Hana Attia

New publication w/ my friend & amazing coauthor @fedetrastulli.bsky.social in @ejprjournal.bsky.social! 🎉

doi.org/10.1017/S147...

We explore: Who considers which political issues as important & how is this related to sociodemographic/socioeconomic variables?

We are pleased that this week, the inaugural lecture of @hanaattia.bsky.social took place at @leuphana.bsky.social. She has been jointly appointed as Junior Professor of #SecurityPolicy and #Peace at the university, and as a Research Fellow at the #GIGA. Warm congratulations, Hana! 💐

🚨 EPSS Belfast 2026 Call for Papers - One week to go! 🚨

Don't forget to submit your paper or panel proposal to the European Political Science Society @epssnet.bsky.social 2026 conference - just one week to go before the deadline: epssnet.org/belfast-2026...

So well deserved!! You are brilliant 💫

Wann und wie werden #Sanktionen beendet?

💡 In diesem Video erklärt #GIGA-Forscherin @hanaattia.bsky.social, welche Faktoren über die Beendigung von Sanktionen entscheiden.

Thank you so much for sharing 😊

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨

Attia (2025) shows that U.S. presidents with strong party support and high approval are more likely to lift sanctions, while congressional oversight makes termination less likely and slower.

academic.oup.com/fpa/article/...

Many thanks to @geraldschneider.bsky.social, @cvonsoest.bsky.social, @leuffen.bsky.social, @grauvogelj.bsky.social, Jordan Tama, Andrew Blinkensop, Cliff Morgan, Aiganym Valikhanova, and others for their super helpful comments and feedback on earlier drafts of this article. (7/7)

I complement my statistical results with material from interviews with US sanctions practitioners and anecdotal evidence from sanctions cases such as Iran and Russia. Check it out: doi.org/10.1093/fpa/... (6/7)

2. Sanctions that include mechanisms of congressional oversight last longer and are less likely to be lifted by the president before achieving their goals. (5/7)

1. Presidents with stronger party power in Congress and higher public approval ratings are more likely to end sanctions, particularly by capitulation. (4/7)

and argue that a president's political capital vis-à-vis the public and Congress, as well as Congress's anticipated responses, influences when and how presidents lift sanctions. To test my argument, I analyze original sanctions data using competing risks and uncover two key findings: (3/7)

In this article, I ask whether domestic factors influence US presidents’ decisions to lift sanctions. I draw on work emphasizing the domestic costs related to leaders’ foreign policy decisions (2/7)

Super happy to share that my article "When and How Do Presidents Terminate Sanctions? The Effect of Domestic Factors on US Sanctions Policy" has been published in Foreign Policy Analysis. (1/7)

Many thanks to @geraldschneider.bsky.social, @cvonsoest.bsky.social, @leuffen.bsky.social, @grauvogelj.bsky.social, Jordan Tama, Andrew Blinkensop, Cliff Morgan, Aiganym Valikhanova, and others for their super helpful comments and feedback on earlier drafts of this article.

I complement my statistical results with material from interviews with US sanctions practitioners and anecdotal evidence from sanctions cases such as Iran and Russia. Check it out: doi.org/10.1093/fpa/... (6/7)

2. Sanctions that include mechanisms of congressional oversight last longer and are less likely to be lifted by the president before achieving their goals. (5/7)

1. Presidents with stronger party power in Congress and higher public approval ratings are more likely to end sanctions, particularly by capitulation. (4/7)

and argue that a president's political capital vis-à-vis the public and Congress, as well as Congress's anticipated responses, influences when and how presidents lift sanctions. To test my argument, I analyze original sanctions data using competing risks and uncover two key findings (3/7)

In this article, I ask whether domestic factors influence US presidents’ decisions to lift sanctions. I draw on work emphasizing the domestic costs related to leaders’ foreign policy decisions (2/7)

A brutal regime falls. But there’s a problem: the UN and several countries say the victorious rebels are terrorists. What to do? There’s no playbook for Islamist insurgents faced with the challenges of running a country. But there is a precedent, in Afghanistan. 1/

Herzlichen Glückwunsch an @hanaattia.bsky.social! 🎉 Die Politikwissenschaftlerin erhält den Leibniz-Promotionspreis 2024 in den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften für ihre #Forschung zu internationalen #Sanktionen. 🏆 Well deserved!

➡️ Mehr Infos: www.giga-hamburg.de/de/presse/gi...

🚨Publication alert🚨 New article in @jeppjournal.bsky.social with Arndt Wonka and Michael Blauberger on democratic backsliding in Poland and Hungary, studying public debates in Gazeta Wyborcza and Index/Telex.hu. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2023.2279245 Short 🧵 (1/7)

Super happy to have received the “Aquila Ascendens Nachwuchspreis for Sicherheitspolitik” (second prize) on Sunday. Beyond grateful for this recognition of my dissertation.

At long last. New publication with @alexandraguisinger.bsky.social

academic.oup.com/fpa/article-...

polisky