS: bit.ly/3Pp91So
Curious? Read this threadπ
@acmsigecom.bsky.social
All videos of #ACMEC24 workshops are now online on the @acmsigecom.bsky.social YouTube channel:
www.youtube.com/playlist?lis...
Thank you @yannaigonch.bsky.social
Our Econometrica paper on "Ambiguous Contracts" is finally out! π
www.econometricsociety.org/publications...
Huge thanks to Paul Duetting, Daniel Peretz, and Larry Samuelson for the fun and inspiring collaboration π
It's tough to gain visibility as a young researcher, and it's job market season! Are you a theoretical computer science PhD/postdoc on the job market?
I don't have a crazy juge audience but I'll try to help a bit: fill this form, and I'll tweet your pitch and info!
docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1F...
ΧΧ¨ΧΧ’ Χ€ΧͺΧΧΧͺ Χ©Χ Χ Χ©Χ ΧΧΧΧΧ§ΧΧͺ!
ΧͺΧΧ ΧΧͺ ΧΧ ΧΧΧ ΧΧ‘ΧΧΧΧ ΧΧΧΧͺ ΧΧΧΧ’ΧΧ ΧΧΧΧΧ§ΧΧ ΧΧΧ ΧΧ‘Χ ΧΧΧΧ ΧΧΧ¨Χ‘ΧΧΧͺ ΧͺΧ ΧΧΧΧ πββοΈπ€ΈββοΈ
Check out the amazing list of SIGecom job market candidates
πππ
@acmsigecom.bsky.social