I've just posted my first written material over on Substack!
It's a piece taking a deep dive on one specific argument often raised but rarely elaborated on: Personnel.
I hope you'll take a few minutes to read it!
open.substack.com/pub/policyha...
This thread, over on twitter, got 450 likes. Here, it got 3.
Use of that place is a moral hazard, and I'd love to make an alternative my default space online. But they deliver the things that make me want to be here.
Canada's Arctic policies shouldn't copy Russia's. They should reflect its own geography, economy, and strategic needs.
Different challenges. Different opportunities. Different countries.
/fin
The crux of this is that when we compare Canada to Russia in the Arctic - militarily, economically, logistically - we need to remember:
They’re not playing the same game.
And they don’t need the Arctic in the same way.
Canada’s in-construction pair of Polar-class icebreakers will exceed the ice-breaking capability of any ship Russia operates—including its nuclear-powered icebreakers.
Why?
Because Canada faces thicker, harder ice, closer to home more often.
That’s Canada’s necessity.
Similar logic applies to Russia’s greater investment in Arctic military facilities, and industry.
But, again, that reflects necessity - not, necessarily, advantage.
But this doesn’t just cut one way.
Canada, meanwhile, mostly needs icebreakers in the Arctic when they can plausibly facilitate shipping - when other ships are able to operate there. This means Canada’s icebreakers travel back and forth between the Arctic and ice-free ports and tend to winter farther South.
Similarly, Canada is sometimes criticized for not investing in nuclear powered icebreakers as Russia does.
However, Russia’s geography requires its icebreakers to remain in the Arctic year-round, where keeping them fueled is logistically difficult and expensive.
This leads to differences in how the two countries invest in the Arctic.
For example: Canada is often criticized for not “keeping up” with Russia’s icebreaker fleet.
But the incentives justifying Russia’s fleet - both economic and strategic - simply don’t exist for Canada.
What this difference in other strategic options means is that the two countries don’t need access to the Arctic in the same ways.
For Canada, Arctic access is valuable.
For Russia, Arctic access is existential.
Meanwhile, Russia’s Eastern ports are thousands of kilometers from where most industry is and, even then, connect to the Sea of Japan - the exits from which are controlled by another potentially unfriendly power.
That leaves only the Arctic as an unthreatened route.
Russia’s situation is very different.
Russia’s best Western ports—St. Petersburg and Novorossiysk—are stuck in inland seas (the Baltic and Black seas, respectively), bottlenecked by potentially unfriendly powers.
Canada also has the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence Seaway: not ice-free, but is the farthest inland navigable waterway on Earth, and cuts through Canada’s industrial heartland on its way to vast interior resources.
Bottom line: Canada doesn’t need to ship through the Arctic.
Canada is blessed with some of the best natural, ice-free, harbours in the world on both its East and West coasts. Vancouver, Halifax, Prince Rupert and Saint John are all contenders to be among the 10 best natural harbours anywhere - all opening directly into the High Seas.
The third difference can be easy to overlook, but is at least as important as the first two:
Strategic alternatives.
Canada has other options. Russia does not.
What this means is that Russia can move goods from its economic heartland into the Arctic more easily and more cheaply.
And thanks to better shipping conditions, those goods can actually go somewhere - whether to other parts of Russia’s Arctic or to be traded with other nations.
Canada by contrast has one “Arctic” port: Churchill.
But its closest major city, also ~1300km away, is Winnipeg (Pop. ~800k), and Churchill is still 1,000km from the Arctic Circle.
To get truly Arctic you’re looking at Tuktoyaktuk. Closest city of size? Whitehorse (Pop. ~30k).
The second key difference is how accessible the Arctic is from each country’s economic centre.
Russia’s main economic centres - Moscow and St. Petersburg, with a combined population of ~18 million - are both under 1,300km from Arctic-facing ports like Severodvinsk.
This difference in shipping seasons matters.
Sea shipping is by far the lowest cost way to move goods. It’s hard to be economically competitive without it.
So easier Arctic shipping means more trade, and more trade drives development.
The result is that Russia has a longer natural Arctic shipping season into, out of, and through its Arctic regions than Canada does. And it’s easier for them to extend this season through the use of icebreakers, making some routes viable year-round.
In warm waters, barrier islands are a benefit - creating sheltered routes for ships.
In the Arctic? They trap ice.
Sea ice around Canada piles into massive ridges in winter - impassable to even the heaviest icebreakers - and lingers longer into summer.
First, the Arctic’s physical geography.
North of Canada’s main landmass is a dense archipelago - nearly 100 large islands (and thousands of small ones) with narrow channels in between.
Russia’s Arctic is mostly a single, contiguous, coastline with a few scattered islands.
Canada and Russia have fundamentally different relationships with the Arctic.
That’s because of three primary factors:
- Physical geography
- Proximity to economic centres
- Strategic alternatives
Canada’s renewed focus on Arctic security has led to lots of comparisons with Russia’s Arctic posture - usually to Canada’s disadvantage.
But these comparisons tend to ignore some key realities. I want to break some of that down. 🧵
What happened on July 4 2024?
Whatever Carney and his government's precise reasoning, this seems like a clear indication that his term as PM is not going to be a meek one.
He's willing to gamble with high stakes to make an impression before he faces voters.
I hope his bets pay off for Canada.
Maybe that's an economic advantage. Maybe it's a political one.
As someone who sees value in Canada having a capable military, I hope they're doing this convinced that Trump won't react as forcefully as he could. But either of those advantages might be served better if he does.
The only reason to publicly state, now, that we may reduce the F-35 order (Blair's comments were clear - it's a reduction that's on the table, not a cancellation) order is because they see some advantage in doing so that the more discrete approach doesn't create.
The gov't could *easily* say that they see a need to grow the RCAF faster, and will continue with F-35 purchases as well as another fighter.
Then if, at some point down the line, they decide not to order more F-35s (whose purchases are staged), we already possess an alternative.
Okay, so what's our new government thinking?
Well, I think it's fair to say that there is a national security imperative to become less reliant on the US. That's why it's no surprise they'd consider this.
But that imperative does *not* require them to proceed like this.
