Tatarigami

Simple. They have more money poured into the production, their factories are far away and can’t be easily targeted. And even if they can be targeted, the payloads are too small due to distance

13/ Of course, the opposite could happen - but counting on that while the balance shifts toward Russia isn’t a strategy. The West must apply real pressure to bring Moscow to the table, as it no longer takes empty threats seriously.

12/ That said, constant self-reassurance that Ukraine is holding and Russia is on the verge of collapse is harmful. The front may stay static and advances slow, until the situation deteriorates to the point where Russia might seize thousands of square kilometers per month

11/ Ukraine’s position in 2025 is better than I had anticipated last year. For example, I expected urban fighting in Pokrovsk to begin by late 2024 or early winter 2025 - but Russian forces have taken significantly more time to reach their current positions

10/ Many changes, such as improved transfers, digitalization, data collection, and the shift to a corps structure, have led to tangible improvements. Ironically, I supported these reforms back in 2022–2023, when some dismissed them, arguing that it can't be done during a wartime

9/ In private conversations with TCK personnel, I was told that legally exempt individuals are sometimes mobilized to meet quotas. Once mobilized, they often launch legal proceedings to secure release- draining time and resources from the combat units who receive such dead weight

8/ This narrative is amplified by Russian propaganda, but it’s also fair to note that the government’s response has often been inadequate. In several clear-cut cases, serious violations were publicly dismissed as Russian psyops or met with vague promises to investigate.

7/ A far bigger problem for Ukraine remains mobilization and growing dissatisfaction with mobilization methods. Although these incidents number in the hundreds, just a fraction of the tens of thousands involved, they receive outsized online coverage and attention.

6/ Russian troops largely doubt the war’s stated goals are achievable. Unlike Ukraine’s forces, Moscow enforces a strict punitive system with systematic extrajudicial punishments. While such cases have increased in the Ukrainian army since 2022–2023, they remain unsystematic

5/ Simultaneously, while force generation remains Moscow’s main advantage, coercion and abuse to mobilize people have increased sharply. More conscripts are pressured to sign contracts to avoid abuse, and far more arrested individuals are offered contracts to avoid criminal cases

4/ Today, Russia is producing more drones, becoming increasingly organized, and gaining an edge, particularly in drone warfare, both in quantity and operational sophistication. The entire kill chain has improved, and training for drone operators has scaled

3/ Each year follows a similar pattern: Russian forces form a pocket around a town, Ukraine cites manpower shortages and lack of aid, Russia takes heavy losses but advances, Ukraine inflates already high Russian casualty figures, while Moscow grossly downplays them

2/ Since early 2025, Russia's personnel losses have remained among the highest since the war began. But at the same time, Ukraine has faced a sharp rise in desertion and AWOL cases. The pace of Russian territorial advances is higher than during the same period in 2024.

A few observations drawn from insider insights, open-source data, information from russian internal documents, and conversations with senior officers, frontline soldiers, and volunteers - based on developments from Spring through Summer 2025. Thread🧵:

I’m happy to report that Ukrainian strikes are moving faster than our team’s geolocation and analysis can keep up with! We’re taking a day off to catch our breath, then we’ll dive into a thorough review of all the latest impacts. Thanks for your patience and donations

8/ Your support is critical for us to provide independent, honest investigations free from editorial bias or state influence. We operate with no strings attached. Please consider supporting us via the link above.

Frontelligence Insight is All Source Public Intelligence Satellite imagery and other expenses 

7/ Our team will need several days, along with fresh satellite imagery, to provide a detailed analysis of all hits. We plan to take tew days to review the data. Meanwhile, we ask for your direct support as we juggle multiple investigations simultaneously:
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6/ So far, this week appears to be more successful in hitting targets. Previously, our team documented many strikes that resulted in little to no damage, but this week clearly stands out with a higher number of impactful hits.

5/ If the strike successfully penetrated, previous attacks suggest a decent likelihood that the assembly’s industrial equipment was damaged or set on fire, potentially requiring repairs or replacement. High-resolution imagery will later confirm or refute this assumption.

4/ The building was reported as a new assembly facility specifically dedicated to production in the local news. Earlier reports estimated Russia’s investment in the project at around 300 million rubles - roughly $4 to $5 million at the time.

3/ Elektropribor supplies a range of electronic products to both the Russian military and law enforcement: automated control systems, encrypted communications equipment, radar technology, and more. Construction of the targeted facility began around 2018.

2/ We verified the strike by geolocating both the recording’s POV and the impact site. The location matches satellite imagery, confirming social media reports that the Penza's Elektropribor was targeted by a drone. Impact coordinates: 53.22469, 44.96600

Geolocated by: @neonhandrail.bsky.social

Penza Military Plant “Elektropribor”: Preliminary Damage Assessment

🧵Thread:

1/ In the early hours of August 2, Ukrainian UAVs struck multiple targets in Russia, including refineries and military-industrial sites. Here’s what’s known so far about the strike on Elektropribor

No, they have confirmed numbers and estimates

Estimates are what they give based on a gap between confirmed and unconfirmed cases.

50,000 would be an estimate, not confirmed names

Yes, I agree with you on that

Flat Earth society has consensus that Earth is flat. After reviewing Russian documents with unit losses, casualty data from regions, memorial/cemetery changes, MIAs, we came to the same Mediazona-BBC estimate of ~50,000 KIA. This discussion is going nowhere, and I have no desire to convince you

Trump has previously said, that Ukraine lost 700,000 people.

My team collaborates with multiple other projects, and we all use different methodologies (including Russian documents themselves), and none point at those numbers.

Realistically, the number could reflect KIA+MIA+POW+heavily WIA

I agree with you, the context of the whole statement is more interesting than the numbers themselves

In March he said that thousands of Ukrainian soldiers are completely encircled. That was obviously a lie.

How do you distinguish, what was provided by the intelligence and what not?

I find it quite amusing that people who claim Trump lies about everything and isn’t trustworthy suddenly treat him as a reliable and truthful source, as soon as he announces casualty figures that sound favorable for Ukraine.
So he’s lying... until he says something you like to hear, right?😆