My latest piece on Turkey and the Iran war:
1️⃣ NATO intercepted a second Iranian missile that entered Turkish airspace. Ankara warned Tehran, while Iranian officials denied responsibility and said they respect Turkish sovereignty. But Iran’s so-called “mosaic defense” strategy, 1/4
Valuable thread from @gonultol.bsky.social
conflict for four to five months. For Erdoğan, that would be a nightmare scenario ahead of possible early elections in 2027.
4️⃣ Most importantly, Ankara believes it has little leverage to shape the course of this war.4/4
👉 Read the rest here: mei.edu/publication/...
One vulnerable asset is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which supplies roughly one-third of Israel’s oil imports.
3️⃣ Turkish officials I spoke with say Iran and its allies have tens of thousands of drones, missiles, and rockets, potentially enough to sustain the 3/4
which decentralizes decision-making, makes such assurances hard to rely on.
2️⃣ Disrupting regional trade and energy flows appear to be the unifying strategy in this decentralized structure. That poses serious risks for Turkey, which sits at the crossroads of key energy corridors. 2/4
My latest piece on Turkey and the Iran war:
1️⃣ NATO intercepted a second Iranian missile that entered Turkish airspace. Ankara warned Tehran, while Iranian officials denied responsibility and said they respect Turkish sovereignty. But Iran’s so-called “mosaic defense” strategy, 1/4
🗞️ Sunday extras:
"After Rojava: What’s Next for the Kurds?" with David Romano and @gonultol.bsky.social . [1/5]
@gonultol.bsky.social talks with David Romano to unpack the collapse of the Kurdish forces in Syria.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=VfQL...
Done.
😀
Turkey’s FM Hakan Fidan says Washington may be prepared to tolerate limited Iranian enrichment under strict limits, while Iran may accept tight caps and intrusive inspections resembling the 2015 model—if it gets meaningful sanctions relief. www.reuters.com/world/middle...
In a geoeconomically fragmenting world, it is interesting to watch what actually counts as “power” for middle powers like Turkey. www.state.gov/releases/off...
The Trump administration is trying to build a critical minerals trading bloc with allies—using tariffs to enforce minimum prices and push back against China’s grip on supply chains. It even hosted a summit in DC last week.
Turkey wasn’t invited. 1/2
Today, the same concept—rebranded as “strategic partnership”—is being celebrated. 4/4
That phrase matters because it signals that on the most consequential issues nothing has fundamentally changed, the relationship remains transactional.
In 2005, when France and Germany floated the idea of a “privileged partnership” it sparked outrage in Turkey. 3/4
None of Turkey’s core demands—modernizing the Customs Union, easing visa restrictions for Turkish citizens, or access to SAFE (let alone a credible membership horizon)—have moved an inch.
If anything, the key takeaway from the visit was the EU’s repeated emphasis on a “strategic partnership.” 2/4
EU commissioner Marta Kos’s visit to Turkey—and her warm rhetoric about Turkey’s growing importance and the EU’s need to deepen ties—has had the intended effect. In Ankar, it’s being hailed as the start of a new chapter in Turkey–EU relations. But that reading is far too optimistic. 1/4
slow erasure of a shared cultural symbol. The building was left to decay for years, then demolished in 2018 and rebuilt in 2021. It was part of a broader effort to challenge what Erdogan sees as the cultural dominance of secular elites and to leave his own imprint.
Trump’s fixation on the Kennedy Center echoes Erdogan’s obsession with the Atatürk Cultural Center (AKM) — a modernist landmark and a symbol of the secular republic founded by Atatürk.
In 2008, Erdoğan shut the AKM under the pretext of “renovation” and what followed was a ++
📌Trump Orta Doğu'da Türkiye'yi dışlıyor mu?
📌Suriye'de Amerikan diplomasisi ile askeriyesi karşı karşıya mı geldi?
📌Trump İran'ı vurma emri verir mi?
Gönül Tol @gonultol.bsky.social ile konuşuyoruz.
Abone olmayı unutmayın!
www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRJ-...
🧵 New piece: What Syria’s fast-moving map changes mean for Turkey’s PKK push—and the Turkey–Israel rivalry inside Syria.
1/ Post-Assad Syria posed Ankara two immediate problems: Kurdish autonomy along Turkey’s border + Israeli actions Ankara saw as undercutting its goals. (1)
Ankara’s double win: Kurds, Israel, and the new Syria mei.edu/publication/...
By @gonultol.bsky.social #Syria #Turkey #Kurds #Israel
Good on Syria, and the balance between Turkish and Israeli influence.
to Turkey’s tens of thousands of troops inside Syria.
7/ Israel’s dilemma: If no deal is reached with Damascus—and Israel maintains its post–December 8 presence in Syria—Damascus may feel increasingly exposed and respond by deepening its cooperation with Ankara.
Full piece here 👇
Israel may find it harder to resist U.S. pressure to compromise.
6/ Ankara’s view: once the SDF issue is settled, a division of influence (Israel in the south, Turkey in the north) is acceptable—maybe even advantageous. If Israeli forces withdraw, scrutiny will inevitably shift (4)
4/ But “PKK disarmament process is dead” is premature: Öcalan likely sticks with disarmament talks unless violence against Kurds spirals out of control.
5/ Israel file: Ankara is in a stronger position than before. With Sharaa gaining ground—and Trump seemingly backing him— (3)
2/ The latest shifts suggest Trump envoy Tom Barrack helped tip the balance toward Ankara on both fronts.
3/ PKK file: the SDF’s collapse + the end of the Kurdish autonomy project strengthen Erdoğan’s hand at home and weaken Öcalan’s leverage. (2)
🧵 New piece: What Syria’s fast-moving map changes mean for Turkey’s PKK push—and the Turkey–Israel rivalry inside Syria.
1/ Post-Assad Syria posed Ankara two immediate problems: Kurdish autonomy along Turkey’s border + Israeli actions Ankara saw as undercutting its goals. (1)
Here is the most striking thing: Rojava’s rise helped Erdoğan consolidate power at home—and its unraveling looks set to bolster his grip on power well beyond 2028. 4/4
