Welcome to the Trump administration, ladies and gentlemen.
09.12.2025 11:16 β π 5 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0@zackcooper.bsky.social
Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute Lecturer at Princeton University Partner at Armitage International Former Pentagon and White House staffer Wrangler of children
Welcome to the Trump administration, ladies and gentlemen.
09.12.2025 11:16 β π 5 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0βWithout a plan for terminating a war in Taiwan, Washington would risk repeating the pattern of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan that many Trump officials critiqued: winning the first battle but losing the war,β argues @zackcooper.bsky.social.
06.11.2025 17:20 β π 9 π 4 π¬ 3 π 1The team at ChinaFile asked eight of us to assess the state of play in US-China relations and who has the upper hand in the ongoing negotiations. I think it's pretty clear.
Beijing is showing its capabilities and biding its time. And it's working.
www.chinafile.com/conversation...
I'm just going to leave this here... π€
www.aei.org/foreign-and-...
In the last year we have gone from:
BEIJING begging WASHINGTON to allow it to buy advanced semiconductors
to...
WASHINGTON begging BEIJING to allow it to sell advanced semiconductors
I give up. π€¦ββοΈ
ASIA INSIGHT PODCAST: Zack Cooper (@zackcooper.bsky.social), Bee Yun Jo, and Lavina Lee discuss the sustainability of U.S. extended #deterrence and #nuclear restraint in #Australia, #Japan, and #SouthKorea in light of three trends. www.nbr.org/publication/...
12.09.2025 21:40 β π 4 π 1 π¬ 0 π 0In short, the time has come to rethink the rebalance.
This world will be more complex and dangerous. But American strategists must accept the world they have created and craft realistic approaches to protect US interests in this evolving region.
rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publica...
Implication 4: These shifting regional dynamics suggest that nuclear proliferation in Asia is a real and growing risk.
If Washington's position in Asia erodes, how would the United States react if some of its allies and partners were to pursue independent nuclear options?
Implication 3: As Chinaβs influence in continental Asia grows, the US might embrace an offshore balancing role.
If the United States adopts an maritime balancing strategy, what would this imply for US allies and partners (like Thailand and South Korea) on the Asian continent?
Implication 2: As Northeast Asian security dominates US engagement, Taiwan will become a litmus test.
But if the US disengages outside Northeast Asia and then stands aside on Taiwan, would this effectively erode what is left of the US position across the entire Asian region?
Implication 1: As security dominates the economic and governance pillars of US strategy, Northeast Asia is once again dominating Washingtonβs thinking.
Will US leaders support or oppose Asian powers (especially India and Indonesia) playing bigger roles in their sub-regions?
What does this mean going forward?
Rather than asking whether these constraints can be reversed, observers should start thinking about how US policy and the Indo-Pacific region will adapt.
I see four basic implications that raise hard questions for American strategists:
Americans must recognize that these three constraints are not primarily about foreign views of Donald Trump.
They are more fundamental. They are due to shifting US views and foreign perceptions of America.
Constraint 3: Regional trust in the US has eroded, limiting US options and influence.
Even close allies are reshaping their engagement with Washington to protect their independence in the face of US pressure and unpredictability.
Constraint 2: Washington will not develop and implement a positive economic agenda towards Asia.
Both parties abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Now the United States will be sidelined as regional economic integration accelerates.
Constraint 1: Asia will not receive the resources that Asia experts desire (barring a conflict with China).
This is due to both America's global responsibilities and the American peopleβs waning appetite for additional overseas spending/engagement.
This is a fundamental change, but it started before Trump.
Going forward, US strategy in Asia will face three constraints, which will require us to rethink our whole approach to the region.
Now, the Trump administration appears to be refocusing its attention on security in Northeast Asia, boiling US strategy down to:
Pillars:
β
Security
β Prosperity
β Good governance
Sub-regions:
β
Northeast Asia
β Southeast Asia
β South Asia
β Oceania/Pacific Islands
But the rebalance stumbled because Washington was:
1) Distracted and failed to devote sufficient resources to Asia
2) Unable to implement a positive regional trade agenda
3) Too often viewed the rest of the region through the lens of competition with China
When it was announced, the rebalance included 3 pillars across 4 sub-regions:
Pillars:
- Security
- Prosperity
- Good Governance
Sub-Regions:
- Northeast Asia
- Southeast Asia
- South Asia
- Oceania/Pacific Islands
After 14 years, I think the time has come to acknowledge that the "Rebalance to Asia" has failed.
I've spent the last decade writing and thinking about how to make the rebalance successful, so this is a painful realization.
A thread on my new piece for RSIS...
Is the "Indo-Pacific" dead? πͺ¦
Today the Pentagon issued a statement labeling the "Asia-Pacific" the priority theater.
Coming ahead of the National Defense Strategy release and amidst heightened tensions with India, this will definitely raise some eyebrows!
Appreciate the thoughtful book review of Tides of Fortune this weekend in @financialtimes.com. Thanks @jamescrabtree.bsky.social!
www.ft.com/content/47d6...
There will be many remembrances, but if you donβt already know what Rich did in the last days of the Vietnam War, then you should watch this.
Wise. Fierce. Courageous. And always a lover of gossip.
He was larger than life. Hard to believe heβs gone.
www.pbs.org/wgbh/america...
Today was a tough day.
Most mornings the last decade my day started with a phone call from Rich Armitage. But not this morning.
Rich was a friend, a mentor, and a business partner. He was my biggest supporter (and sometimes my toughest critic).
He was a giant. What a life.
πΏ
24.03.2025 22:18 β π 48 π 14 π¬ 0 π 2Looking forward to joining this RAND event tomorrow on the US-Japan alliance - great lineup!
If youβre in Los Angeles (or want to stream), join us here:
www.japanhousela.com/events/rand-...
Delighted to join so many fantastic scholars as part of the Wilson China Fellowship for the coming year.
Thanks to the Wilson Center and Carnegie Corporation for bringing together this great group!
www.wilsoncenter.org/article/wils...
Really useful discussion of the core tensions to Trump's foreign policy strategy.
06.03.2025 14:38 β π 2 π 2 π¬ 0 π 0Prioritization or Retrenchment?
I think this is the central question for the US strategic community today.
Hereβs my new piece trying to add some historical perspective to this the strategic debate. Read it here:
theamericanenterprise.com/the-trump-ad...