It's not all about strike scaling, but drone defense as well.
The AFU shot down 160 drones per day in June; it's 1850 in March.
SBS hit 227 wings in June and 2200 in February, following the overall GSUA trend.

Battle for the low sky

Both armies recovered after the harsh winter weather, and russian progress toward a drone advantage is anything but noticeable.
SBS scaling is more stable but still falls behind.
While SBS added 400 more strikes, reported ru strikes increased by 2000.

The absolute tragedy of the Russian-Ukrainian war is that both sides fell into the same pit - one jumped in deliberately, the other was pushed.

Against a disciplined, morally coherent adversary, it loses on the battlefield. Against its own society, it wins - in the worst possible way.

An institution that ceases to value the lives of its own combatants has already defeated itself.

The devaluation of life becomes a cultural inheritance, outlasting the war that produced it by generations.
The shell soldier doctrine is not a path to victory. It is a bet that the enemy exhausts its patience before you exhaust your people.

Both populations reintegrate into civilian life, into institutions, into governments - bringing the logic of expendability with them. Societies that wage war through mass human expenditure do not cleanly recover.

The damage does not end at demobilization. Veterans return broken in two distinct ways. Those who were treated as expendable carry wounds that conventional frameworks do not fully capture. Those who administered the doctrine carry a different injury: the practiced suppression of moral response.

Supply chains hollow out. Medical care collapses. Corruption fills the vacuum left by absent accountability - because there is no moral framework remaining to demand otherwise. The resources nominally allocated to those soldiers migrate upward, and no one answers for it.

The deeper damage is institutional.
A military that normalizes the disposability of its own personnel does not confine that judgment to the battlefield. Officers who learn to calculate lives as logistics carry that calculus into every decision.

Even high-quality soldiers, misused as gap-fillers within such a doctrine, get swallowed by it. The system does not discriminate. It consumes.

But the ceiling arrives quickly. Shell soldiers consume faster than they can be replaced at quality. Every one lost demands a replacement, and the pipeline must run constantly simply to maintain the same degraded capability.

When gaps open in a line, even minimally capable personnel can prevent immediate enemy exploitation. More cynically, advancing expendable forces compels the enemy to reveal defensive positions, weapon systems, and response patterns - reconnaissance purchased with lives rather than intelligence craft

But they can occupy space, hold a static position, and advance toward an objective. In a doctrine built on mass expenditure, that is sufficient.
Their utility, while narrow, is real. Specialists cannot be everywhere.

The result is the shell soldier: a combatant hollowed of professional substance, useful only in the most blunt applications of force. They cannot maneuver, adapt, or exploit opportunity.

When command culture - driven by ideology, desperation, or institutional indifference - decides that human life is cheap enough to spend freely, a new operational logic becomes viable. Training pipelines shorten. Standards collapse.

It creates systemic drag across the entire force - more errors, more supervision required, more cascading vulnerabilities. Under-capable soldiers raise casualties for everyone around them, not just themselves.
This is where the doctrine turns dangerous.

There is, however, a floor that cannot be breached without consequences. Deploying personnel below a functional cognitive minimum does not merely reduce individual performance.

The gap between layers is bridged by training, leadership, and institutional culture. This architecture is not a weakness - it is the engine of combined-arms effectiveness.

Healthy armies answer this through stratification. Specialists occupy the top tier, operating complex systems and executing nuanced tactics. General infantry fills the broader base, performing standardized functions under clear doctrine.

The intellectual floor of a mass army is not a policy choice - it is a demographic reality. The question every commander eventually faces is not how to wish it away, but what to do with the lower end of the curve.

Shell Soldiers: The Doctrine of Expendable Forces

Every military draws from the same population it defends, which means it inherits that population's full distribution of capability.

UK retards published video without blur

Trump 101: Planning is Gay

The Gulf countries have a hard choice be bombed by Iran or sanctioned by The US

K2 got their Shahed Time with 17/32 of SBS reported.
As drones have used their area for incursion.

Above the average combined attack at multiple targets across the country, with focus on Dnister HPP.

Missile launch was a lot weaker than expected, unless there will be a following one within 3 days.

0/2 Zircon
8/13 Iskander-M
11/14 Kalibr
453/480 Drones

22 locations were hit, 5 damaged by debris

as if any new bombers will make things worse.
Cyprus was a good message, but it barely achieved anything.
If we distant of Iran we will barely notice anything.

Any examples?

The US will destroy all the production once there will be no better targets.
Don't worry about their capabilities, there will be no significant and centralized capabilities after.

Their goals are also simple, bomb Iran into previous century and repeat every year until regime won't change.
But US policies will change way faster, hence Iran will be damaged but undefeated