Juan P. Arroyave

The author conclude that Moral violations "put us in a huff," but reason is the engine. We use emotional rhetoric to communicate our convictions, but the judgment itself is built on reasoning about harm, rights, and welfare. #Rationalism #MoralPsychology

This "hidden reasoning" about risk creates the appearance of an unreasoned judgment, even when reason is truly the core engine.

These "absolutists" do not believe that the proposed benefits of such technology can really outweigh the inherent risks of harm. Thus, absolutism is a form of harm-based reasoning where the perceived risk is so high that no benefit can justify the act.

Rationalists argue this is not just an emotional "gut" reaction, but is rooted in background beliefs about what is inherently harmful.In studies on GMO opposition, what looks like "disgust" is often actually a fear of novel technologies and unforeseen consequences.

Moreover, they also consider the case of "Moral absolutis2: is the steadfast opposition to actions that violate "sacred values," such as loyalty or purity, regardless of the potential costs or benefits involved.

The "harmless" case of Julie and Mark (incest) is used to show "moral dumbfounding". But researchers found that participants privately retained beliefs about real-world harm (risks, family unit), even when the experimenter told them no harm occurred.

Even "harmless" wrongs, like the famous Haidt's vignette of Mark and Julie, involve reason. People often condemn these acts because they hold background beliefs that such actions are inherently risky or likely to cause harm in the real world

Sympathy can actually be a distraction from morality. It can lead people to violate their own moral principles and favor a loved one over others who are more deserving based on fairness. In these cases, emotion subverts the conscience rather than guiding it.

What about Sympathy? In a famous experiment, people induced to feel sympathy for a terminally ill child chose to move her up a waitlist, violating their own fair moral principles. Here, emotion didn't guide morality: it subverted it.

Do we need anger to judge? In a study by Batson et al., participants judged the torture of a Sri Lankan soldier as just as immoral as that of a US soldier, but only felt anger for the US one. This shows moral judgment can exist entirely without the emotion.

The Ultimatum Game is a classic: responders often reject "unfair" low money offers. While some see this as "moral anger," studies show people often reject offers just because they dislike being in a subordinate status, not necessarily due to a moral principle.

Studies show we often judge an act as immoral even without feeling angry, especially if it involves strangers. Reasoning about the harm done, not the intensity of the rage, is what defines the judgment.

While emotions and moral judgments often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause those judgments. Research suggests we only reliably feel strong emotions when conduct affects the welfare of ourselves or those we value. Take anger, often seen as the response to injustice.

Rationalism challenges the idea that emotions dictate morality by arguing that conscious reasoning about harm, welfare, and rights is the core process of moral judgment. It posits that we don't just follow "gut feelings" but actively analyze situations.

Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments? The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that the...

Do emotions play an essential role in moral
judgments? Nice paper by W. McAuliffe on the discussion Rationalism vs. Sentimentalism: Does reason or "gut feeling" drive morality? #Moralpsychology www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

Compartiré el flyer con colegas que están en Colombia y sé que les podría interesar 👍🏻

Predatory as hell!

The authors propose a radical step: Abandon the term "modularity" altogether. It's too contaminated by intentional-level intuitions of the "Self." Using "functional mechanisms" shifts the focus to real scientific questions: evolvability and computational adequacy.

Another myth is that EP claims a "separate computer" exists for every problem. Not true. Functional mechanisms can share "tools" or sub-processes. Just as a saw is used for both chairs and boats, mechanisms aren't required to be entirely bounded, isolated units.

No viable alternative exists.
This confusion creates false standards. Some critics think that if a behavior is slow, conscious, or flexible, it’s not "evolved." But selection doesn't follow Fodor’s rules; an adaptation can be deliberative if that's what its function requires. Form follows function.

According with the authors, when Critics hear "Massive Modularity" they imagine a "many-headed monster" of isolated units. But for EP, it’s a "boring biological axiom." If the mind is material, it MUST be composed of evolved functions, their by-products, and noise.

EP operates at the Functional Level. It’s purely mechanistic.
There is no "You," only a constellation of mechanisms executing if/then rules. Here, modularity simply means functional specialization: the mind is composed of evolved tools designed for specific problems.

Fodor’s modularity is Intentional. It assumes a "Central Agency" (a "You"). Modules here are defined by what is outside your control. Attributes like automaticity and encapsulation only make sense if there’s a "You" that is being excluded from the process.

The authors claims that many psychologists use the same word ("module") but operate in different ontologies: sets of entities and rules. Fodorians look at the mind through an "Intentional" lens; EP uses a "Functional" one.

Why Evolutionary Psychology Should Abandon Modularity - PubMed A debate surrounding modularity-the notion that the mind may be exclusively composed of distinct systems or modules-has held philosophers and psychologists captive for nearly 40 years. Concern about this thesis-which has come to be known as the <i>massive modularity debate-</i>serves as the primary …

pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34730453/ Why Evolutionary Psychology (EP) should abandon the term "modularity." This thread summarizes a key paper by Pietraszewski & Wertz on the "Modularity Mistake". For 40 years, researchers have been arguing past each other due to a confusion of "levels of analysis".

And individual factors play a significant role, as people with certain dispositional characteristics (such as chronic anxiety or concern about disease) are more likely to respond to perceived threats.

Finally, Threat management systems are sensitive to context in which threats occur. Responses to self-protection or disease avoidance are more likely to be activated when circumstances suggest increased vulnerability (e.g., darkness or fear of infection)...

This precautionary bias is adaptive because, most of the time, avoiding a real danger is more important than making minor mistakes. However, in the modern context, this bias can contribute to psychological disorders, such as post-traumatic stress disorder or obsessive-compulsive disorder.

Third, the systems face an inherent problem: errors in interpreting threat cues. While some signals, like a bad smell or an angry facial expression, often correctly indicate a threat, interpretation is not always perfect: an angry face might be wrongly perceived as a threat of real aggression.