Thomas Zimmer

In this lecture, @lioneltrolling.bsky.social offers a brilliant synthesis of the fascism debate, demonstrates why it makes sense to conceptualize the Trumpist Right as a specifically American version of fascism, and provides an extremely incisive analysis of where America stands. Excellent.

And a lot of these billionaires perceive even the slightest amount of pushback they are getting from us peasants as a totalitarian leftist threat that leaves them no choice but to go all hyper-reactionary and use their wealth to support a far-right "counter-revolution" against liberal democracy.

I'm learning a bunch from every episode you're doing, and I feel much, much better equipped to analyze and handle the world around us because of the pod. What you are doing is immensely valuable!

!!!

🙏

"In Bed With the Right" is easily among the smartest, most incisive analysis of gender politics, culture, and whatever is happening on the Right you'll find anywhere. Grateful to @adriandaub.bsky.social and @moiradonegan.bsky.social for what they are offering with their podcast. Please listen!

No, not a euphemism - a distinct concept established in political/social science since the 80s. I talk about this in the piece.

Oh, I agree with that - this piece is really not an attempt to explain the election result, but focused on misconceptions about a rightward realignment and the type of lasting coalition Trump was supposedly building. If the question is: Why did he win in 2024? the factors you mention are crucial.

What is really going on in this society that elected Donald Trump president a second time?
 
I wrote about three stubborn myths regarding Trump’s support and what happened in the 2024 election – and why America is experiencing a de-alignment rather than a rightward realignment:

If and when Trump leaves the scene, the country will still face a daunting task:

Who can channel the disruptive political energies of a society in which the established institutions have lost the people’s trust into a (small-d) democratic direction?

However, both major parties are vastly unpopular, and trust in established institutions has been declining massively.
 
America is not experiencing a realignment as much as it is going through a de-alignment of the established order.

Trump does not have a stable conservative/right-leaning majority behind him, he does not represent the “will of the people.” America remains deeply divided, with a numerical majority rejecting the reactionary agenda and generally supporting the vision of liberal pluralism.

Among Latinos, for instance, support for Trump is concentrated heavily among protestants, and especially evangelicals – and among those who favor a strict anti-immigration policy and generally regard the prospect of a pluralistic, liberal society very skeptically.

We do see a partisan sorting of the non-white electorate according to identity and ideology – something that has shaped the white electorate for decades. But that doesn’t mean Trumpism as a political project isn’t defined by a reactionary ethno-national vision for America.

What about the fact that Trump has indeed strengthened his support among people of color between 2016 and 2024? Well, first of all, whatever gains he made with Latinos, especially, seem to have evaporated a year later – not exactly indicating a lasting realignment.

No matter where we look: Religious identity, racial and cultural resentment, attitudes towards the religious/racial/cultural pluralization of American society are dividing the country - and shaping the political conflict - much more strongly than education polarization.

Put differently: If you look at a group of voters with the same education, their level of racial resentment strongly predicts their vote choice. But in a group of people with the same level of racial resentment, educational attainment does not allow for a strong prediction of their politics.

In 2024, people with high racial resentment scores strongly tended to vote for Donald Trump, regardless of their educational attainment; by contrast, people with low racial resentment scores strongly tended to support Kamala Harris, whether they had a college degree or not.

Among white people, the correlation between racial resentment and their voting decision is much, much stronger than between educational attainment and political alignment.

In fact, if you control for racial resentment, education polarization basically disappears.

To think of people with a college degree as synonymous with a “liberal elite” makes no sense: That group also includes those who graduated from the many religious-conservative colleges.

And there is little correlation between education and political alignment among people of color.

What about “education polarization” though, often presented as the root cause of everything that is happening in U.S. politics – the closest thing we have to a widely accepted master narrative?
 
Its impact is dramatically overstated; its implications are generally misinterpreted.

Yes, Trump dominates among the *white* working class (if defined as people without a college degree). But even here, religion played a key role: In 2024, about 86 percent of non-college white evangelicals voted for Trump – vs. only a minority of the non-evangelical white working class.

The tribune of the poor, the downtrodden? Studies clearly indicate that Trump’s most ardent supporters, especially in poorer areas, are, by local standards, quite wealthy / financially stable. Their “economic anxiety” is mostly downstream from anxieties over racial and cultural status.

Trump does not represent the “will of the people” – a stable majority of Americans, including about two thirds of those who call themselves independents, reject core tenets of the Trumpist agenda. It is the Republican Party that is losing touch with the mainstream of American society.

Ideas of a “populist revolt” against ignorant liberal elites, a backlash against “woke” radicalism are stubbornly persistent – as is the idea that Trump emerged from the election with a broad mandate to correct course and impose his radical agenda.
 
But it’s just not true.

After the election, prominent commentators immediately reached for grand explanations that were intended to match the emotional impact of what many perceived to be a shocking victory. We were witnessing nothing short of an era-defining rightward realignment, we were told.

I tackle three building blocks of the misleading “realignment” narrative:

1) The idea that U.S. society moved right in accordance with the broader outlines of Trumpism’s vision;

2) that Trump is the tribune of the working class;

3) that he is building a stable multiracial coalition.

What is really going on in this society that elected Donald Trump president a second time?

This is my attempt to synthesize the empirical information we have and build on the best available analysis. The question really matters. We can’t afford to cling to fallacies and (willful) misunderstandings.

The Myth of a Rightward Realignment Let’s discard some stubborn misconceptions about Trump’s support and what happened in the 2024 election that are obscuring our understanding of a profound de-alignment

The Myth of a Rightward Realignment
 
Let’s discard some stubborn misconceptions about Trump’s support and what happened in the 2024 election. They are only obscuring our understanding of a profound de-alignment.

As the piece is partially behind a paywall, I’ll share some key thoughts:

🧵

🙏