Anurag Deb

I don't have any terrible writing tips because my entire writing ethic is terrible: make enough coffee to wake the dead, have your eureka moments at 3 am, never plan your first draft (free write with glee) and play some apocalyptic tunes to get into editing (with a metaphorical machete).

James II & VII rises again.

I'll just note, as I do every time this discourse comes up, that the male loneliness/access to sex/romantic partners etc etc conversation basically never, ever admits the possibility (either those bemoaning the issue or those dismissing it) that queer men exist.

This is sadly, what we have all expected. But, from a technical perspective I think the judge has made a mistake in their discussion of the comparator selection in these paragraphs. I'll try to explain. 🧵

Most interesting thing here to me (other than the 100+ paragraphs about why being born male might make you taller and so better at the stick game, which, deeeep sigh @ this being a judicial issue at all) is this paragraph:

The UK didn't opt in to this version of the reception conditions directive - but the Court makes some reference to the first version of the Directive, which the UK *did* opt in to

Yes sorry the 2003 Directive and not the 2013 Directive.

Relevant to NI under the Windsor Framework (in terms of any diminution of rights under the Reception Conditions Directive as they stood on exit day).

High Court green-lights challenge to Palestine Action proscription The High Court (Chamberlain J) has granted a co-founder of Palestine Action (PA) permission to apply for judicial review of the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe PA. Judgment in R (Ammori) v S…

High Court green-lights challenge to Palestine Action proscription administrativecourtblog.wordpress.com/2025/07/31/h...

No, Recognizing Palestine Would Not Be Contrary to International Law A group of British peers, among them several distinguished lawyers, yesterday sent a letter to the Attorney-General, Lord Hermer, asking him to advise the UK Government that its announced forthcoming ...

Analysis of whether recognition of Palestine breaches international law, from the @ejiltalk.bsky.social blog - www.ejiltalk.org/no-recognizi...

"A bank cheque, written on a watermelon, is nonetheless a cheque and even negotiable!" David A Bearman and Richard H Lyttle, 'The Power of the Principle of Provenance' (1985-86) 21 Archivaria 14, 22.

Interesting places where my PhD continues to take me, part 651: the watermelon cheque

18(b). On the flip side, when a devolved administration successfully lobbies for fiscal devolution, it should be fully prepared to operationalise it properly (ahem, Stormont and corporate tax)

18(a). Fiscal devolution is a distinct minefield from administrative and/or legal devolution but not a separate one: devolving functions without devolving the funds/fundraising needed to run them is useless.

This happens only in respect of a handful of special SIs at Westminster, under specific kinds of SI making powers. Or if the UKG decides unilaterally to publish a draft (also v rare). Meanwhile Parliament's perennial complaint about too many SIs and insufficient scrutiny remains perennial. 2/2

In NI, secondary legislation in general involves deeper legislative input than at Westminster. Proposals are exchanged between the responsible department and the corresponding Assembly committee before the SI/SR is drafted. This increases legislator confidence when the draft is voted on. 1/

It's used sparingly, and as often as not simply for political mileage by the UKG of the day. But there are specifics in how devolved administrations function which might also provide points of comparison and learning, beyond simply what policies they come up with in their areas of governance.

17. Related to (16). Courts need to bear context (devolution itself) in mind much more prominently when giving effect to the devolution settlements. The Scottish Parliament is not a local authority. It is a primary lawmaker with a democratic mandate.

The original provisions of 1998, essentially replicated from the Good Friday Agreement, contained no executive vetoes comparable to 2006. That system didn't run long enough to demonstrate success or failure, which I think is a shame.

A codified supreme constitution that constrains Parliament needn't guarantee greater devolved lawmaking freedom. India is a great example. State laws must be read subject to federal laws on concurrent subjects - a similar qualification the UK abandoned for NI in 1973 (and hasn't revived since).

16. Related to (13). Parliamentary sovereignty is not a threat/obstacle to devolution. Parliamentary politics (e.g. a Government with a huge and absolutely whipped majority in the HoC) is.

15. NI has in one sense the most radical settlement (the ability to secede from the Union) and the most impractical executive (various Stormont vetoes from the St Andrews Agreement). This enhances Stormont volatility and precludes stability.

14. UK Cabinet ministers being able to consequentially and unilaterally interfere in devolved lawmaking is anathema to devolution. Either drastically prescribe this power or abandon it altogether.

13. Westminster needs explicit devolved representation. EVEL provides a model. But reforming the Lords provides greater opportunities.

12. Some of the enduring asymmetries between the 3 devolved frameworks no longer make sense and Westminster + Whitehall need to periodically review these frameworks with substantive devolved input to revise them and update them as needed.

11. Devolved administrative and statutory experiments can provide so much food for thought at a Whitehall level and this isn't as openly discussed/acknowledged as it needs to be. Devolution is a policy laboratory. Use it.

10. If a holistic understanding of and focus on devolution is a danger to the Union, the Union is inherently weak and that's not the fault of devolution (though it is a problem for it).

9. Our focus on Holyrood + Stormont + Cardiff Bay v Whitehall + Westminster blunts our focus on how each of the devolved administrations themselves treat devolution within their control (i.e. their relationships with their local authorities). That too is devolution.

8. An understanding of how Westminster granted autonomy + independence to parts of the empire is crucial in understanding devolution in the UK. "But that's the empire" is not a valid counterargument in a legal sense: the UK Parliament didn't transform into a different body for NSW compared to NI.

7. The legal ways the Union formed, from Henry VIII (the Laws in Wales Acts) to 1921 (the Partition of Ireland) is a crucial part of understanding what devolution today is and what it could be.