The BEROC-IPM School of Economics and Business (BISEB) at European Humanities University invite students to join the 2026 IGB European Case Championship – an international competition focused on solving real business challenges. See details: igbstart.lt Ping @sthlmschoolofecon.bsky.social
Best paper in #gender economics
SITE’s Maria Perrotta Berlin @lilleberlin.bsky.social contributes to the Sorbonne Alliance series Europe and the War in Ukraine with a new policy paper on Russia sanctions - what worked, what’s left, and how frozen Russian assets could help fund Ukraine’s defence & reconstruction. ➡️ tr.ee/5DPLl7
Today I’m presenting part of the Russia in Africa project at the 18th @the-peio.bsky.social conference @iepolisci.bsky.social in Segovia. Great conference, great people!
Friends and colleagues working on sanctions, keep this conference on your radar! 24-25 September in Warsaw, deadline for abstract submission 28 February. www.sgh.waw.pl/kgs/badania-...
SITE's Maria Perrotta Berlin @lilleberlin.bsky.social maps how Russian (incl. Wagner-linked) activity shapes development cooperation and public attitudes across Africa. Donor responses vary - and Russia’s presence can boost views of US leadership while eroding trust in democratic norms. tr.ee/y4LUk8
MSCBE & @sitestockholm.bsky.social launch a new Research Seminar & Policy Brief Series on Closing Gender Gaps Through Economics Research. First seminar on Feb 5 w Dr. Bert D’Espallier on gender research in development finance, leadership, and microfinance. More info: cbe.aua.am/cbrd/project...
Russia has ramped up its Africa outreach since 2022 - but what has it really gained? A new brief by SITE’s Maria Perrotta Berlin ( @lilleberlin.bsky.social ) & BEROC’s Lev Lvovskiy finds limited strategic payoff from Moscow’s efforts.
📄 Read more: tr.ee/FrJGDA
Join @golovchenko.bsky.social 's presentation on the effects of #sanctions on the #ShadowFleet . Tuesday 27/1, irl or online!
📆 📢 SAVE THE DATE - Feb 12 | SITE, together with SUCC and CSSC, is bringing Ukrainian and international experts to Stockholm for keynote talks and a panel discussion on 'Ignoring Antagonistic Information Threats: Costs and Evidence from Ukraine'. ➡️ Learn more and register here: tr.ee/Qz6Sc3
New report out for EBA!
Perceptions and Power: Assessing the Impact of Russia’s Influence on Development Cooperation and Attitudes in Africa
Using geospatial aid and conflict data, and opinion surveys, I show that Russian presence reshapes donor behavior and public attitudes. eba.se/rapporter/pe...
🧨 What does Russia’s military procurement reveal about Moscow’s longer-term plans? Pavlo Shkurenko, a sanctions research fellow at the KSE Institute, and Jacob Parakilas, a research leader at RAND Europe, examine this question in a joint article @foreignpolicy.com foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/07/r...
🌍 Can Russia’s push into Africa reshape global alliances? 🔎 @lilleberlin.bsky.social (@sitestockholm.bsky.social) and Lev Lvovskiy (BEROC) investigate Moscow’s expanding, yet shallow, footprint across the continent. freepolicybriefs.org/2026/01/19/r... #FreeNetwork #Russia #Africa
Glad to have contributed to Di’s work mapping emerging power struggles in Africa. Major developments are unfolding across the continent that will demand far more attention going forward.
The effects of U.S. sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil have been substantial, but their effectiveness over time will hinge on enforcement capacity and political will. The EU cannot afford reliance on U.S. measures alone; it must adopt decisive complementary actions. Excellent analysis ⬇️
EU leaders are discussing this week a proposal to explore mechanisms to use immobilized Russian central bank assets to support Ukraine. This brief analyses existing legal mechanisms and puts forward concrete recommendations. sanctionsrussia.org/publication/...
Lessons for the EU:
• Extraterritorial sanctions are 🧨: a high-impact power tool.
• Shared policies require shared burdens. Enough with permanent free-riders.
New U.S. sanctions on Rosneft & Lukoil are reshaping global oil flows - and testing EU unity. A new policy brief by Maria Perrotta Berlin (@lilleberlin.bsky.social) & Chloé Le Coq breaks down the impacts on Russia’s budget, EU policy tensions & future sanctions design. ➡️ www.hhs.se/en/about-us/...
🇺🇦🇲🇩 Thanks to all who joined SITE Development Day 2025! Experts from Ukraine, Moldova & beyond discussed EU accession, economic resilience, democratic challenges & human capital. We are grateful for the insights shared throughout the day. Photos & recap now available. www.hhs.se/en/about-us/...
🇪🇺 Can the EU keep sanctioning Russia without breaking internal unity? @lilleberlin.bsky.social of @sitestockholm.bsky.social and Chloé Le Coq of CRED & SITE, discuss the consequences of the sanctions, their immediate impact on Russian firms and the state budget. freepolicybriefs.org/2025/12/08/e...
With renewed debate in recent days about peace proposals involving territorial concessions, Crimea has (once again) come sharply into focus. Join an informed and research-based discussion of how Crimea should be understood, historically, politically, and legally, and how it can be studied.
Some taxes, such as the mineral extraction tax (MET), are based on production volumes rather than profits. But as profitability declines, and especially if the sector’s investments fall, the medium-term fiscal losses become more substantial as reduced investment ultimately erodes production volumes.
Sanctions-driven increases in shipping, insurance, and compliance costs will further compress margins, reducing the tax base. The loss of foreign assets, or their sale at distressed prices, diminishes both current profit tax liabilities and future dividend streams.
Oil and gas normally account for 25–30% of Russia’s federal budget, and Rosneft and Lukoil together produce 40–45% of national oil output (Rosneft roughly 25–30%, Lukoil 15–17%). Any reduction in company profitability therefore translates directly into lower tax payments and smaller dividends.
Implications for the Russian state: Lukoil and Rosneft are the two largest taxpayers in Russia, through several major fiscal streams as well as payments associated with state-owned infrastructure. In Rosneft’s case, with state-owned majority stake, dividends are also a source of federal revenue.
Higher operating costs and lower revenues mean that both companies will have less capital available for investment. Given the capital-intensive nature of Russia’s upstream sector, under-investment can accelerate production declines over time and structurally weaken the entire industry.
Despite this, export volumes are unlikely to fall substantially in the near term, because of the already developed sanction circumvention network and practices.
However, over the medium to long term, the sanctions can become more consequential.
A sharper adjustment is expected from India as compared to China: India’s trade with Russia is less diversified, settlement in currencies other than the dollar is more difficult, and barter-like arrangements are less feasible than they are with China.
The sanctions also increase the risk for suppliers, banks, insurers, and logistics partners, now exposed to secondary sanctions when doing business with Lukoil or Rosneft. This narrows the pool of potential counterparties and gives greater leverage to buyers, who can demand deeper discounts.
The sanctions raise the prospect of forced divestments of Lukoil’s foreign assets, at depressed valuations. Even when divestment is not required, they make it hard to receive dividends from their foreign holdings. This implies loss of income in SR and of strategic presence, esp in Europe, in LR.
