Yunus Şahin

Temmuzla birlikte bedenlenmiş veya bedensel biliş alanındaki önemli bir tartışmaya eğiliyoruz. Dilbilim okurken dile bedensel yaklaşımlar baya ufkumu genişletmişti. Hem dilbilim okuyan ve çalışanlara hem de dille ilgilenen her disiplinden katılımcıya tavsiyemdir.

Bedenlenmiş Biliş ve Dil – Alper Kumcu (PhD) | Eğitim #24 - CogIST Hayatımız boyunca kelimelere başvurmadan neredeyse hiçbir düşünceyi sürdüremeyiz. Hepimizin kabul edeceği gibi dil oldukça soyut kavramları barındırırken kendisi de doğrudan dış dünyada bulunan bir ci...

Daha fazla bilgi almak ve kayıt olmak için: cog-ist.com/duyuru/beden...

Bence bu, belki de açıktan dile getirmediği bir "Yapacak hiçbir şey kalmadı" kanaatinin sonucudur. Ki bu kanaate katılırım işte.

Burak Bilgehan hocayı sever ve sayarım. Yakın zamana kadar da "E tamam da ne yapalım?" sorusuna somut cevap verebilen tek siyaset bilimci olarak da görürdüm. Fakat bu yayında, ayrışma noktalarında, maalesef söylediği akla yatkın tek bir önerme bile göremiyorum.

Eskiden siyaseti, bu farklı yorumları ve analizleri günbegün takip edip, kendim de bu akıl yürütme ve kamusal tartışma süreçlerine ayak uydurmak, belki katkı sunmak istiyordum. Fakat 2022 Aralık'tan beri ama özellikle de 2023 Mayıs'tan beri büsbütün anlamsız geliyor.

Parlamenter Sistem için Yol Ayrımında mıyız? | Berk Esen | Çavuşesku'nun Termometresi ÖZEL #255 YouTube video by Daktilo1984

Bu çok iyi yayın olmuş. İlk bi saati izledim. Tüm tartışma noktalarında Berk Esen'e hak veriyorum.

www.youtube.com/live/x4eO3Vz...

Twitter'ı kapattım. Gündem tartışmaları canımı çok sıktı. Bir hafta kafa dinleyeyim.

Dil ve Düşünce Etkileşimleri Yaz Kampı - Arkhé Projesi

Detaylı bilgi ve başvuru için: archeprojesi.com/kamp/dil-ve-...

İşaret dilleri her doğal dil gibi kompleks yapılardır ve zihinsel prensiplere sahiptir. Peki, işaret dillerini işler kılan sözlüksel sistem nasıl çalışır? Düşünceyle nasıl bir etkileşim içindedir? Arkhe'de Maharrem Ayar'ın işaret dilleri üzerine dersini dinleyeceğiz!

#cogist

I think this is the epistemological ground-zero for cognitive science. And my proposal is that, we can build on this our 'philosophy of cognitive science' as well rather than taking philMind -and commitments related to that field- as the fundamental.

Notice that, this is true for all theories in cogsci be it computationalism, cognitivism or any kind of embodiment. We first look at some form of organism-environment interaction and than we interprete it in particular ways, as our theoretical commitments dictate. +

And I take it that, in cognitive science, what we observe and interprete via our theories and methodologies are, before everything else, organism-environment interactions -action, behaviour or simply just interaction, doesn't matter how we name it here- +

In doing so, philosophers may or may not refer to scientific and empirical theories/findings. But philosophy of cognitive science, as a subdiscipline of philosophy of science, deals with how cognitive science is being conducted and how it should be conducted. +

Of course it is hard, or maybe impossible to draw a strict line. It pretty much depends the particular scholar's tendencies and what they seek for in those fields. But I take it that, philosophy of mind tries to answer the question of "what is mind?" +

Bu dönemin son Akademi Kognisyon'u! Gelin, öğrenelim, konuşalım, tartışalım.

Kafeste Yön Bulmak: Göçmen Kuşların Göç Rotasyonu – Utku Fuat Dailli | Akademi Kognisyon #34 - CogIST 34. Akademi Kognisyon‘da Ankara Üniversitesi‘nden Utku Fuat Dailli’yi dinleyeceğiz. Göçmen kuşlar ve göç içgüdüsü (zugunruhe) üzerine yapacağı sunumda, bu kuşların göç davranışları hakkında nasıl çalı...

Etkinliğe kaydolmak ve içerik hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak için: cog-ist.com/etkinlik-duy...

"Communicative #AI" @politybooks.bsky.social
My copy of the book that was recently co-authored with @coeckelbergh.bsky.social finally showed up in today's post.
www.politybooks.com/bookdetail?b...

I would be delighted to hear your feedback and criticism. I love debates!

I owe deep thanks to my advisors Esra Mungan and Oğuz Erdin, and to the entire Boğaziçi University Cognitive Science program, for the freedom they gave me, their sincere friendship, and their unwavering support.I hope to share parts of this work in article form very soon.

We shouldn't try to naturalize what is unnatural, but rather we should expand the domain of what is already natural. I ended the thesis by sketching possible directions for future research into a non-mentalistic ontology for cognitive science.

Just like biology doesn’t rely on a vitalist ontology, but philosophers of biology still reflect on the concept of life, philosophy of mind can reflect on cognition, but it shouldn’t underlie the scientific frameworks. The flow should go from cognitive science to philosophy of mind, not the reverse

2) I never claimed philosophy of mind is useless. I simply argued that problems like the mind-body problem are for philosophers of mind, not for cognitive scientists. Theories in cognitive science should not depend on philosophy of mind, but rather be constrained by philosophy of science.

In the final chapter, I added a few clarifications to prevent misunderstanding. Most importantly:

1) I’m not a reductionist. I don’t assume a fundamental level of reality or analysis. All levels are interdependent fictions.

I briefly attempted to situate this proposal in relation to existing schools within cognitive science, clarifying which approaches it aligns with and which it stands in opposition to.

Finally, I claimed that the radical externalism I defend dissolves the internal/external distinction itself. Instead of positing a framework that presupposes an answer to the metaphysics of mind, we should remain agnostic in that regard and allow cognitive science to proceed without it.

I argued that those who claim we must work with such concepts, and that special sciences must first posit special ontologies and then operate within them, are obliged to demonstrate such a categorical necessity. Otherwise, I claim, my position remains the more reasonable one.

or mentalistic vocabulary. And imagine they were trying to explain biological diversity and the phenomena on Earth we took to be 'mental.' I argued that they could explain everything without ever needing such discordant concepts. Thus, there is no categorical necessity to introduce them.

NCC tells us to opt for the latter.)

To further support my view, I presented a thought experiment: imagine a group of Martian scientists far more advanced than us in their methodology, technology, "formalisms like mathematics" and science generally which lack any teleological, normative...

(Although not discussed in the thesis, this could also apply to concepts like goal-directedness/normativity vs. equifinality. Whether we invoke normativity or treat the same phenomenon as equifinality in a long-distance/long-term causal chain is a theoretical decision.

and insisting on mechanistic explanations ultimately enabled scientific progress. I argued that if special science reasoning had prevailed at the time and treated "entelechy" as a special ontology, we might today be facing a problem analogous to the mind-body problem.