Emory Law Journal

The Emory Law Journal is reopening submissions for Volume 75 on August 1, 2025, through Scholastica. All submissions will be considered on a rolling basis. We look forward to reviewing your articles for publication in the Spring of 2026!

The Emory Law Journal is reopening submissions for Volume 75 on August 1, 2025, through Scholastica. All submissions will be considered on a rolling basis. We look forward to reviewing your articles for publication in the Spring of 2026!

It features pieces from @orlylobel.bsky.social, @ariezra.bsky.social, Aleksander Goranin, @matthewsag.bsky.social, Peter K. Yu, @jessicasilbey.bsky.social, @nicholson.bsky.social, and @saragerke.bsky.social!

This issue is full of interesting pieces covering a plethora of artificial intelligence issues, including privacy, healthcare, art, copyright, and more!

A blue cover with white text that reads, "Emory Law Journal, Volume 74, Number 5, 2025." The pieces of Issue 5 are listed in order, as follows: "Technological Readiness Versus Disruption: A Framework for Assessing Distinct Artificial Intelligence Policy Strategies" by Orly Lobel; "Civil Society and the Crisis of Privacy Law" by Ari Ezra Waldman; "A Deep Look at Copyright’s Volitional Conduct Doctrine and Generative Artificial Intelligence" by Aleksander J. Goranin; "The Globalization of Copyright Exceptions for AI Training" by Matthew Sag and Peter K. Yu; "How Theories of Art Can Inform Debates About AI" by Jessica Silbey; "Clinicians in the Loop of Medical AI" by W. Nicholson Price II; and "A Comprehensive Labeling Framework for Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML)-Based Medical Devices: From AI Facts Labels to a Front-of-Package AI Labeling System — Lessons Learned from Food Labeling" by Sara Gerke.

Issue 5 of Volume 74 is live! Issue 5 features pieces from the 2024 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium. The Symposium was entitled "The Promise and Challenge of Artificial Intelligence in the Information Age." scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol74/is...

Two more student-run journals have joined Bluesky! Welcome @stanlrev.bsky.social and @nyujlpp.bsky.social! Check out the starter pack of student-run journals and the list (a feed compiling all posts from such journals)!

Starter Pack: go.bsky.app/SjT51yY

List: bsky.app/profile/did:...

Check out the full piece in ELJ: scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol74/is...

In "Access or Sovereignty," Professor Holden contends that a legislative update could level the playing field—allowing tribes to compete online and securing a $40 billion industry that supports hundreds of communities.

Some tribes have sacrificed sovereignty for access, while others have refused. But, Professor Holden argues, none should be forced into such a choice.

Professor John Holden considers in ELJ.

Although the tribal gaming industry once flourished, it now stands at a crossroads. A key legal restriction—that all gaming must occur on “Indian lands”—prevents tribes from expanding into the online market, as commercial operators do so.

Cover of the Emory Law Journal: dark blue with white text that reads "Access or Sovereignty" by John T. Holden

How is online gambling changing the ability of tribes to raise revenue and preserve their sovereignty?

Tribal casinos are a vital source of revenue for many Indigenous communities, but what you might not realize is that outdated federal law threatens their future.

Kayla O'Brien is a Managing Editor of ELJ and @emorylaw.bsky.social Class of 2025. Her comment "Health Is Wealth: Strengthening Plaintiffs’ Ability to Confer Standing in Health Information Data Breach Cases" was recently published in ELJ. Check it out: scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol74/is...

She critiques courts’ limited interpretation of injury-in-fact and advocates for a more comprehensive approach that encompasses both economic and noneconomic harms. Kayla also proposes reforms to strengthen privacy protections, offering insights into the challenges of securing health information.

Kayla’s article explores the challenges data breach victims face conferring standing in federal court, particularly when the compromised data includes health information.

Individuals’ health information is increasingly at risk of data breaches as healthcare providers and individuals use digital devices and applications more frequently to log health data.

ndividuals’ health information is increasingly at risk of data breaches as healthcare providers adopt health information technologies and individuals use digital devices and applications to log their health data. The frequency of data breaches involving health information has escalated year after year, and, as a result, more individuals are seeking recourse in federal court. To proceed in federal court, however, these individuals must have Article III standing, and meeting the injury-in-fact requirement to confer standing has been a difficult hurdle for plaintiffs in data breach cases to overcome. Federal courts have narrowly interpreted what constitutes a concrete harm stemming from data breaches, disregarding the noneconomic harms faced by plaintiffs and focusing almost exclusively on economic harms, such as identity theft and credit card fraud, as sufficient to constitute an injury-in-fact. This narrow interpretation fails to acknowledge the sensitive, immutable nature of individuals’ health information and threatens individuals’ ability to enforce privacy rights. This Comment argues that federal courts should broaden their interpretation of injury-in-fact in data breach cases involving protected health information. It proposes that federal courts shift their analytical framework for evaluating injury-in-fact by expanding their recognition of intangible harms that result from both the threat of misuse of compromised data and the mere fact that the data has been compromised. Moreover, Congress should amend HIPAA to include a private right of action, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services should broaden the definition of entities that must comply with HIPAA regulations. These measures will empower victims of data breaches to seek redress for harms stemming from their exposed health data, enforcing their right to privacy.

To bring a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury-in-fact. But, this is extremely difficult in health data breach cases. Often, courts focus on economic harms, disregarding the profound noneconomic harms of such a breach.

Kayla O'Brien considers in ELJ.

What role should copyright and antitrust law play in regulating AI? Professors Daryl Lim and Peter K. Yu consider in ELJ Volume 74: scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol74/is...

Check it out here: scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol74/is...

It examines technological challenges, as AI relies on structures targeted by antitrust law, and ideological shifts from the Chicago to Neo-Brandeisian Schools. It highlights copyright’s competition safeguards and argues against premature antitrust intervention, warning of economic/legal disruption

The U.S. government had intensified antitrust actions against Big Tech, with the FTC signaling interest in AI regulation, particularly regarding unauthorized use of copyrighted works. This Article explores the evolving relationship between antitrust and copyright in generative AI.

The abstract of "The Antitrust-Copyright Interface" by Daryl Lim and Peter K. Yu: "The U.S. government’s antitrust actions against Big Tech have recently surged in response to the growing dominance of Amazon, Apple, Google, Meta, and Microsoft. In fall 2023, the Federal Trade Commission filed a controversial submission in response to the U.S. Copyright Office’s request for comments on artificial intelligence (AI) and copyright. The agency’s submission hinted at its eagerness to fully deploy its enforcement powers in the AI sector, including targeting AI developers that have used copyrighted works without authorization to train AI models. This Article examines the changing interface of antitrust and copyright law in the age of generative AI. It argues that this interface faces new complications in two directions: technological and ideological. Technologically, the structural elements antitrust law aims to regulate are key to the success of AI developers. Ideologically, antitrust law, in recent years, has been confronted with a policy shift from the once dominating Chicago School to the Neo-Brandeisian School. The Article then highlights copyright’s oft-overlooked competition policy. It identifies several built-in procompetitive safeguards, such as fair use, the idea-expression dichotomy, the first sale doctrine, compulsory licenses, and the copyright misuse doctrine. The second half of this Article makes the case against antitrust intervention at this nascent stage of AI development. It discusses how such intervention could stifle the growth of the AI sector, change longstanding antitrust principles, upset copyright’s internal balance, and generate unintended global consequences. This Article concludes with a five-pronged strategy for reconfiguring the antitrust-copyright interface and reducing the tensions between antitrust and copyright law."

Professors Daryl Lim (of Penn State Dickinson Law) and Peter K. Yu (of Texas A&M University School of Law) have published “The Antitrust-Copyright Interface in the Age of Generative Artificial Intelligence” in Volume 74 of the Emory Law Journal.

The Editorial Board of Emory Law Journal, Volume 74.

Congratulations to ELJ's Volume 74 Editorial Board on their graduation from @emorylaw.bsky.social today! It has been an incredible year, with more pieces from Volume 74 still to come. Join us in congratulating this incredible group!

Check it out here: scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol74/is...

And two student Comments: "Health is Wealth: Strengthening Plaintiffs’ Ability to Confer Standing in Health Information Data Breach Cases" by ELJ Managing Editor Kalya O'Brien; "The Protection of “Style” Under Copyright and its Application to Generative Artificial Intelligence" by David Nielsen.

Issue 4 of Volume 74 is live!

It features two articles: "The Antitrust-Copyright Interface in the Age of Generative Artificial Intelligence" by Daryl Lim (of Penn State) and Peter Yu (of Texas A&M); and "Access or Sovereignty" by John Holden (of Indiana).

Megan's comment, "Farewell Feres: Does the Camp Lejeune Justice Act Overturn the Feres Doctrine," was recently published in ELJ. Special thanks to @marknevitt.bsky.social, who advised Megan.

Check it out here: scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol74/is...

Megan Rohn, Articles Editor of ELJ and @emorylaw.bsky.social Class of '25, argues the Doctrine is ripe for reconsideration based on the arguments presented in the Ninth Circuit case Spletstoser v. Hyten and the reformed statutory landscape following the Camp Lejeune Justice Act.

In 1950, the Supreme Court held in Feres v. United States that soldiers cannot sue the government for injuries incurred “incident to service.” This holding set a precedent for denying suits by injured soldiers and their families, and the precedent became known as the Feres Doctrine. Over time, the Feres Doctrine has been expanded and abused to universally dismiss lawsuits by soldiers for negligence, medical malpractice, sexual assault, and intentional torts including sexual assault. Because the original decision did not adequately define “incident to service,” the Feres doctrine has been applied differently in different judicial circuits, causing confusion and drawing ire from legislators, judges, and Justices alike. In 2022, the Feres Doctrine was dealt two significant legal blows. First, Congress passed the Camp Lejeune Justice Act (Lejeune Act), allowing soldiers negligently injured by toxic water at Camp Lejeune to sue the government. Second, the Ninth Circuit decided Spletstoser v. Hyten, which both allowed a survivor of military sexual trauma to sue the government and held that sexual assault is not incident to service. This Comment argues that, because soldiers are allowed to sue for negligence under the Lejeune Act and for sexual assault under Spletstoser, neither negligence and subsequent medical problems nor sexual assault are incident to service. Today, the combination of the Lejeune Act and Spletstoser results in a severely curtailed Feres Doctrine. This is because, under both the Lejeune Act and Spletstoser, the only lawsuits still barred by Feres are suits for other intentional torts, which is far narrower than the Doctrine’s original purpose of barring all Federal Tort Claims Act suits by soldiers. Thus, Feres is ripe for reconsideration and abandonment because of the confusion it brings upon courts and because a majority of Feres’s founding legal precedent has been overturned. The combination of the Lejeune Act and Spletstoser provides the ideal op…

Since 1950, the Feres Doctrine has forbidden injured American soldiers from suing the military for sexual assault, medical malpractice, and other negligence soldiers suffer incident to service. This lack of military accountability has led to soldiers to lack a legal remedy.

Check it out here: scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj-online/53/

Brandon explores the history of the act and argues for a reformed settlement.

Brandon's Essay, "Old Habits Die Hard: How the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act Perpetuates Settler Colonialism and Denies Indigenous Sovereignty" was recently published in ELJ Online.