Tjerand Silde

I am co-organising (with @drl3c7er.bsky.social and Lucjan Hanzlik) a workshop on Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography in Rome on May 10 as an affiliated event to IACR Eurocrypt. Submit your best PEC-work (3-page extended abstract) for presentation by February 25th: privcryptworkshop.github.io

Submission week for the Cryptographic Application Workshop (CAW), an affiliated event at Eurocrypt'26 in Rome! Please submit your talk proposals on constructive real-world crypto using the following instructions before Jan 23, 2026 AoE. All infos on: caw.cryptanalysis.fun.

We're hosting an Autumn School in London, UK, from 15 to 17 September 2026, to bring together ethnographers and cryptographers to discuss ways in which the two fields can be meaningfully brought into conversation. This is also the premise of our Social Foundations of Cryptography project: to ground cryptography in ethnography. Here, we rely on ethnographic methods, rather than our intuition, to surface security notions that we then formalise and sometimes realise using cryptography. Our intention is to 'flip' the typical relationship between the computer and social sciences, where the latter has traditionally ended up in a service role to the former. Rather, we want to put cryptography at the mercy of ethnography. But how do we do this? How do we as cryptographers interact with and make sense of ethnographic field data? How can we refine, improve or extend this interaction? What obstacles do we face when we make cryptography rely on ethnographic data which is inherently 'messy'? How do we handle that cryptographic notions tend to require some form of generalisation but ethnographic findings can only be particular? How do ethnographers retain the richness of ethnographic field data in conversations with cryptographic work? Indeed, our project has already highlighted some limitations of our approach. It has brought to the fore concrete challenges in 'letting the ethnographic data speak' while still making it speak to cryptography. The Autumn School is an opportunity to explore these questions jointly across ethnography and cryptography, through a series of talks, group discussions and activities. We say a bit more about the programme and registration for the Autumn School here.

Social Foundations of Cryptography: Autumn School
London, UK | 15 to 17 September 2026
social-foundations-of-cryptography.gitlab.io/school

Lecturer (≅ Assistant Professor/Juniorprofessor/Maître de conférences) in Cryptography at King’s College London 2026 We are looking to recruit a lecturer in cryptography at King’s College London to work with us within the cybersecurity group: I think it’s fair to say we got strong expertise in lattice-based and p…

Come work with us!

Lecturer (≅ Assistant Professor/Juniorprofessor/Maître de conférences) in Cryptography at King’s College London

martinralbrecht.wordpress.com/2026/01/05/l...

www.jobbnorge.no/en/available...

Germany has agreed to stop ChatControl for now, due to huge amounts of public pressure. Good job! The bad news is that it could come back as soon as December, and the German government has interpreted the feedback as a need to “moderate” the proposal.

The Discord Hack is Every User’s Worst Nightmare A hack impacting Discord’s age verification process shows in stark terms the risk of tech companies collecting users’ ID documents. Now the hackers are posting peoples’ IDs and other sensitive informa...

Discord user IDs getting leaked is the entirely predictable consequence of requiring platforms to do age verification. That data never goes away, it spreads. In this case, into appeals in a breached customer support database. And predictably, it can get worse. www.404media.co/the-discord-...

Forhåpentligvis snart!

Citizen Protest Halts Chat Control; Breyer Celebrates Major Victory for Digital Privacy In a major breakthrough for the digital rights movement, the German government has refused to back the EU's controversial Chat Control regulation yesterday after facing massive public pressure. The go...

Ser ut som de er i mot forslaget til slutt: www.patrick-breyer.de/en/citizen-p...

Someone please make me understand how Denmark can be at the same time freaking out about hybrid war with Russia AND pushing for government-mandated spyware as Chat Control.

YouTube video by Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy What is Chat Control?

What is chat control? Good video explainer developed by @carmelatroncoso.bsky.social and team at Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy #chatcontrol www.youtube.com/watch?v=-y2O...

We are alarmed by reports that Germany is on the verge of a catastrophic about-face, reversing its longstanding and principled opposition to the EU’s Chat Control proposal which, if passed, could spell the end of the right to privacy in Europe. signal.org/blog/pdfs/ge...

Ja det høres plausibelt ut

Det burde det ja. Åpenbart eksempel på såkalt "freemium", hvor ting testes gratis, samler inn mye info, og lærer om bruken nå, og så vil det bli big business etterhvert for å beholde tilgang og få benytte avanserte funksjonaliteter.

Interessant, det var eg ikke klar over, og finner heller ikke noe om Chat GPT via UiO når eg søker litt rundt i NTNU sitt intranett...

Abstract. We present Olingo, a framework for threshold lattice signatures that is the first to offer all desired properties for real-world implementations of quantum-secure threshold signatures: small keys and signatures, low communication and round complexity, non-interactive online signing, distributed key generation (DKG), and identifiable abort. Our starting point is the framework of Gur, Katz, and Silde (PQCrypto 2024). We change the underlying signature scheme to Raccoon (Katsumata et al., Crypto 2024), remove the trapdoor commitments, and apply numerous improvements and optimizations to achieve all the above properties. We provide detailed proofs of security for our new framework and present concrete parameters and benchmarks. At the 128-bit security level, for up to 1024 parties and supporting 2⁶⁰ signatures, our scheme has 2.6 KB public keys and 9.7 KB signatures; while signing requires communication of 953 KB per party. Using the LaBRADOR proof system (Beullens and Seiler, Crypto 2023), this can be further reduced to 596 KB. An optimistic non-interactive version of our scheme requires only 83 KB communication per party.

Image showing part 2 of abstract.

Olingo: Threshold Lattice Signatures with DKG and Identifiable Abort (Kamil Doruk Gur, Patrick Hough, Jonathan Katz, Caroline Sandsbråten, Tjerand Silde) ia.cr/2025/1789

Signal Protocol and Post-Quantum Ratchets We are excited to announce a significant advancement in the security of the Signal Protocol: the introduction of the Sparse Post Quantum Ratchet (SPQR). This new ratchet enhances the Signal Protocol’s...

In 2023, Signal was the first mainstream messenger to enable post-quantum cryptography. We’re still ahead of the (elliptical) curve, implementing a new hybrid PQ ratchet ensuring Forward Secrecy & Post-Compromise Security even in a post-quantum world. signal.org/blog/spqr/

Nå må vi ikke være utelukkende negative her, det finnes mange nyttige bruksområder som for eksempel å lage vittige akronymer som tittel på forskningsprosjekter. Slikt kan ikke måles i penger.

NTNU gjør allerede noe lignende (vi vet jo ikke nøyaktig hvordan Oxford skal benytte Chat GPT Edu enda) ved bruk av Microsoft Copilot: i.ntnu.no/wiki/-/wiki/...

The EU has never been closer to agreeing on Chat Control – here's how we got here and what’s at stake The Danish version of Chat Control is thought to have the best chances of becoming law since 2022

Burn it with fire

Offentleg KI-teneste skal gi nordmenn trygge helseråd på Helsenorge Regjeringa har tatt det første steget for å etablere ein nasjonal teneste for helserelaterte spørsmål basert på generativ kunstig intelligens (KI). Nyleg ba Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet om ei vurder...

Ah ja hvorfor satse på personvernvennlige nettsider med riktig informasjon når man heller kan samle persondata via en tjeneste som tar feil iblant FOR FUCKS SAKE STATEN dere -kan- ikke være så cucked www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/o...

500 eksperter siger nej til EU’s chatkontrol | Version2 Vi støtter alle målet, men midlet fører til masseovervågning og betydeligt svækket sikkerhed, siger lektor i kryptologi.

The same interview but in Danish: www.version2.dk/artikel/500-...

500 eksperter sier nei til EUs overvåkingsforslag Det fører til masseovervåkning og betydelig svekket sikkerhet, sier førsteamanuensis ved NTNU.

Interview in Norwegian news regarding #ChatControl: www.digi.no/artikler/int...

More than 500 researchers have signed an open letter against the dangerous EU proposal on chat control.

The proposal remains ineffective, undoes decades of results in E2E encryption, and threatens the privacy of half a billion citizens.

csa-scientist-open-letter.org/Sep2025

The EU Parliament has published a new proposal for Chat Control to mass-surveil all digital communication in Europe. The proposal is ineffective, weakens secure communication, and violates basic human privacy. This must be stopped immediately. #ChatControl
csa-scientist-open-letter.org/Sep2025

Accepted papers at IACR Asiacrypt 2025 are now available online (not a complete list yet): iacr.org/cryptodb/dat...

EU is demanding that every site use age verification technology, while insisting it do things it cannot do, and behave in a manner it cannot behave. This is not policy making. This is wishful thinking, with a side of "we'll just blame the tech companies for not waving their magic wand."

Full klar over det, og det er hva som menes med angreknapp i artikkelen på NRK.