Shiran Victoria Shen

Join us in congratulating @svshen.bsky.social for this fantastic recognition! 👏

🚨 New Policy Brief 🚨

How can citizen voices shape #ClimatePolicy in non-democracies?

Drawing on lessons from #China ’s 2021 Henan flood, this @gldinstitute.bsky.social brief shows how citizen petitions can drive more efficient, cost-effective #ClimateAdaptation — even under #authoritarian rule.

Congratulations to the APPAM World Citizen Prizes in Environmental Performance award recipient Shiran Victoria Shen! We look forward to learning more about her at #2025APPAM. Learn more: https://ow.ly/7JJP50XeWYh

🚨New Policy Brief No. 28 written by @svshen.bsky.social is a fresh answer to a classic governance challenge—the principal-agent problem: How can principals deploy regularized campaigns to reduce discretion, curb capture, and reshape agent incentives—with lasting effects?

Learn More: bit.ly/GLDPB28

🚨New Policy Brief🚨

A fresh answer to a classic governance challenge—the 𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗰𝗶𝗽𝗮𝗹-𝗮𝗴𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗯𝗹𝗲𝗺:

How principals can deploy 𝗿𝗲𝗴𝘂𝗹𝗮𝗿𝗶𝘇𝗲𝗱 𝗰𝗮𝗺𝗽𝗮𝗶𝗴𝗻𝘀 to reduce discretion, curb capture, and reshape agent incentives—with lasting effects.

Now live
@gldinstitute.bsky.social

New Publication!
How can governments sustain compliance improvements when institutions falter and ad hoc enforcement fades? New paper @psjeditor.bsky.social by @svshen.bsky.social (@washupolisci.bsky.social)
offers a fresh answer to this enduring principal-agent challenge
doi.org/10.1111/psj....

Grateful to collaborators and colleagues for their support—and motivated to continue advancing research for stronger environmental performance worldwide.

5/5

<em>Policy Studies Journal</em> | PSO Public Policy Journal | Wiley Online Library How can governments sustain compliance improvements when institutions falter and ad hoc enforcement fades? This study introduces “regularized campaigns” as an institutional innovation that combines t....

📑 Regularized Campaigns @psjeditor.bsky.social: Finds that repeated enforcement campaigns can deliver lasting compliance gains, even where regulatory capture is common.

doi.org/10.1111/psj....

4/5

📑 Social Competition @pnas.org: Demonstrates how social competition between neighborhoods reduces informal waste burning, creating durable norm shifts that cut pollution.

doi.org/10.1073/pnas...

3/5

The Political Regulation Wave Cambridge Core - Environmental Policy, Economics and Law - The Political Regulation Wave

📘 The Political Regulation Wave @cambup-law.cambridge.org: Explores how political and bureaucratic incentives shape environmental outcomes—and how they can be harnessed to drive real improvements.

doi.org/10.1017/9781...

2/5

I'm delighted and honored to receive the 2025
@appam.bsky.social 🌍 World Citizen Prize in Environmental Performance 🌍

polisci.wustl.edu/news/shiran-...

recognizing a body of works on #pollution control, including:

1/5

📑 Social Competitions @pnas.org: Demonstrates how social competitions between neighborhoods reduce informal waste burning, creating durable norm shifts that cut pollution.

doi.org/10.1073/pnas...

3/5

The Political Regulation Wave Cambridge Core - Environmental Policy, Economics and Law - The Political Regulation Wave

📘 The Political Regulation Wave @cambup-law.cambridge.org: Shows how political and bureaucratic incentives shape environmental outcomes—and how they can be harnessed to drive real improvements.

doi.org/10.1017/9781...

2/5

These findings show how extreme weather can spark bottom-up political engagement—even in authoritarian settings.

Incorporating citizen perspectives can strengthen adaptation policy—especially where top-down, technocratic approaches (e.g., costly but ineffective “sponge city” pilot) dominate.

10/10

Concern over the flood and disaster preparedness spilled over beyond Henan—prompting petitions in unaffected provinces that explicitly referenced the 2021 Henan flood.

9/10

The 2021 Henan flood stands out for the scale of destruction—and its political aftermath.

Other major, but less devastating, floods did not trigger comparable surges in adaptation-related petitions on the LLMB.

8/10

Topic modeling shows that appeals focused on concrete, localized vulnerabilities—demands that weren’t framed as “climate” issues but were functionally aligned with adaptation.

7/10

Using a dynamic DiD model, I find a sustained rise in adaptation-related requests in Henan.

These estimates are likely conservative, given:

1️⃣ Spillover effects in other provinces
2️⃣ Concurrent but less severe flooding elsewhere

6/10

The flood triggered a sharp rise in climate adaptation petitions across Henan—a surge that persisted for months.

5/10

The 2021 Henan flood was among the deadliest floods in recent 🇨🇳 history.

Official source found that anthropogenic climate change increased rainfall intensity by 7.5%: doi.org/10.1016/j.sc...

4/10

In authoritarian regimes, public sentiment carries less direct political weight.

But state-sanctioned petition platforms can still channel bottom-up pressure.

This study focuses on one such system: China’s Local Leaders’ Message Board (LLMB).

3/10

Why study the Global South and authoritarian regimes?

1️⃣ They face acute climate risks but often lack capacity and resources.
2️⃣ The focus has largely been on politicians and bureaucrats—not citizens.
3️⃣ Studies on public response often rely on commercial social media and are mainly descriptive.

2/10

🚨New Article🚨

What happens after a major climate disaster in developing and authoritarian contexts?

My new study ‪@commsearth.nature.com‬ examines how citizens made adaptation demands to local governments in 🇨🇳 after the 2021 Henan flood.

doi.org/10.1038/s432...

🧵 1/10

‘Keeping us hooked on fossil fuels’: how can we negotiate with autocracies on the climate crisis? The bulk of global greenhouse gas emissions come from countries that are not democratic, and many big oil and gas exporters are also authoritarian

‘Keeping us hooked on fossil fuels’: how can we negotiate with autocracies on the climate crisis? www.theguardian.com/environment/...

We conduct an extensive set of robustness checks—see the full paper for details.

Although the empirical case is situated in an authoritarian context, the theory should be applicable to democratic settings as well.

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Notably, the effect was indistinguishable from zero in 2018—a year with no active central campaigning, suggesting a sustained impact of regularized campaigns.

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Using confidential government data, we find that firms with greater economic significance were more likely to violate standards prior to the CEI.

After the CEI, this compliance gap narrowed and became statistically insignificant.

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Central environmental inspections (CEIs) were introduced in campaign-style waves to address persistent compliance gaps—defined as disparities in compliance outcomes among regulated entities.

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retain discretion over enforcement, and enforcement data is often reported by agents themselves, creating opportunities for manipulation.

This creates a classic principal-agent problem.

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Empirical case: firm pollution regulation in 🇨🇳

The core challenge: While the principal—the Ministry of Environmental Protection—possesses reliable emissions data through institutional monitoring systems like CEMS, local agents (prefectural environmental protection bureaus)

3/