Daniel Spiro

I do think, however, most environmental economists underestimate the costs of global warming, compared to my beliefs.

On the other hand, most non-specialists would not voice a public opinion on it either. FYI, Nordhaus is an outlier among environmental economists. He is respected for his methodological contributions, but not for his policy advice.

C4: Economists in general are very worried about global warming. Hardly anyone would think or call the costs of 2 degrees “trivial”, let alone 3-6 degrees. That said, most economists are not working in environmental economics and would not really be aware of how fundamentally things may change.

C3: Clearly false. Economists are generally skeptical to subsidies. There are exceptions, such as subsidizing R&D or green investments, or alleviating poverty. I cannot think of anyone that would say let’s subsidize rich people.

Paper is probably right that most economists expect that increasing GDP (holding other policies fixed) will increase welfare, but with plenty of caveats (Lipsey Lancaster mentioned were economists!). Whether it is empirically true I do not know, neither do authors of paper.

Most economists probably think that GDP is 1 important proxy for welfare but that it is incomplete. For instance, except for things mentioned above, inequality, institutional stability, rule of law, peace etc are viewed as important in their own right and there are plenty of econ research on this->

Paper is right in the sense that utility almost always contains consumption. But wrong because utility is always concave in consumption, so increasing consumption of a poor person gives higher improvement than doing so for the rich. ->

In macro it is quite common to include utility from leisure; in environmental economics there is direct utility from the environment or its degradation harms production which harms consumption thus utility. ->

Switch to english...

C2: Paper is wrong in the sense that, in normative economic models the goal is _not_ to maximize GDP, it is to maximize welfare of the population (a utility function). This utility function may have several components.->

Jag tror inte rapporten svarar på den frågan, den fokuserar på systemtjänsterna.
Jag tror (killgissning) att den direkta effekten av nedlagd KK (att det nu finns mindre KK i SE3 och SE4) är viktigare än den indirekta (att överföring från norr till söder blir sämre).

Min läsning av rapporten i ett politiskt perspektiv är alltså att den säger att regeringen överdrivit problemet (systemtjänsterna inget problem) men att det fortfarande finns stora problem (effektbrist).

ger för lite systemtjänster. Rapporten/analysen visar att så inte är fallet.
Det Tidö mfl tryckt mest på är att nedlagd KK/ökad vind lett till för lite effekt, dvs att man inte får den el man vill när man vill.
Rapporten/Wråke säger att effektbrist fortfarande är ett problem.->

Jag tycker inte att det är det rapporten och Wråke säger (även om man får det intrycket av ingressen).
Det de talar om är systemtjänster (såsom att frekvensen inte avviker för mycket från 50 hertz). Det har funnits en farhåga att nedlagd KK och ökad vind (som inte tillhandahåller sånt) ->

antingen är helt dumma i huvudet, eller är ondsinta. [Jag tycker mina diskussioner med dig alltid är bra!]
Jag tycker artikeln du länkade andas detta tyvärr. Ta gärna vilken du vill av deras H1-10 eller C1-4, gärna den som låter värst, så kan jag säga om/varför den är en felaktig beskrivning.

De jag jobbar med uppskattar jag väldigt mycket. Likaså tycker jag individuella diskussioner med naturvetare i princip alltid är bra.
Det som inte är bra, och rent av obehagligt ibland, är vissa personer och grupperingar från naturvetarsidan inom miljö som verkar tro/tycka att ekonomer ->

Jag själv (och fler ekonomer inom miljö och naturresurser) jobbar med ekologer, miljövetare, earth-system fysiker mm. Det är generellt väldigt värdefullt, om än ibland trögt pga skillnader i terminologi och kunskap. Det funkar bra så länge man har epistemic humbleness och tror gott om den andre.

Jag tittade på de hypoteser de ställer upp i artikeln, som påstås representera economics. Blev sen förvånad över att artikeln publicerats 2024, eftersom deras påståenden är baserade på ekonomi från typ 50-talet och rätt grava missförstånd. Det är så mycket att unpack att jag blir alldeles matt.

I’m sure Trump could help them remain without a profit.

One question is what would be the most crippled if part of EU was controlled by Putin-apologetics: aid in the form of monetary policy, fiscal policy/loans or military equipment.

But who do you buy it from?

give away some of its resource and business opportunities (like infrastructure) to those that aided it during war.

Of course you are right that if the EU consists of lots of Putin-verstehers any such avenue (fiscal, monetary, military) would be difficult.

Just like it's understood that, if you lend out a grenade to someone at war you won't get that grenade back afterwards, it would be understood that some of the loans would not be paid back.
The loans (or part thereof) would be either for free, or the attacked country could, after the war,->

What I think would happen in your scenario is that, rather than relying on monetary policy, the EU and its member states would rely on the member states' governments providing the loans and assistance in mil equip (and possibly personnel).
->

Incredibly interesting thread Niko. It seems plausible what you write.
I don't know what analysis goes on in the ECB, but I do think the question of monetary policy has to be viewed in combination with EU-wide fiscal and defense policy.->

A very interesting thread on the interaction between economic policy and security

I actually agree on the "icon" and "legend" part -- coal was an integral part of the industrial revolution which enabled immense improvements in living standards.
But I disagree about "the moment", coal belongs to history: economically, environmentally and health-wise.

What speaks against this hypothesis of mine is that Sweden, and the Nordic countries in general, also have a lot of civicness and private contributions (in the form of time and engagement) to public goods (such as sports clubs and local activities).

If, say, Russia would have invaded Sweden in 2018, our problem wouldn't just have been a weak military, but also that it would have taken a long time before people would have really understood that it's also their job to resist, fight etc.

I think this has partly changed now in Sweden, many understand that there exist great problems that you cannot simply rely on the state to protect your from. But up until covid and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine the mentality was very different. ->

But it does create a sense that "surely it's somebody's job to fix this".
When all of society is under stress (as in war) each person really needs to be part of the solution, you need to solve both your own problems and be part of solving society's problem.->