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Law professors blogging since 2002 -- independent until 2014, hosted at Washington Post 2014-17, hosted at Reason 2017-now

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[Eugene Volokh] Open Thread What’s on your mind?
05.03.2026 08:04 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
Preview
[Ilya Somin] US Court of International Trade Orders Refund of All Illegally Collected IEEPA Tariffs Importantly, the Court ordered payment of refunds even to those businesses who have not filed a lawsuit to claim them.
05.03.2026 02:22 — 👍 0    🔁 1    💬 0    📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Court Dismisses Discrimination Claims Against Northwestern Over Alleged Post-Oct. 7 Anti-Semitism [1.] From Judge John Robert Blakey's decision yesterday in Doe v. Northwestern Univ., the allegations in the Complaint (note that at this stage they are of course just allegations): In the days following [the October 7] attack, several members of Northwestern's faculty in Evanston posted about the attack on social media, with one stating "resistance is justified when a people are occupied." Another professor, Steven Thrasher, said a New York Times story on sexual assault allegations relating to the October 7 attack was "widely discredited," and noted that a story by the Guardian was disturbingly "similar." School programs like the Northwestern Women's Center and the Asian American Studies Program also made statements on social media. The Women's Center shared a brochure from the Palestinian Feminist Collective with short articles on protests and advocacy, protest chants, hashtags like #AlAqsaFlood, and website links to suggested readings about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Asian American Studies Program made a statement on Islamophobia and disputed reports that Hamas had "beheaded babies." Student groups like Students for Justice in Palestine ("SJP") issued statements accusing "Zionists" of "whitewashing" and legitimizing the "genocide" of Palestinians, which several Northwestern faculty members signed onto. Northwestern maintains a satellite campus in Qatar ("Northwestern Qatar"), through which students and faculty in Evanston and Qatar may visit the other campus in exchange programs. At Northwestern Qatar, faculty also posted on social media about the Hamas terror attack. Professor in Residence Khaled AL-Hroub called for a Third Intifada to "sweep away the occupier," while an assistant professor in residence tweeted the "chain must be broken," in reference to the Hamas incursion into Israel. AL-Hroub also participated in a radio interview where he said he had not seen "any credible media reporting" that Hamas killed women and children on October 7th, prompting Northwestern to issue a statement condemning the "attempt to minimize or misrepresent the horrific killing of Israeli civilians by Hamas." On April 25, 2024, student demonstrators at Northwestern's Evanston campus organized an encampment of tents, protest signs, and flags on Dearing Meadow, the campus' central lawn. Within the encampment, several individuals dressed up as members of Hamas, demanding to know whether others spoke Hebrew. Some of the signs featured blatant antisemitic imagery, like a slashed-out Star of David or a drawing of Northwestern's President Schilll—a Jewish man—with horns and blood dripping from his mouth. In and around the encampment, several demonstrators physically assaulted or shouted slurs at Jewish students. During the encampment, participants also shouted slogans like "Intifada, Intifada, Long live the Intifada," "Globalize the Intifada," "Resistance is justified when people are occupied," and "From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free." When Jewish students attempted to document the encampment, they were physically assaulted, blocked from entering, or had phones and cameras knocked out of their possession. In a video statement to the Northwestern community, President Schill condemned such incidents of antisemitism, stating that the signs with a slashed-out Star of David or the drawing of him with horns left "no ambiguity" about their antisemitic nature. On the first day of the encampment, Northwestern issued statements declaring the encampment was prohibited and that students who refused to remove their tents would be subject to arrest. Northwestern Police cited several students who refused to remove their tents. Despite these efforts, the encampment persisted, and demonstrators declined Northwestern's offer to "peacefully assemble" in compliance with Northwestern policies. Seeing this, Northwestern decided to "move forward with other options to protect the safety of the community." While the encampment continued, Northwestern turned off the regularly scheduled lawn sprinklers on Dearing Meadow. Northwestern also allowed demonstrators, some not affiliated with the school, to access the Multicultural Center, normally accessible only to students. On April 29, 2025, four days after the encampment began, Northwestern reached an "agreement" with the encampment organizers. Under the agreement, demonstrators removed their tents from Deering Meadow, while Northwestern promised to cover the undergraduate tuition of five Palestinians, and to renovate a house for Middle Eastern, North African, and Muslim students. Northwestern also condemned the doxing of "any community member" and advised employers not to rescind job offers for students engaging in speech "protected by the First Amendment." {"Doxing" involves releasing someone's personal details onto the Internet in an easily accessible form and it may be used to humiliate, intimidate, threaten, or punish the identified individual.} Following the agreement, Northwestern SJP held an overnight sleepover on the lawn. Two days later, on May 1, 2024, student demonstrators held a "Strike for Gaza" on Northwestern's Evanston campus. Some professors cancelled classes so students could participate, while others lectured at the demonstration. Some of the posters at the demonstration stated, "resistance is justified when people are occupied #AlAqsaFlood," and participants repeated similar messages. During these on-campus demonstrations, Northwestern's school library asked demonstrators to "please consider saving your protest materials," inviting student demonstrators to submit materials for preservation in the University Archives. Northwestern also maintains a Campus Violence Prevention Plan aimed at disciplining any "community member" who engages in "unacceptable behavior" like "intimidating, threatening, or violent behaviors that affect the ability to learn, work, or live in the University environment." Under the plan, community members who display material that degrades a person or group, or causes harm or fear for one's safety remains "subject to disciplinary action." [2.] The court rejected plaintiffs' Title VI hostile environment harassment claim (though, as with the other claims, they can try to replead it with more specific factual allegations, if they think those allegations are well-founded): A school "can only be liable for harassment about which it has actual knowledge." School officials have actual knowledge "only of the incidents that they witness, or those that have been reported to them." Courts, therefore, have "focused on reports or observations in the record of inappropriate behavior to determine when school officials had actual notice." As a predicate matter, Plaintiffs must allege that a school official was aware of the "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" harassment. Yet in many instances here, Plaintiffs have not done so in the current complaint. Plaintiffs allege liability and predicate their claims of loss of access to educational benefits on a variety of incidents, all relating to demonstrations in the wake of Hamas' October 7 terrorist attack. They allege a Title VI violation based upon "many other incidents on campus" which contributed to the hostility they endured. But Plaintiffs do not plead any facts about what these "other incidents" involve; nor do they allege how these "other incidents" were reported to Northwestern officials, or that those officials otherwise had actual knowledge of such incidents. For example, John Doe 2 alleges that he was the subject of a "derogatory and harassing online post." Yet Plaintiffs do not allege anyone reported this post to Northwestern officials, or that Northwestern officials had actual knowledge of the post. Likewise, John Doe 3 attributes his loss of access to educational benefits to a variety of events, including "antisemitic rhetoric" being "shouted at him," online harassment, false accusations, his observation of posters at a May 1, 2024 demonstration, and an interaction with a protestor at that demonstration where the protestor said to him, "resistance is justified when people are occupied." Again, however, Plaintiffs do not allege that Northwestern had actual knowledge of the antisemitic rhetoric, online harassment, or false accusations John Doe 3 faced, or knowledge of the substance of his alleged harassment. Plaintiffs similarly do not allege that Northwestern officials had actual knowledge of the interaction between John Doe 3 and the protester at the May 1, 2024 demonstration. With no allegations that Northwestern had the requisite actual knowledge of these specific instances of harassment, Plaintiffs fail to properly allege a Title VI claim in connection with these incidents. Across all the alleged instances of severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive conduct (that certainly deprived Plaintiffs of access to educational opportunities as alleged), there is just one—the encampment—where Plaintiffs allege facts to show school officials had actual knowledge. There, Plaintiffs' claims of deliberate indifference [an element of the hostile educational environment claim -EV] also lack sufficient factual detail, but for a different reason. At the Deering Meadow encampment, numerous participants engaged in antisemitic harassment: dressing up as members of Hamas, displaying antisemitic signs, and assaulting or verbally harassing Jewish students. For Title VI liability to attach, however, Northwestern must have not only known about the conduct but been deliberately indifferent to it. Plaintiffs allege that Northwestern did nothing in the face of such offensive conduct and "allowed" the encampment to "clamor for five days uninterrupted." Plaintiffs add that Northwestern even encouraged, "accommodated," and "acquiesced to" the protesters: turning off its lawn sprinklers and awarding the protesters with "a bundle of goodies" in its negotiations to end the encampment. All of this, Plaintiffs argue, shows Northwestern was deliberately indifferent. Deliberate indifference is a "stringent standard of fault." The deliberate indifference standard "requires that the school's response not be clearly unreasonable, which is a higher standard than reasonableness." A school's response is sufficient "so long as it is not so unreasonable, under all the circumstances, as to constitute an 'official decision' to permit discrimination." CA school's response does not need to be perfect or successful to clear this standard, and even a negligent response is not necessarily unreasonable under Title VI. Depending upon the circumstances, a school's ultimate decision to impose no remedial measures could suffice and might not be "clearly unreasonable" or constitute deliberate indifference…. As currently alleged, … the allegations do not explain how Northwestern's conduct was clearly unreasonable or deliberately indifferent. Indeed, in the paragraphs immediately following Plaintiffs' allegations that Northwestern "allowed" the encampment to clamor "uninterrupted," Plaintiffs describe efforts by Northwestern officials to bring the encampment to an end…. Northwestern officials also publicly denounced the encampment and told demonstrators that the encampment was prohibited. Thereafter, some protestors refused demands to remove their tents, and they received citations from Northwestern Police; and then, after this initial approach failed to end the encampment, Northwestern explored "other options to protect the safety of the community and the continued operations of the Evanston campus." Working over the weekend, Northwestern officials negotiated the end of the encampment in four days, "a relatively short period compared to similar encampment activity on other college campuses." … Northwestern officials did not leave the encampment totally "undisturbed" or otherwise order law enforcement to stand down in the face of unlawful conduct. Instead, Northwestern unsuccessfully tried to discourage protesters with warnings and police citations, before negotiating for the encampment's conclusion, with a "purpose in returning civil order." Plaintiffs take issue with Northwestern's decision to explore "other options," and accuse Northwestern of accommodating or acquiescing to the encampment. But Title VI does not mandate a specific set of increasingly punitive measures to remove hostile environments, and courts "must hesitate to second guess" officials' judgments to find the appropriate response. [Northwestern] officials came to the "defensible conclusion that intervention could have triggered an even larger and more disruptive backlash," … deciding that a negotiation would bring a quicker and more peaceful resolution. In short, the legal question is not whether Northwestern "could have handled each situation better," but rather was Northwestern "so indifferent to known acts of harassment that it caused students to undergo harassment or made them more vulnerable to it, and thereby undermined the students' education." The current complaint lacks the requisite allegation to show Northwestern's indifference. {In the current complaint, the Plaintiffs also lack detail regarding the concrete deprivations of access to Northwestern's educational benefits. To state a valid Title VI claim, Plaintiffs must "plead with specificity that the conduct at issue had some 'concrete, negative effect' on their education." Courts have found concrete deprivations existed where plaintiffs alleged they "were forced to change their study habits or change schools, where they had a measurable drop in grades or increase in absenteeism, or where they developed anxiety sufficient to require intervention." For example, in Gartenberg [a previous case involving Cooper Union in New York], plaintiffs alleged they suffered from "intense anxiety and panic attacks," "engaged therapists, missed and/or dropped assignments," and one student delayed completion of their degree. There, the court concluded plaintiffs plausibly alleged a loss of educational benefits and opportunities. Similarly, in Canaan v. Carnegie Mellon University, the plaintiff alleged that she missed numerous lectures and many hours of an 18-credit course, was denied meetings with a mentor, and avoided community events associated with her school program. This, too, was sufficient to show a loss of educational benefits and opportunities. So too in Frankel v. Regents of University of California, where plaintiffs were blocked from entering classrooms and ultimately missed their final exams…. Here, among other things, Plaintiffs allege that they "heard hateful expressions when walking near the encampment," that they were subjected to verbal or online harassment, that they viewed a friend being struck by a protester, and that they generally observed unspecified "other incidents" but, again, lack details of the denials of access to Northwestern's resources or opportunities.} [3.] The court also concluded that plaintiffs hadn't plausibly alleged facts necessary to prevail under a straight-up intentional discrimination theory: Plaintiffs claim they have alleged discriminatory intent, through "discriminatory conduct of official Northwestern departments, and the school's lucrative partnership with Qatar and Al-Jazeera." Plaintiffs add that Northwestern's "lucrative partnership with Qatar and Al-Jazeera" provides further "motive" for Northwestern to overlook antisemitism, and to "placate its major overseas donor and institutional partners." Plaintiffs further claim, "faculty and staff at Northwestern Qatar call for violence against Jews and support Hamas, consistent with the Qatari government." Plaintiffs argue, then, that the "back-and-forth flow of Northwestern Qatar's faculty and students with Northwestern's Illinois campuses," combined with Northwestern's refusal to discipline "discriminatory conduct of its Northwestern Qatar faculty," "results in an unsafe campus for Jews at Northwestern." The unsafe campus ultimately leads to Plaintiffs' alleged deprivation of access to educational benefits: "a harassing campus climate that is a direct result of Northwestern's lopsided and discriminatory policy enforcement." Plaintiffs' theory, however, does not explain how Northwestern's decision to establish a campus in Qatar demonstrates discriminatory intent on the part of Northwestern, and their arguments remain predicated upon conclusory allegations. Plaintiffs also plead no facts explaining how Northwestern is acting to "placate" Qatar, and they allege no non-conclusory facts plausibly showing a connection between Northwestern's foreign partnerships and its actions toward antisemitism on its Evanston campus. At this stage, Plaintiffs must allege "adequate factual detail to lift" their claims "from mere speculative possibility to plausibility." Plaintiffs have not. The alleged connection between Qatari faculty and students and Northwestern's Evanston campus is also conclusory. Plaintiffs repeatedly complain that the relationship between Northwestern-Qatar and Northwestern-Evanston contributes to an unsafe environment for Plaintiffs in Evanston, but they plead no facts as to how. Though Plaintiffs complain that students from Qatar "participated in the major antisemitic event on campus"—the encampment—Plaintiffs' only factual support for this allegation is an image of a poster stating, "NU Qatar 4 a Free Palestine." By itself, this poster fails to plausibly show discriminatory harassment under Title VI. Plaintiffs complain that Qatari faculty sometimes speak at "lectures and presentations" on the Evanston campus through Northwestern's exchange program, but Plaintiffs plead no facts about any event in Evanston with a Qatari faculty member who engaged in discrimination. Plaintiffs also plead no facts showing that any of the Qatari faculty members named in the Complaint ever visited Northwestern's Evanston campus. In short, Plaintiffs' current allegations do not plausibly show how Qatari faculty and students created an unsafe environment for Plaintiffs in Evanston. Finally, even where the complaint alleges individual Northwestern faculty and staff made offensive posts on social media, it fails to allege how those posts precluded Plaintiffs from participating in, or denied them the benefits of, an educational program. Plaintiffs do not explain the details of how the social media posts "so eroded" their experience at Northwestern that they were "denied equal access to its resources or opportunities." Without any allegations that Plaintiffs even encountered the posts, or that the posts affected the programs Plaintiffs were enrolled in, the posts, without more, cannot form the basis of a Title VI claim. [4.] The court likewise concluded that plaintiffs hadn't sufficiently alleged that Northwestern "enforce[ed] its policies in one manner when it comes to Jewish students, while enforcing them in another when it comes to all other protected classes": Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged two comparator cases as evidence of this lopsided enforcement. First, when Northwestern responded to white supremacist stickers on campus by filing police reports, working with local authorities, and issuing a condemnation of the behavior. Second, when Northwestern announced its opposition to racism and police brutality in the wake of George Floyd's murder. Without more, however, these two comparators are insufficient to demonstrate discrimination under the indirect method, because Plaintiffs have not put forth "a single example of a similarly situated individual" outside their protected class that "received the response" Plaintiffs sought from Northwestern upon complaining of harassment. Here, Plaintiffs' reliance on the encampment also lacks the temporal connection to show that Northwestern's disciplinary decisions led to the "harassing campus climate." Plaintiffs' suggestion that Northwestern's past disciplinary decisions somehow led to the encampment is too conclusory to impose Title VI liability as alleged. Plaintiffs plead no facts establishing a plausible inference that past disciplinary decisions were a cause of the Deering Meadow encampment. [5.] Plaintiffs also sued for breach of contract, but the court didn't consider that issue: Having determined that Plaintiffs' federal claim must be dismissed, the Court need not yet decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state-law breach of contract claim…. "The usual practice is to dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial." … Casey T. Grabenstein, Elizabeth Anne Thompson, James A. Morsch, Joshua W. B. Richards, and Megan Quinn Warshawsky (Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP) represent Northwestern. The post Court Dismisses Discrimination Claims Against Northwestern Over Alleged Post-Oct. 7 Anti-Semitism appeared first on Reason.com.
04.03.2026 17:49 — 👍 1    🔁 1    💬 0    📌 0
[Josh Blackman] SCOTUS Resolves Two-Way State Court Split About New Jersey Transit The New York Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is reversed.
04.03.2026 16:52 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[David Bernstein] Marco Rubio Threatens to "Unleash Chiang" on Iran. What? Rubio: "We're going to unleash Chiang on these people in the next few hours and days. You're going to really begin to perceive a change in the scope and intensity of these attacks as, frankly, the two most powerful air forces in the world take apart this terroristic regime." But what the heck does unleash Chiang mean? Some internet sleuthing tells me that after the Communists took over China and Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists fled to Taiwan, conservative commentators argued that the US should support a Nationalist invasion of the mainland. The shorthand for this became "unleash Chiang." Over time, in conservative foreign policy circles, "unleash Chiang" became slang for "unleash overwhelming force."   The post Marco Rubio Threatens to "Unleash Chiang" on Iran. What? appeared first on Reason.com.
04.03.2026 14:01 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Interesting Dissent in American Indian Religious Case Under Texas RFRA From a dissent from rehearing en banc Friday in Perez v. City of San Antonio, by Fifth Circuit Judge Andrew Oldham, joined by Chief Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod and Judges Jerry Smith, Stephen Higgenson, Don Willett, and James Ho: The City of San Antonio plans to destroy a sacred Native American religious site. The burdens on plaintiffs' religious freedoms are undeniable. But a panel of our court dismissed them. In my view, this easily meets the standard for en banc rehearing. And I respectfully dissent from the majority's contrary view…. Gary Perez and Matilde Torres are members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church. "For centuries, [their] ancestors have gathered at a specific bend along the [San Antonio] River to meditate, worship, and pray." Specifically, church members understand "the trees and cormorants that occupy a twenty-foot by thirty-foot area" near the River to be "the 'axis mundi,'" a bridge between this world and the after-life. These elements form a cohesive "spiritual ecology;" the trees' roots "go into the underworld, underneath the earth," before "ris[ing] all the way up into the heavens," while the cormorants signify "a spirit … [that] scattered life-giving water across the San Antonio River Valley" in the church's creation story. As in many faiths, the trees and cormorants' religious significance to the Native American Church turns on a tight relationship between the sign and the thing signified—"ceremonies cannot be properly administered without specific trees present and cormorants nesting." The City of San Antonio owns the land on which this sacred site rests, called Brackenridge Park. In 2022, the City announced "reformation efforts" in the Park. Among other things, the City plans to uproot most of the trees in the sacred area and deploy "pyrotechnics, clappers, spotlights, lasers, distress calls, effigies, balloons, explosives, and drones" to keep the cormorants away. The City maintains that this campaign "[will] not harm the birds." But the City concedes that its heavy artillery is intended to and likely will prevent cormorants from nesting in the Sacred Area. Recognizing a grave threat to their religious practices, Perez and Torres sued under, inter alia, the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("TRFRA"). They sought an injunction preventing the City from moving forward with its destructive campaign…. [A Fifth Circuit panel decision] held that the City's campaign of tree removal, pyrotechnics, lasers, and explosives would not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious practice and, even if it did, the City's deforestation and artillery were the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling need to repair the park…. That's wrong on both counts. But the substantial-burden point is the most egregious. First, the City's plan substantially burdens religious conduct under any reading of TRFRA. Second, the panel majority's faulty substantial burden analysis poses a particularly acute risk to minority faiths. Third, the better approach is to apply the same standards to all people. First, the existence of a substantial burden. Under TRFRA, a burden is "substantial if it curtails religious conduct and impacts religious expression to a 'significant' and 'real' degree." And burden is considered from "the person's perspective, not from the government's." This is not a high bar for religious observers. The government can still prevail if it can show that it's using the least-restrictive means to pursue a compelling interest. But the law requires the government to bear that burden; it requires relatively little from would-be worshipers. Nobody disputes that plaintiffs' religious practice at the Sacred Area "relies on the presence of trees [and] birds," even down to "specific trees." So nobody should dispute that destroying most of the trees, relocating others, and targeting the birds with a campaign of pyrotechnics and explosives objectively burdens plaintiffs' worship. To put it quite simply, plaintiffs will be unable to practice their faith if the City's plans go forward. If that is not a substantial burden, I do not know what is. Second, the panel majority's contrary analysis is wanting. In the few sentences the majority devoted to substantial burden, the panel noted that plaintiffs "continue[ ] to have virtually unlimited access to the park," that "no cormorants … inhabit [the park] for extended periods of time each year," and that "cormorants are not specifically targeted" and may "nest[ ] nearby or elsewhere in the 343-acre Park." Respectfully, these are non sequiturs. "[V]irtually unlimited access to the park" is useless if the park's Sacred Area is destroyed. That cormorants do not nest in the park for "extended periods" is interesting, but the City intends to permanently drive off the birds with pyrotechnics and lasers. And plaintiffs' ability to go "elsewhere in the 343-acre Park" misses the point entirely: their practice relies on the unique spiritual ecology of this riverbend…. "To the extent the majority suggests that Appellants can obtain spiritual fulfilment by exercising their religious beliefs in a manner contrary to their testimony, such reasoning is forbidden." … One searches this analysis in vain for a "granular focus on the specific facts, practices, and interests" at stake. But there's more at play here than just misreading TRFRA. Does anyone imagine, for instance, that a court would deem insubstantial a ban on accessing the Lord's Table because congregants can still sit in the pews? Could the government ban baptisms as long as Christians have "virtually unlimited access" to water? Or could the State ban Lord's Day services because the church is empty six days a week? These are judgment calls we simply do not make. And if the government were to padlock a church on the theory that Christians could worship elsewhere, we would not hesitate to hold it unlawful: "[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." Yet in singling out plaintiffs' beliefs for dismissal, the panel joins an unfortunate line of cases treating "the distinctive qualities of Indigenous religious practices regarding sacred sites" as a reason to deny relief. The encouragement to simply worship "elsewhere" reflects this unfortunate tendency. As Justice Gorsuch recently noted in Apache Stronghold v. United States (2025) (dissenting from denial of certiorari), many American Indians "live far from Washington, D.C., and their history and religious practices may be unfamiliar to many. But that should make no difference." Here, treating all religions alike requires recognizing the Sacred Area's value to plaintiffs and the burden posed by the City's destructive plans, just as courts recognize the value of church attendance and the burden imposed by forbidding such attendance. Third, respecting sacred sites—and recognizing the substantial burdens that attend their destruction—would not privilege Native American religions. Rather, it treats them equally. The law already recognizes that other believers have the right "to use their sacred sites in a manner consistent with their theological requirements, free from government interference." An obvious example is McCurry, which held barring the doors of a Christian church obviously and substantially burdens religion. And courts already prohibit objective governmental interference with religious volunteerism in the context of non-Indigenous faiths. For example, imposing mandatory LGBTQ+ instruction can substantially burden families with contrary religious beliefs. Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025). The threat of a small criminal fine is a substantial burden on Amish families who do not want to send their kids to public school. Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972). And the prohibition on bringing a kirpan to a government workplace substantially burdens a Sikh IRS agent. Tagore v. United States (5th Cir. 2013). It is no answer to say the substantial-burden analysis should be different when the government owns the place where individuals worship, as it owns Brackenridge Park. Courts routinely recognize substantial burdens on religious practice in prisons, the military, and zoning decisions—even though the government has plenary power and coercive control over those areas. The substantial burdens recognized in those areas include denying scented oils and sweat lodges in prisons, denying Sikh turbans in the military, and denying zoning approval for church expansions. Why apply a different, less-protective standard to people of Indigenous faiths? And if we're applying the same standard to people of all faiths, can it seriously be said that bulldozing a sacred site and artillery-blasting the cormorants in a church's creation story is somehow less burdensome than the five-dollar fine in Yoder or the workplace kirpan ban in Tagore or the denial of scented oils in prisons? Here's the panel opinion's view on the substantial burden question (written by Judge Carl Stewart and joined by Judge Priscilla Richman); it may also indicate why Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n (1988), which (to oversimplify) held that the government's management of its own land generally can't be viewed as a "substantial burden" on religious practice for Free Exercise Clause purposes, wasn't substantially discussed in this Texas RFRA case: Appellants did not sufficiently establish a substantial burden. Appellants emphasize that if the City were permitted to proceed with its tree removal and rookery management procedures, the measures would irreversibly destroy the Sacred Area and their ability to practice their religion there. To bolster these contentions, they cite caselaw analyzing governmental actions that involve complete bans or prohibition of religious exercise. As is the case here, "[w]hen a restriction is not completely prohibitive, Texas law still considers it substantial if 'alternatives for the religious exercise are severely restricted.'" This court has held that according to [Barr v. City of Stinton (Tex. 2009)], "that means a burden imposing a less-than-complete ban is nonetheless substantial if it curtails religious conduct and impacts religious expression to a 'significant' and 'real' degree." The City contends that "[w]hen analyzing whether a governmental body's activities on its own land impose a substantial burden on a plaintiff's religious beliefs, courts agree that the activity does not impose a substantial burden where it affects only the subjective religious experience of the plaintiff." The City argues "that a government's use of its own land does not substantially burden religious beliefs if the conduct is not coercive and impacts the subjective religious experience only." The City is correct to pinpoint that the proposed construction is indeed occurring on its own land. Still, Appellants are not merely alleging subjective religious experiences here. Moreover, because we are analyzing Appellants' claims under TRFRA, not the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), the correct standard for evaluating substantial burden is not "coercion" but whether the burden is "real" and "significant." Compare Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv. (9th Cir. 2008) ("Where, as here, there is no showing the government has coerced the Appellants to act contrary to their religious beliefs under the threat of sanctions, or conditioned a governmental benefit upon conduct that would violate the Appellants' religious beliefs, there is no 'substantial burden' on the exercise of their religion.") and Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n (1988) ("It is true that this Court has repeatedly held that indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment."), with Barr ("Thus defined, 'substantial' has two basic components: real vs. merely perceived, and significant vs. trivial."). In analyzing Appellants' contention that the destruction of the tree canopies, where cormorants nest, and the driving away of the cormorants themselves will burden their religions, we consider whether they have met their burden of establishing a likelihood of success on their argument that the presupposed burden is real and significant. Under TRFRA, a burden is substantial if it is "real vs. merely perceived, and significant vs. trivial"—two limitations that "leave a broad range of things covered." The focus of the inquiry is on "the degree to which a person's religious conduct is curtailed and the resulting impact on his religious expression," as "measured … from the person's perspective, not from the government's." This inquiry is "case-by-case" and "fact-specific" and must consider "individual circumstances." "Federal case law interpreting RFRA and [the Religious Land Use And Institutionalized Persons Act ('RLUIPA')] is relevant." While Appellants argue that the City's plan would destroy or alter natural resources of religious importance, they plainly failed to establish a likelihood of success on their position that the burden is real and significant under this circuit's case law. Indeed, Appellants did not even address this issue in their principal brief because they incorrectly assumed that the City would agree that its plans substantially burden their religious exercise. Moreover, under our precedent, it is unclear that the burden on Appellants is significant. In A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist. (5th Cir. 2010), we determined that the challenged exemptions placed a significant burden on the plaintiff's religious conduct because the burden was both indirect and direct. As we explained, "because the District's exemptions directly regulate a part of [the plaintiff's] body and not just a personal effect … the burden on [his] religious expression is arguably even more intrusive." While we do not suggest that directness is dispositive, we note that here, the City's development plan only indirectly impacts Appellants' religious conduct and expression. Appellants continue to have virtually unlimited access to the Park for religious and cultural purposes. The record shows that, regardless of the rookery management program, no cormorants, due to their migration patterns, inhabit the area for extended periods of time each year. Further, cormorants are not specifically targeted nor dissuaded from nesting nearby or elsewhere in the 343-acre Park. Mindful of the preliminary posture of this expedited appeal, we conclude that though the City's development plan may affect the nesting of cormorants within two acres of the 343-acre Park, Appellants did not meet their burden to show that they are likely to succeed on their claim that the plan constitutes a substantial burden of their religious exercise. Even if they did, that would not change the outcome of this appeal because the City's plan advances a compelling interest through the least restrictive means—and thus survives strict scrutiny…. The City argues that it has a compelling governmental interest in repairing the crumbling retaining walls on the northern bank of the riverbend, and that tree removal and relocation is an integral part of that plan. It further contends that the bird deterrence activities are necessary to protect the health and safety of citizens who visit the Park. The City avers that the purpose of the rookery management program is twofold: (1) to mitigate the health and safety hazards arising from the bird guano that dense bird colonies produce and (2) to ensure no migratory birds are nesting in trees within the Project Area such that work can begin under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the bond project improvements can proceed without delay…. You can also read further there about the compelling interesting question, both in the majority opinion and in Judge Oldham's panel dissent. The post Interesting Dissent in American Indian Religious Case Under Texas RFRA appeared first on Reason.com.
04.03.2026 14:01 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Tom Merrill] The Role of Delegation Theories in Deforming the Constitution The Supreme Court's approaches of assuming agency authority to issue legislative rules and of prohibiting Congress from delegating to itself have resulted in an enormous transfer of power to the Executive.
04.03.2026 14:01 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
Preview
[Josh Blackman] Today in Supreme Court History: March 4, 1861 3/4/1861: President Abraham Lincoln's inauguration. President Abraham Lincoln The post Today in Supreme Court History: March 4, 1861 appeared first on Reason.com.
04.03.2026 13:04 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Open Thread What’s on your mind?
04.03.2026 08:19 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Josh Blackman] Justice Kagan's Bad Ayahuasca Trip Because this hallucinogen can also be used for a religious ritual, there is a very difficult question about how federal gun law would apply.
04.03.2026 05:28 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Josh Blackman] Substantive Due Process After Mirabelli Dobbs didn't end SDP, but instead reoriented it to the Glucksberg history and tradition test.
04.03.2026 05:28 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0

It's a hybrid model. The Journal of Free Speech Law, which I cofounded, is purely faculty-screened; this is student-screened at a first cut and faculty-screened for a second; I think there's value for the ecosystem to have both approaches (as there is for the pure student-screened model).

04.03.2026 00:52 — 👍 1    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0

Just to be clear, two of the four initial articles published by the journal are by non-law-professors, in respected schools but not elite ones.

I expect the editorial board was chosen in large part because they're from elite schools, but that's what it takes to get respect for the journal, I think.

04.03.2026 00:50 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Equal Protection Clause Challenge to Single-Sex Public School Classes Can Go Forward Plus, some allegations of some unusual teacher behavior in the boys' class.
03.03.2026 22:49 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Josh Blackman] Mirabelli Offers a Beautiful Vision of the Emergency Docket Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh, as well as the Chief Justice, are on the same page.
03.03.2026 19:01 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Jonathan H. Adler] Confusion about Commandeering Whether the issue is immigration enforcement or environmental law, states are not obligated to enforce federal laws.
03.03.2026 16:10 — 👍 1    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Josh Blackman] SCOTUS Saves Staten Island Will Callais come tomorrow?
03.03.2026 16:10 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] $10M Award to Idaho Prof Accused of Murder Based on Defendant's "Psychic Intuition" For more on the backstory, see these posts; an excerpt from one: This case arises out of the tragic murder of four University of Idaho students in November 2022. Plaintiff Rebecca Scofield is a professor at the University of Idaho. She alleges that, despite never meeting any of these students or being involved with their murders in any way, Defendant Ashley Guillard posted numerous TikTok (and later YouTube) videos falsely claiming that Plaintiff (i) had an extramarital, same-sex, romantic affair with one of the victims; and then (ii) ordered the four murders to prevent the affair from coming to light…. Plaintiff asserts two defamation claims against Defendant: one is premised upon the false statements regarding Plaintiff's involvement with the murders themselves, the other is premised upon the false statements regarding Plaintiff's romantic relationship with one of the murdered students. On June 6, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment …. On the issue of liability for Plaintiff's two defamation claims against Defendant, the Court concluded that Plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact relating to the falsity of Defendant's statements about her. Id. (after citing evidence, stating: "This is powerful evidence at the summary judgment stage. It not only substantiates Plaintiff's argument that Defendant's statements about her are false, it also highlights the complete lack of any corroborating support for Defendant's statements."). Under Rule 56, this shifted the burden to Defendant to dispute that claim by setting forth facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial relating to whether her statements about Plaintiff are true. In relying only on her spiritual investigation into the murders, however, the Court concluded that Defendant did not satisfy her burden. Id. ("As a result, Defendant's psychic intuition, without more, cannot establish a genuine dispute of material fact to oppose Plaintiff's summary judgment efforts."). The Court therefore concluded that "the totality of the evidence reveals that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact that Defendant defamed Plaintiff." Friday, the jury awarded Scofield $1M in compensatory damages and $2.5M in punitives as to the "inappropriate romantic relationship with a student" claim, and $1.5M in compensatory damages and $5M in punitives as to the "orchestrated the murder" claim. The post $10M Award to Idaho Prof Accused of Murder Based on Defendant's "Psychic Intuition" appeared first on Reason.com.
03.03.2026 14:16 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Faculty-Run Independent Law Journal Looking for Editors (Law Clerks, SJD Students, Fellows, or Junior Professors) The Independent Law Journal is a new faculty-led legal journal aimed at helping reform academic legal publishing and promoting ideological diversity and faculty participation in article review. It has already published its first issue, which includes articles from law professors at NYU and Texas, and professors in other fields at Illinois and Cal Poly. The ILJ is led by a faculty board of distinguished scholars (from the law schools at Penn, Vanderbilt, Columbia, Harvard, Cornell, Virginia, Notre Dame, Yale, Berkeley, and Northwestern), who do the final screening on each published article. Initial article screening and editorial work is conducted by an editorial staff of judicial clerks, SJD candidates, and law students (currently ones from UCLA, Duke, Virginia, Harvard, BU, Cornell, and Washington & Lee). The ILJ is now recruiting more judicial clerks, SJD candidates, legal fellows, and junior faculty interested in serving on the editorial staff. (It's not currently looking for more law student editors.) Editor positions run for one-year renewable terms. Being an editor at the ILJ provides people interested in legal scholarship and academia an opportunity to engage with the cutting edge of current legal scholarship by reviewing, editing, and providing feedback on scholarly pieces on a wide variety of legal issues. Those interested can find more details on how to apply at the ILJ's website. The post Faculty-Run Independent Law Journal Looking for Editors (Law Clerks, SJD Students, Fellows, or Junior Professors) appeared first on Reason.com.
03.03.2026 14:16 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 2
[Tom Merrill] The "Unitary Executive" Theory's Contribution to the Deformation of the Constitution The "three buckets" picture of the federal government, in combination with the unitary executive thesis, gives extravagant power to the President.
03.03.2026 13:19 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
Preview
[Josh Blackman] Today in Supreme Court History: March 3, 2019 3/3/2019: Schenck v. United States decided.   The post Today in Supreme Court History: March 3, 2019 appeared first on Reason.com.
03.03.2026 12:22 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 1    📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Open Thread What’s on your mind?
03.03.2026 08:34 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Josh Blackman] Counting The Votes In Mirabelli v. Bonta We only know how Justice Gorsuch voted because Justice Kagan told us he was in the majority.
03.03.2026 07:37 — 👍 1    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Josh Blackman] The Supreme Court's Emergency Docket Meets The Inferior Courts' Emergency Dockets Why should the Supreme Court defer to the emergency docket of lower courts?
03.03.2026 06:40 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Stephen Halbrook] Second Amendment Roundup: Oral Argument in Hemani Testing whether an unlawful user of marijuana forfeits the right to have arms.
03.03.2026 04:46 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
Preview
[Ilya Somin] Slavery and Birthright Citizenship All the Trump Administration's arguments for denying birthright ctizenship to children of undocumented immigrants are at odds with the main purpose of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - granting citizenshp to freed slaves and their descendants.
03.03.2026 04:46 — 👍 1    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Parental Rights Not to Have School Hide Child's Social Gender Transition / Parental Rights to Provide Child with Surgical or Hormonal Gender Transition Today's unsigned majority opinion in Mirabelli v. Bonta held that California policies that "prevent schools from telling them about their children's efforts to engage in gender transitioning at school unless the children consent to parental notification" and "require[] that schools use children's preferred names and pronouns regardless of their parents' wishes" violate parental rights. Justice Kagan's dissent, joined by Justice Sotomayor, argues: [A] contrast—this time, between this case and United States v. Skrmetti (2025)—is also striking. In Skrmetti, several parents challenged Tennessee's ban on gender-affirming care for minors. The suit raised claims grounded in both equal protection and substantive due process. As to the latter, the parents in Skrmetti, similarly to the parents here, asserted a right "to make decisions concerning medical care for their minor children." And in support of that right, the Skrmetti parents relied on the same [parental rights] precedents the Court does today …. But the Court, when deciding to grant certiorari in Skrmetti, limited its review to the equal protection issue: It would not even hear the parents out on their substantive due process claim. So why aren't state statutes limiting youth gender medicine treatments violations of parental rights (given that they apply even when the parents ask for the treatment for their children)? The answer, I think, is that the Court hasn't generally recognized a constitutional right to get forbidden medical procedures for oneself, much less a right to get them for one's children. I think Sixth Circuit Judge Jeffrey Sutton correctly summarized the legal rules in L.W. v. Skrmetti, which the Court declined to review; an excerpt: There is a long tradition of permitting state governments to regulate medical treatments for adults and children. So long as a federal statute does not stand in the way and so long as an enumerated constitutional guarantee does not apply, the States may regulate or ban medical technologies they deem unsafe. Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) puts a face on these points…. The Court reasoned that there was no "deeply rooted" tradition of permitting individuals or their doctors to override contrary state medical laws. The right to refuse medical treatment in some settings, it reasoned, cannot be "transmuted" into a right to obtain treatment, even if both involved "personal and profound" decisions…. Abigail Alliance (D.C. Cir. 2007) hews to this path. The claimant was a public interest group that maintained that terminally ill patients had a constitutional right to use experimental drugs that the FDA had not yet deemed safe and effective. As these "terminally ill patients and their supporters" saw it, the Constitution gave them the right to use experimental drugs in the face of a grim health prognosis. How, they claimed, could the FDA override the liberty of a patient and doctor to make the cost-benefit analysis of using a drug for themselves given the stark odds of survival the patient already faced? In a thoughtful en banc decision, the D.C. Circuit rejected the claim. The decision invoked our country's long history of regulating drugs and medical treatments, concluding that substantive due process has no role to play…. As in these cases, so in this one, indeed more so in this one. "The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults." A parent's right to make decisions for a child does not sweep more broadly than an adult's right to make decisions for herself…. Parental rights do not alter this conclusion because parents do not have a constitutional right to obtain reasonably banned treatments for their children. Plaintiffs counter that, as parents, they have a substantive due process right "to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." At one level of generality, they are right. Parents usually do know what's best for their children and in most matters (where to live, how to live, what to eat, how to learn, when to be exposed to mature subject matter) their decisions govern until the child reaches 18. But becoming a parent does not create a right to reject democratically enacted laws. The key problem is that the claimants overstate the parental right by climbing up the ladder of generality to a perch—in which parents control all drug and other medical treatments for their children—that the case law and our traditions simply do not support. Level of generality is everything in constitutional law, which is why the Court requires "a 'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest." So described, no such tradition exists. The government has the power to reasonably limit the use of drugs, as just shown. If that's true for adults, it's assuredly true for their children, as also just shown. This country does not have a custom of permitting parents to obtain banned medical treatments for their children and to override contrary legislative policy judgments in the process. Any other approach would not work. If parents could veto legislative and regulatory policies about drugs and surgeries permitted for children, every such regulation—there must be thousands—would come with a springing easement: It would be good law until one parent in the country opposed it. At that point, either the parent would take charge of the regulation or the courts would. And all of this in an arena—the care of our children—where sound medical policies are indispensable and most in need of responsiveness to the democratic process. I have argued that there should be a constitutional right to choose certain medical treatments for oneself in narrow circumstances (basically when the person is terminally ill, and seeks a possibly life-saving though unproven treatment). But even if I'm right, that would be quite a narrow right; and in any event, the Abigail Alliance en banc opinion, described in the excerpt above, rejected even that narrow argument. The post Parental Rights Not to Have School Hide Child's Social Gender Transition / Parental Rights to Provide Child with Surgical or Hormonal Gender Transition appeared first on Reason.com.
03.03.2026 02:49 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Justices Debate Substantive Due Process Again, This Time in Parental Rights / Gender Transition Concealment Case Today's unsigned majority opinion in Mirabelli v. Bonta held that California policies that "prevent schools from telling them about their children's efforts to engage in gender transitioning at school unless the children consent to parental notification" and "require[] that schools use children's preferred names and pronouns regardless of their parents' wishes" violate parental rights, which are facet of the "substantive due process" doctrine. It also held that the policies violate religious parents' Free Exercise Clause rights, but that would have only protected parents who have religious objections to the policies; the substantive due process argument protects all parents. (For more, see this post.) Justice Barrett, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, added this: As the dissent observes, substantive due process is a controversial doctrine. Judges typically interpret express constitutional rights, such as the freedom of speech or religion. But substantive due process asks us to find unexpressed rights in a constitutional provision that guarantees only "process" before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property. When rights are unstated, how do judges know what they are? The obvious risk is that judges will use their own values as a guide, thereby jeopardizing the People's right to self-governance. To mitigate this risk, the Court has crafted a demanding test for recognizing unexpressed rights: They must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Washington v. Glucksberg (1997). Relevant here, the doctrine of substantive due process has long embraced a parent's right to raise her child, which includes the right to participate in significant decisions about her child's mental health. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska (1923); Parham v. J.R. (1979)…. The dissent questions how the Court can adhere to parental-rights precedent after its decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022). But Dobbs calls into question neither the doctrine of substantive due process nor the other unexpressed rights that the doctrine protects. Applying Glucksberg, Dobbs holds that Roe v. Wade (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey (1992), were incorrectly decided because a right to abortion is not "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Dobbs, 597 U. S., at 231. And because the Court concluded that the stare decisis factors counseled against retaining these cases, Dobbs overruled them. It does not follow from Dobbs that all our substantive due process cases conflict with Glucksberg, much less that stare decisis would counsel overruling any that do. No party to this dispute questions the continued validity of Meyer, Pierce, or Parham. For all its concerns about deciding the issue in this posture, the dissent expresses "no doubt that parents have rights, even though unenumerated, concerning their children and the life choices they make." And the precedent recognizing those rights controls our assessment of whether the parents are likely to succeed on the merits…. Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Jackson, dissented: [T]he District Court … ruled on substantive due process grounds [as well as Free Exercise Clause grounds], finding a parental right to "direct the upbringing and medical care of their children." … This Court, to affirm the relief given, must follow the same course: It explains that the State's policy "excludes parents" from "participation in decisions regarding their children's mental health.". But the very phrasing the Court uses betrays the delicateness of the operation: Even in recognizing that parental right, the Court cannot quite bring itself to name the legal doctrine—it is, again, substantive due process—that provides the right's only basis. Anyone remotely familiar with recent debates in constitutional law will understand why: Substantive due process has not been of late in the good graces of this Court—and especially of the Members of today's majority. The Due Process Clause, needless to say, does not expressly grant parental rights of any kind. The relevant text bars a State only from depriving a person of "liberty" "without due process of law." Members of the majority often have expressed skepticism—sometimes outright hostility—to understanding the "capacious" term "liberty" to enshrine specific rights. Dobbs. Substantive due process, one has stated, is a "particularly dangerous" "legal fiction" because it "invites judges" to "roa[m] at large in the constitutional field guided only by their personal views." McDonald v. Chicago (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Obergefell v. Hodges, (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). {For that reason, Justice Thomas has called for overruling "all" of this Court's "substantive due process precedents." That invitation presumably extends to the [parental rights] precedents ….} Another has pointed to the "judicial misuse of the so-called 'substantive component' of due process to dictate policy on matters that belonged to the people to decide." Sessions v. Dimaya (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). And yet a third, when defending the Court's elimination of a 50-year-old right grounded in substantive due process, explained that the "Constitution does not grant the nine unelected Members of this Court the unilateral authority to rewrite the Constitution." Dobbs (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). There are many such statements to choose from in this Court's recent substantive due process caselaw. Especially given the Court's last venture into the field, today's decision cannot but induce a strong sense of whiplash. Compare [the majority opinion here] (recognizing a parent's right to make important decisions about her child's health), with Dobbs (repudiating a woman's right to make important decisions about her own health). None of this is to say that the Court gets the merits here wrong…. I have no doubt that parents have rights, even though unenumerated, concerning their children and the life choices they make. On the other side of ledger, of course, a State has critical interests in the care and education of children. But California's policy, in depriving all parents of information critical to their children's health and well-being, could have crossed the constitutional line. And that would entitle the parents, at the end of the day, to relief…. The post Justices Debate Substantive Due Process Again, This Time in Parental Rights / Gender Transition Concealment Case appeared first on Reason.com.
03.03.2026 01:52 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] Justices Debate Emergency Docket in Parental Rights / Gender Transition Concealment Case Today's opinion in Mirabelli v. Bonta involved, on the merits, California policies that "prevent schools from telling them about their children's efforts to engage in gender transitioning at school unless the children consent to parental notification" and "require[] that schools use children's preferred names and pronouns regardless of their parents' wishes." But the procedure was unusual: The injunction had been issued by the District Court and appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which temporarily stayed (i.e., blocked) the injunction pending. The Supreme Court was asked to vacate the stay, and thus reinstate the injunction, again pending appeal. That's the kind of procedure that happens on the Court's "shadow docket" or "emergency docket" or "interim relief docket." And the Justices had an interesting discussion about this. From the unsigned majority opinion: We grant the application and vacate the stay with respect to the parents because this aspect of the stay is not "justified under the governing four-factor test." Likelihood of success on the merits. We conclude that the parents … are likely to succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause claim [and substantive due process claim]. [For details, see this post. -EV] … Irreparable harm. The denial of plaintiffs' constitutional rights during the potentially protracted appellate process constitutes irreparable harm. Balance of equities. Finally, the "equities do not justify depriving [the parents] of the District Court's judgment in their Everyone agrees that children's safety is the overriding equity. And the injunction here promotes child safety by guaranteeing fit parents a role in some of the most consequential decisions in their children's lives. The injunction also permits the State to shield children from unfit parents by enforcing child-abuse laws and removing children from parental custody in appropriate cases. [The majority didn't expressly discuss the fourth factor, the public interest, but its discussion dealt with it implicitly. -EV] … Justice Barrett, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, concurred: [T]he precedent recognizing [parental] rights controls our assessment of whether the parents are likely to succeed on the merits. The word "likely" is important, because it reflects that our assessment is preliminary. We consider the merits not to conclusively resolve them, but because they bear on the limited question before us: Are the parents entitled to the benefit of the judgment entered by the District Court while California tries to overturn that judgment on appeal? The Ninth Circuit—itself acting on an interim basis—said "no." We disagree. The parents must continue to litigate in the Ninth Circuit, and if necessary, this Court. But in the meantime, the injunction of California's policy—which, incidentally, was entered after a full merits process—remains in place. And contrary to the dissent's charge, granting interim relief is not a sign of the Court's "impatience" to reach the merits. Instead, the grant reflects the Court's judgment about the risk of irreparable harm to the parents. If the parents were probably right but would suffer little harm from the Ninth Circuit's stay, they would not be entitled to interim relief. But that is not the situation here. Under California's policy, parents will be excluded—perhaps for years—from participating in consequential decisions about their child's mental health and wellbeing. Thus, the parents are likely to suffer irreparable harm if California enforces its policy while this litigation winds its way through the courts. One last point: The Court has chosen to accompany today's order with a per curiam opinion that explains its reasoning. The choice to say more rather than less is perhaps the source of the dissent's concern that our disposition of this application will be taken as a "conclusive merits judgment." But see, e.g., Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief ) (critiquing this Court's interim orders for "barely bother[ing] to explain [their] conclusion[s]"); Trump v. Boyle (2025) (Kagan, J., dissenting from grant of application for stay) (similar). Interim applications routinely require the Court to balance the lock-in risk of saying too much against the transparency cost of saying too little. In my judgment, the benefits of explanation win out here. The Ninth Circuit (following the Sixth Circuit) significantly misunderstood Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025), and general course correction will allow the case to progress efficiently…. When an interim application comes to us, "we must decide it—grant or deny." Because the [stay] factors strongly favor the parents, I see no basis for denying this application. Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Jackson, dissented: Today's decision shows, not for the first time, how our emergency docket can malfunction. A case raising novel legal questions and arousing strong views comes to this Court via an application about whether to stay a district court's injunction pending appeal. The ordinary appellate process has barely started; only a district court has ruled on the case's merits. The Court receives scant and, frankly, inadequate briefing about the legal issues in dispute. It does not hold oral argument or deliberate in conference, as regular procedures dictate. It considers the request on a short fuse—a matter of weeks. And then the Court grants relief by means of a terse, tonally dismissive ruling designed to conclusively resolve the dispute. The Court does all this even though the application of existing law to the case raises tricky questions, and so cries out for reflection and explanation. The Court is impatient: It already knows what it thinks, and insists on getting everything over quickly. Indeed, the precipitousness of the Court's decision today has yet a further—and wholly new—dimension: In granting emergency relief, the Court cannot even wait for an appellate court to conclude its own process for deciding the identical issue. As the Court notes, a Ninth Circuit panel last month stayed the District Court's injunction against the challenged policies, pending the State's appeal of that order. The plaintiffs responded by simultaneously filing two motions—one asking this Court to vacate the panel's stay and the other asking the Ninth Circuit to do the same thing through en banc review. The Ninth Circuit is already acting on the motion filed there: The court promptly called for (and has now received) a response from the State, preparatory to exchanging memoranda and voting on reconsideration of the panel's decision. Regular order counsels that, in this situation, the Ninth Circuit should go first. The lower court, that is, should decide whether to vacate the stay; and only then should this Court decide whether further action is needed. Cf. Supreme Court Rule 23.3 (Stay applications "shall set out with particularity why the relief sought is not available from any other court"). But the Court's impatience cannot be contained for even that long. The Court jumps the line, pre-empting the Ninth Circuit's normal (and notably reflective) en banc process. Why wait for appellate procedures to play out when the Court already knows what it wants? And still, there is worse: The Court resolves the issues raised through shortcut procedures on the emergency docket even though it has had—for months now—the option of doing so the regular way, on our merits docket. Since November of last year, a petition for certiorari has been pending in a case that, in critical respects, is a carbon copy of this one. In Foote v. Ludlow School Comm. cert. pending, as here, a public school adopted a policy, conforming to a state agency's guidance, about students who identify as transgender. There, as here, the policy requires school employees to use only a student's preferred name and pronouns, while barring employees from disclosing the student's at-school gender identity to parents. And there, as here, parents challenge that policy as a violation of their right to substantive due process. Why not, then, just grant certiorari in Foote, and decide it this coming fall? {The one difference between this case and Foote is that this case also involves a First Amendment free exercise claim, which would (if successful) give relief to parents with religious objections to the State's policy. But … the Court's recognition of the substantive due process claim here makes the free exercise claim immaterial. That is because accepting the due process claim gives relief to all objecting parents, religious and non-religious alike. So granting certiorari in Foote would allow the Court to consider, on its regular merits docket, the only claim doing actual work here. And if it is nonetheless thought important to address the First Amendment issue as well, the Court could grant certiorari (as I next explain) on one of multiple other cases raising both issues that are likely to reach us in short order.} Or if there is some reason that Foote is not suitable, the Court could take one of the many cases lined up behind it. By recent count, almost 40 cases raising due process and/or free exercise objections to similar school policies are currently in the judicial system (with several recently decided by appellate courts), so this Court would not have to wait long. By granting certiorari on one (or more) of those cases, the Court could ensure that the issues raised by such policies receive the careful, disciplined consideration they merit, rather than the inevitably truncated review the Court affords emergency applications. Certainly, the Court cannot claim that thought and care are not needed. If nothing else, this Court owes it to a sovereign State to avoid throwing over its policies in a slapdash way, if the Court can provide normal procedures. And throwing over a State's policy is what the Court does today. To be sure, the Court sprinkles the word "likely" atop its assessment of which party's arguments will succeed. But no one—in particular, neither a state official nor a lower court—is apt to read the Court's per curiam, brusque though it is, as anything less than a conclusive merits judgment…. The Court … would be far better equipped to draw the appropriate line and to explain its legal basis—in short, to do law in the right way—if it had followed our ordinary processes. A mere decade ago, this Court would never have granted relief in this posture. (Indeed, I am confident that the plaintiffs would never have thought to ask, at this stage, for the Court's involvement.) Then, though apparently not now, we understood that our normal processes—full briefing, oral argument, conference, and opinion writing, along with the time they take—exist for a reason. They ensure that before the Court makes a decision, it has marshaled all the relevant facts; considered all interested parties' and multiple lower courts' legal arguments; and deliberated internally, with full understanding of each other's perspectives, on all disputed issues. So too, those processes enable us to think through the best legal rationale for, and scope of, any decision, given both the views we have earlier expressed and the related issues that will soon come before us. And they allow us to explain ourselves well and carefully, both to the parties and to the public. Our processes are, in short, the hallmark of judicial probity, and alike its guarantor. There was no reason to abandon them here….   The post Justices Debate Emergency Docket in Parental Rights / Gender Transition Concealment Case appeared first on Reason.com.
03.03.2026 01:52 — 👍 0    🔁 0    💬 0    📌 0
[Eugene Volokh] S. Ct. Reinstates Trial Court Injunction Blocking Cal. Policy Limiting Schools' Disclosure to Parents of Student's Changed Gender Identity From today's opinion in Mirabelli v. Bonta: [Plaintiff] parents object that [California] policies prevent schools from telling them about their children's efforts to engage in gender transitioning at school unless the children consent to parental notification. The parents also take issue with California's requirement that schools use children's preferred names and pronouns regardless of their parents' wishes…. [T]he [District Court] granted summary judgment for all plaintiffs and entered a permanent injunction in their favor. The injunction prevents the schools from "misleading" parents about their children's gender presentation at school and their social transitioning efforts.  It also requires the schools to follow parents' directions regarding their children's names and pronouns. And it compels defendants to include in state-created or approved instructional materials a notice of the rights protected by the injunction. The Ninth Circuit granted defendants' motion to stay the injunction pending appeal…. On the free exercise issue, it relied on a not-precedential Sixth Circuit decision and brushed aside Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025), as "a narrow decision focused on uniquely coercive 'curricular requirements.'" The Ninth Circuit expressed skepticism about the parents' and teachers' Fourteenth Amendment due process claim because it viewed those claims as seeking to expand the protection afforded by established precedent. When the Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction, the parents and teachers filed this application seeking vacatur of the Ninth Circuit's stay pending appeal…. We conclude that the parents who seek religious exemptions are likely to succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause claim. California's policies likely trigger strict scrutiny under that provision because they substantially interfere with the "right of parents to guide the religious development of their children." Mahmoud (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)). The parents who assert a free exercise claim have sincere religious beliefs about sex and gender, and they feel a religious obligation to raise their children in accordance with those beliefs. California's policies violate those beliefs and "impos[e] the kind of burden on religious exercise that Yoder found unacceptable." Indeed, the intrusion on parents' free exercise rights here—unconsented facilitation of a child's gender transition—is greater than the introduction of LGBTQ storybooks we considered sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny in Mahmoud. California's policies will likely not survive the strict scrutiny that Mahmoud demands. The State argues that its policies advance a compelling interest in student safety and privacy. But those policies cut out the primary protectors of children's best interests: their parents. See Troxel v. Granville (2000) (plurality opinion). California's policies also appear to fail the narrow-tailoring requirement. The State's interest in safety could be served by a policy that allows religious exemptions while precluding gender-identity disclosure to parents who would engage in abuse. For these reasons, the parents who object to the California policies on free exercise grounds are likely to succeed on the merits. The same is true for the subclass of parents who object to those policies on due process grounds. Under long-established precedent, parents—not the State—have primary authority with respect to "the upbringing and education of children." Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925); accord, Meyer v. Nebraska (1923). The right protected by these precedents includes the right not to be shut out of participation in decisions regarding their children's mental health. Parham v. J.R. (1979). Gender dysphoria is a condition that has an important bearing on a child's mental health, but when a child exhibits symptoms of gender dysphoria at school, California's policies conceal that information from parents and facilitate a degree of gender transitioning during school hours. These policies likely violate parents' rights to direct the upbringing and education of their children…. The denial of plaintiffs' constitutional rights during the potentially protracted appellate process constitutes irreparable harm…. [And while e]veryone agrees that children's safety is the overriding equity[, the district court] injunction here promotes child safety by guaranteeing fit parents a role in some of the most consequential decisions in their children's lives. The injunction also permits the State to shield children from unfit parents by enforcing child-abuse laws and removing children from parental custody in appropriate cases…. The application to vacate the Ninth Circuit's stay presented to Justice Kagan and by her referred to the Court is granted as to the parents but is otherwise denied [presumably with regard to a separate part of the District Court's injunction which dealt with objections by teachers -EV]. Justices Thomas and Alito voted to "grant the application in full," presumably including the portion related to teachers. Justice Barrett, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, added this: The parent-applicants are likely to succeed on the merits under a straightforward application of [the parental rights substantive due process] cases. California prohibits its public schools from informing parents of their child's gender transition at school unless the child consents. The record in this case indicates that the State's non-disclosure policy applies even if parents expressly ask for information about their child's gender identification. One set of parents learned of their child's transition at school only after the child attempted suicide. Strikingly, even after this tragic event, school administrators continued to withhold information about the student's gender identification. California's nondisclosure policy thus quite obviously excludes parents from highly important decisions about their child's mental health, and is unlikely to satisfy heightened scrutiny. Our resolution of the parents' likelihood of success on this claim is dictated by existing law…. [And] the parents are likely to suffer irreparable harm if California enforces its policy while this litigation winds its way through the courts…. Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Jackson, dissented, mostly on procedural grounds and to discuss substantive due process more broadly; I plan to blog further about that shortly. But here's their brief discussion of the merits in the opinion: I have no doubt that parents have [substantive due process] rights, even though unenumerated, concerning their children and the life choices they make. See Pierce; Parham. On the other side of ledger, of course, a State has critical interests in the care and education of children. But California's policy, in depriving all parents of information critical to their children's health and well-being, could have crossed the constitutional line. And that would entitle the parents, at the end of the day, to relief. The Court, however, would be far better equipped to draw the appropriate line and to explain its legal basis … if it had followed our ordinary processes…. Justice Sotomayor voted to "deny the application in full." More soon on the emergency docket questions, the substantive due process discussion, and the role (or not) of parental rights when parents who want to allow their children to transition genders want the children to get surgery or hormone therapy that's forbidden by state law. The post S. Ct. Reinstates Trial Court Injunction Blocking Cal. Policy Limiting Schools' Disclosure to Parents of Student's Changed Gender Identity appeared first on Reason.com.
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