🗞️ Sunday extras:
"After Rojava: What’s Next for the Kurds?" with David Romano and @gonultol.bsky.social . [1/5]
🗞️ Sunday extras:
"After Rojava: What’s Next for the Kurds?" with David Romano and @gonultol.bsky.social . [1/5]
@gonultol.bsky.social talks with David Romano to unpack the collapse of the Kurdish forces in Syria.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=VfQL...
Done.
13.02.2026 01:40 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0😀
12.02.2026 15:07 — 👍 1 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
Turkey’s FM Hakan Fidan says Washington may be prepared to tolerate limited Iranian enrichment under strict limits, while Iran may accept tight caps and intrusive inspections resembling the 2015 model—if it gets meaningful sanctions relief. www.reuters.com/world/middle...
12.02.2026 15:02 — 👍 0 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 0
In a geoeconomically fragmenting world, it is interesting to watch what actually counts as “power” for middle powers like Turkey. www.state.gov/releases/off...
10.02.2026 21:56 — 👍 2 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
The Trump administration is trying to build a critical minerals trading bloc with allies—using tariffs to enforce minimum prices and push back against China’s grip on supply chains. It even hosted a summit in DC last week.
Turkey wasn’t invited. 1/2
Today, the same concept—rebranded as “strategic partnership”—is being celebrated. 4/4
08.02.2026 15:28 — 👍 3 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0
That phrase matters because it signals that on the most consequential issues nothing has fundamentally changed, the relationship remains transactional.
In 2005, when France and Germany floated the idea of a “privileged partnership” it sparked outrage in Turkey. 3/4
None of Turkey’s core demands—modernizing the Customs Union, easing visa restrictions for Turkish citizens, or access to SAFE (let alone a credible membership horizon)—have moved an inch.
If anything, the key takeaway from the visit was the EU’s repeated emphasis on a “strategic partnership.” 2/4
EU commissioner Marta Kos’s visit to Turkey—and her warm rhetoric about Turkey’s growing importance and the EU’s need to deepen ties—has had the intended effect. In Ankar, it’s being hailed as the start of a new chapter in Turkey–EU relations. But that reading is far too optimistic. 1/4
08.02.2026 15:28 — 👍 8 🔁 5 💬 1 📌 3slow erasure of a shared cultural symbol. The building was left to decay for years, then demolished in 2018 and rebuilt in 2021. It was part of a broader effort to challenge what Erdogan sees as the cultural dominance of secular elites and to leave his own imprint.
02.02.2026 15:06 — 👍 8 🔁 3 💬 1 📌 0
Trump’s fixation on the Kennedy Center echoes Erdogan’s obsession with the Atatürk Cultural Center (AKM) — a modernist landmark and a symbol of the secular republic founded by Atatürk.
In 2008, Erdoğan shut the AKM under the pretext of “renovation” and what followed was a ++
📌Trump Orta Doğu'da Türkiye'yi dışlıyor mu?
📌Suriye'de Amerikan diplomasisi ile askeriyesi karşı karşıya mı geldi?
📌Trump İran'ı vurma emri verir mi?
Gönül Tol @gonultol.bsky.social ile konuşuyoruz.
Abone olmayı unutmayın!
www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRJ-...
🧵 New piece: What Syria’s fast-moving map changes mean for Turkey’s PKK push—and the Turkey–Israel rivalry inside Syria.
1/ Post-Assad Syria posed Ankara two immediate problems: Kurdish autonomy along Turkey’s border + Israeli actions Ankara saw as undercutting its goals. (1)
From Ankara's perspective, once the SDF issue is settled, a division of influence in Syria — Israel in the south, Turkey in the north - is acceptable, perhaps even advantageous. If Israeli forces withdraw, scrutiny will inevitably shift to Turkey's tens of thousands of troops inside Syria. If Israel stays, Damascus may feel more exposed and therefore more inclined to deepen cooperation with Turkey. This is the dilemma Israeli decision-makers now face as they weigh their next moves in Syria.
Ankara’s double win: Kurds, Israel, and the new Syria mei.edu/publication/...
By @gonultol.bsky.social #Syria #Turkey #Kurds #Israel
Good on Syria, and the balance between Turkish and Israeli influence.
27.01.2026 18:21 — 👍 1 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 0
to Turkey’s tens of thousands of troops inside Syria.
7/ Israel’s dilemma: If no deal is reached with Damascus—and Israel maintains its post–December 8 presence in Syria—Damascus may feel increasingly exposed and respond by deepening its cooperation with Ankara.
Full piece here 👇
Israel may find it harder to resist U.S. pressure to compromise.
6/ Ankara’s view: once the SDF issue is settled, a division of influence (Israel in the south, Turkey in the north) is acceptable—maybe even advantageous. If Israeli forces withdraw, scrutiny will inevitably shift (4)
4/ But “PKK disarmament process is dead” is premature: Öcalan likely sticks with disarmament talks unless violence against Kurds spirals out of control.
5/ Israel file: Ankara is in a stronger position than before. With Sharaa gaining ground—and Trump seemingly backing him— (3)
2/ The latest shifts suggest Trump envoy Tom Barrack helped tip the balance toward Ankara on both fronts.
3/ PKK file: the SDF’s collapse + the end of the Kurdish autonomy project strengthen Erdoğan’s hand at home and weaken Öcalan’s leverage. (2)
🧵 New piece: What Syria’s fast-moving map changes mean for Turkey’s PKK push—and the Turkey–Israel rivalry inside Syria.
1/ Post-Assad Syria posed Ankara two immediate problems: Kurdish autonomy along Turkey’s border + Israeli actions Ankara saw as undercutting its goals. (1)
Here is the most striking thing: Rojava’s rise helped Erdoğan consolidate power at home—and its unraveling looks set to bolster his grip on power well beyond 2028. 4/4
19.01.2026 15:58 — 👍 3 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0presidential rule and the accumulation of unprecedented power. For the Kurds, by contrast, dismissing Washington’s warnings contributed to the unraveling of what many saw as their greatest achievement: Rojava. 3/4
19.01.2026 15:58 — 👍 1 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0Yet their shared skepticism toward US engagement produced starkly different outcomes. President Erdoğan skillfully used US–SDF cooperation to stoke anti-American sentiment and nationalist fears, forging a durable alliance with the nationalist MHP that enabled his long-sought shift to 2/4
19.01.2026 15:58 — 👍 2 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0Since the United States began airdropping weapons to Syrian militias fighting ISIS in Kobane in 2014, American officials have repeatedly insisted that the partnership was “transactional and temporary.” Two actors never accepted that claim: Turkey and the Kurds. 1/4
19.01.2026 15:58 — 👍 2 🔁 2 💬 1 📌 1
New reports that Ankara is mediating between Hezbollah and Damascus have sparked a fresh debate: is Turkey emerging as Hezbollah’s new partner? Several experts—including me—weighed in. Read the full debate 👇 amwaj.media/en/debate/de...
17.01.2026 14:40 — 👍 5 🔁 5 💬 2 📌 0
Bottom line: Turkey’s strategy is not to choose between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, but to balance both. And the Turkey–Saudi–Pakistan defense pact is far less ambitious than a “Muslim NATO." You can read the full piece here. mei.edu/publication/...
17.01.2026 14:38 — 👍 3 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0corporate partnerships —giving the UAE greater structural leverage. Ankara is also acutely aware of Abu Dhabi’s lobbying clout in Washington, which Turkish officials believe has previously worked against Turkey’s interests.(5/6)
17.01.2026 14:38 — 👍 1 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0not a binding commitment to automatic military action. Crucially, Turkey has no interest in sidelining the UAE. While Saudi capital has helped Erdoğan at key moments, Abu Dhabi’s financial footprint is far more deeply embedded in Turkey’s economy—from currency swaps and capital markets to (4/6)
17.01.2026 14:38 — 👍 2 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0