What do you see in a double eclipse? Philosophers agree you see the far object. But which part? Not the front, and not the back. The edge? Daniel García Saavedra, argues you see the far object, without seeing any of its parts.
Read it here: philpapers.org/rec/GARBPS-2
@tomstoneham.dair-community.social.ap.brid.gy
Come write some philosophical fiction with me in York @yorklitfest.bsky.social!
Everyone is welcome and all you'll need to bring with you is a pen and paper.
Tickets and more event info: www.yorktheatreroyal.co.uk/show/lets-ge...
#York #CreativeWriting #PhilSky @uoyphilosophy.bsky.social
There's (literally) no time like the present to read Dave Ingram's newly revised entry for the Spring 2026 edition of The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Presentism!
plato.stanford.edu/entries/pres...
Tom Stoneham recently gave a talk in Oxford as part of an AI & Ethics Conference. Video(s) here!
www.mpls.ox.ac.uk/training/mpl...
On 21 January, Tom Stoneham was on the radio talking about AI companions. Starts at 57 minutes.
soundcloud.com/voislam/brea...
Daniel Morgan on Napoleon's and Joseph Stalin's contribution to the moral psychology of addiction: ahc.leeds.ac.uk/centre-theor...
The National Student Survey (NSS) gathers students’ opinions, which are used to improve student experience and keep the Department accountable. Final year undergraduates in Philosophy will be contacted via email. Please use this opportunity to express your views!
Join a two-hour workshop where you can try your hand at writing the best kind of fiction: philosophical fiction!
The workshop (on March 6th) is run by Rachel Handley, and is part of the York Literature Festival.
Find out more, and register here: www.yorktheatreroyal.co.uk/show/lets-ge...
Sandrine Berges has just co-edited a very exciting book with Alan Coffee, called Women and Republicanism!
Access the book here: academic.oup.com/book/61867
Check out our new Equity, Diversity and Inclusion webpage!
Learn about the work of our EDI team, and then dig into two spotlights: Sandrine Berges on the history of abolitionism, and Mike Stuart's adventures teaching philosophy in prison!
www.york.ac.uk/philosophy/a...
Come write some weird and philosophical fiction with me at the @yorklitfest.bsky.social in March! You know you want to!
Tickets: www.yorktheatreroyal.co.uk/show/lets-ge...
@uoyenglishrl.bsky.social @livunienglish.bsky.social @sotauol.bsky.social @uoyphilosophy.bsky.social @yorkstjohn.bsky.social
We are delighted to invite you all to the inaugural BJPS Popper Prize Lecture on Wednesday 25 February 2026 6.30-8pm. To be delivered by the 2024 BJPS Popper Prize winners, Alex Franklin and Vanessa Seifert. This hybrid event will be hosted by LSE. Please register here: www.lse.ac.uk/events/molec...
📣 Letter with the latest updates on EPSA2027 *and* EPSA2029, changes in the steering committee, the proceedings for EPSA25, and more... #philsci
There are 10 days left to submit a proposal for the 6th Biennial EENPS Conference (Bucharest, 18–19 September 2026).
Submission deadline: 15 February!
Talks and symposia across all areas of philosophy of science are welcome ☀️
eenps2026.sciencesconf.org
#philsci
On 30 June 1642 Briggett Drewie recounted her experience of the 1641 rebellion. At the hands of the rebels, she was left a pregnant widow: ‘being left in that miserable state & predicament great with chyld’. Learn more about her story and others here: voicesproject.ie/impact/blog-...
Very pleased to share details of a new permanent academic job opportunity in Creative & Cultural Industries at University College Dublin. We are seeking candidates with a PhD whose work engages with the commercial creative industries. Deadline: 6 March 2026 universityvacancies.com/university-c....
The University of York - two fully-funded PhD positions as part of the IndiBrain European training network (Project DC9 & DC10). Offer a unique opportunity to conduct cutting-edge neuroimaging research in a multidisciplinary environment. Apply via portal: indibrain.eu/recruitment
Good news - we have a new ERC-funded 4-year PhD Studentship at the University of Edinburgh, based in Philosophy and our Centre @technomoralfutures.bsky.social, supervised by Dr Emily Sullivan; the project applies philosophy of science to assessing ML's epistemic & social value. Apply by 16 March!
we are better off in many ways reading the accounts of the women philosophers who lived in those homes.
The home has not always featured in our lives in the way it did when Simone de Beauvoir (or Betty Friedan) wrote about it. And although Beauvoir, like many philosophers before her, speculates about what the home was to those that came before her,
It is, after all, where the food gets made that allows them to keep working). Furthermore, bringing up the perspective of women philosophers on the problem of the home will enable a study of that problem in all its historical richness and variety.
But bringing up the writings of earlier women will help debunk this myth and show that the home was only absent from (historically recorded) philosophy because the women were, and men did not regard it as a problem (why would they?
It seems that as things are, the home is absent from mainstream versions of the history of philosophy, and we would be forgiven for thinking that it was a new problem, one brought up perhaps by Simone de Beauvoir in the Second Sex.
This book is about the home, but from the perspective of a selection of women philosophers, from antiquity to the twentieth century, from Japan to South America, and Constantinople to Boston. One aim is to reinstate the home as a philosophical problem, worthy of inquiry.
Sandrine Bergès's book on The Home is out! You can't own a physical copy until March (😭), but the online version is accessible now, here: academic.oup.com/book/61894
Abstract in the comments!
the (alleged) categorical force of all moral reasons, not merely agent-neutral reasons.
If you're interested, contact Jamie for a preprint!
Williams’s internal reasons constraint. Drawing the distinction in this way enables us to resituate the conflict between Kantians and their anti-rationalist internalist opponents (traditionally your archetype Humean, desire-based reason theorists) as one concerning
necessarily part of the subjective motivational set of all rational agents – the second, conciliatory aim is to offer a theoretically neutral way of understanding the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons that is compatible with
the event to which the reason applies. To the extent that the reconstruction of this dialectic highlights an inconsistency in Nagel’s position – Nagel cannot maintain the truth of his neo-Kantian cognitive internalism while defending the idea that agent-neutral reasons are
