Mariana Velasco-Rivera

I am delighted to say that Lars Vinx and I have signed a contract with @universitypress.cambridge.org for our Handbook on the Limits of Constituent Power. The aim of the Handbook is to shed much-needed critical light on the concept and practice of constituent power.
@cambridgelaw.bsky.social

Israeli Int'l Law Scholars on Plan to "Concentrate" Gaza Population Israeli international law scholars send urgent letter to Israel’s Minister of Defense, the IDF Chief of Staff, the Attorney General.

Group of Israeli international law scholars send urgent letter to Israel’s Minister of Defense, IDF Chief of Staff, and Attorney General

On plan to "concentrate" Palestinian population in South Gaza

via @eliavl.bsky.social and @tamarmegiddo.bsky.social

Japan is such a fascinating case!

Thank you so much, Paolo!!

Thank you, Tobias!

Writing this book was a long journey. I have many people to thank for their support who are duly mentioned in the ackowledegments so I won’t risk missing anyone here. In any case, you know who you are. Thank you. ✨

Since the book is quite expensive, I expect that some people won’t be able to get it — but if you’re able to recommend it to your librarian that would be very much appreciated :)

If you would like to learn more about the book here’s a free chapter for you: academic.oup.com/book/60428/c...

And if you’d like to get it, here’s a discount code: AUFLY30

—please feel free to share widely.

The framework highlights how the interplay of political parties, party systems, constitutional culture, and key political actors' (eg. President and/or Supreme Court) decisions influence the mode of constitutional change.

Building on Mexico’s (tragic) experience I propose an analytical framework for understanding constitutional change, suggesting that both formal and informal change occur within an 'economy of constitutional change.'

Focusing on Mexico as a case study I explore the non-institutional factors that influence the relative ease of amendment to its constitution.

Drawing from the US experience, many assume it's the stringency of amendment rules. However, Mexico, with similar a rule to that of the US, has one of the most amended constitutions in the world. So, if it's not the stringency of the rules, what is it?

Happy publication day to me!

Here’s a little celebratory thread🧵 to explain what the book is about:

One of the everlasting questions in constituional theory and practice is what makes a constitution difficult to amend?

I guess I’m here now 🙄