@gregkoblentz.bsky.social
I research, teach, and write about about the causes and consequences of the proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological (CBRN) weapons to states and terrorists. Views are my own.
Tocsin...Toxin....get it?
Sound the Tocsin: A Summary of the @biodefensecomm.bsky.social “Pick Your Poison: The Enduring Threat of Biological Toxins” at the @atlanticcouncil.bsky.social
pandorareport.org
Pandora Report 3.13.2026
This issue highlights emerging concerns about biological toxins, the continued spread of H5N1 across the Americas, new research and vaccine efforts to combat avian influenza, and upcoming opportunities in biodefense and global health security.
pandorareport.org
A new pre-print "A Labour of Harm: Artificial Intelligence and Biological Weapons Acquisition" discusses how focusing on technological capability risks overlooks the human processes through which biological weapons are imagined
Read here⬇️
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....
Important new paper provides useful context for the sociotechnical factors limiting influence of AI on development of biological weapons
A Labour of Harm: Artificial Intelligence and Biological Weapons Acquisition by @ghionis.bsky.social @nnconnell.bsky.social et al
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....
this will be interesting.....
Meanwhile:
White House stalls release of approved US science budgets www.nature.com/articles/d41...
China pledges billion-dollar spending boost for science www.nature.com/articles/d41...
Mass firings leave national security ranks thinned as war raises threats
www.washingtonpost.com/national-sec...
Intel report warns large-scale war ‘unlikely’ to oust Iran’s regime
www.washingtonpost.com/national-sec...
Pandora Report 3.6.2026
This issue highlights evolving chemical and biological weapons risks, update on H5N1 in the US and Cambodia, shifting leadership in U.S. public health institutions, and the growing intersection of biotechnology, AI, and biosecurity governance.
www.pandorareport.org
Strikes on Iranian Nuclear Sites Signal Resolve To End Tehran’s Nuclear Weapons Program
www.fdd.org/analysis/202...
So nothing can get in or out but the facility may also be too deep for destruction, even by MOPs (US had to use 12 against Fordow). Without return of IAEA inspectors, Iran will retain unsafeguarded latent nuclear capability.
Key takeaway is that IAEA believes Iran's HEU is stored in a tunnel complex at Isfahan, which Iran declared as an enrichment facility but IAEA has never inspected, that is twice as deep as the Fordow enrichment site and the entrances have all been buried by Iran.
The entrances to the underground facility at Isfahan are 600 feet/180 meters below the mountain peak (per ISIS report) which is approximately twice as deep as Fordow, which was struck with 12 GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrators in June 2025.
As of March 3, the site had not been struck by the US or Israel
www.nytimes.com/2026/03/03/w...
In early February, Iran completely buried the three entrances to the tunnel complex/IFEP indicating this was a high value site they sought to protect from airstrikes.
isis-online.org/isis-reports...
Iran's storage of its 20% and 60% HEU at this site, coupled with potential enrichment capability at this site, is concerning and would have been the highest priority site for IAEA to inspect under the (never implemented) Cairo Agreement.
Since Iran claims the IFEP was attacked in June 2025 and the tunnel complex at Isfahan is known to have been attacked at that time, it is reasonable to infer Iran had built, was building, or planned to build an enrichment facility inside the tunnel complex.
Details on this tunnel complex, which was built in 2005 and upgraded in 2020-2021 can be found here: isis-online.org/isis-reports...
IAEA believes that the 184 kg of 20% HEU and 441 kg of 60% HEU is stored at "the tunnel complex at Isfahan."
IAEA cannot provide update on status of Iran's declared enrichment facilities since it has not had access to them since June 2025.
IAEA assess that 7 declared facilities were subject to military attack plus Iran has claimed the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant (IFEP) it declared on June 12 was also attacked. IAEA has never visited the IFEP.
Iran has not provided access to any of the fuel cycle facilities attacked in June 2025 despite the September 2025 Cairo agreement on ‘Practical Steps on Safeguards Implementation in Iran pursuant to the NPT Safeguards Agreement following the armed attacks on its safeguarded nuclear facilities’
Latest IAEA report on status of Iran's nuclear program. Highlights to follow
www.iaea.org/sites/defaul...
ODNI MIA on HEU
Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act in the FY23 NDAA directs the DNI to provide Congress and the public with unclassified reports on the status of Iran's nuclear program every 6 months. Last update provided in March 2025.
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-c...
Per the FY23 NDAA, ODNI is required to submit unclassified reports to Congress and public every 6 months on the status of the Iranian nuclear program. So Gabbard should have released 2 such reports since the March threat assessment. Where are they?
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-c...
Takeshi Ebisawa Sentenced To 20 Years In Prison For Conspiring To Traffic Nuclear Materials, Narcotics, And Firearms
www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr...
This is playing with fire...
This is a problem:
"AI-enabled synthesis and retrosynthesis capabilities are provided by a heterogeneous set of vendors and some are offered with limited or no user verification."