Juan Diego Bogotá

Out now! Mind as Metaphor (OUP, 2023) t.co/eBlYtDd5lY

Hi. DM me the details. 650 words sounds short for an article, so I’m a bit confused.

I love you Britain, but after having a proper taste of Finnish trains over the last four months I don’t think I want to travel in one of your trains ever again.

El listado está lejos de ser completo. Por favor hagan sugerencias para completarlo. No se sientan incómodos al sugerir su propio nombre, y disculpas de antemano por la omisión. Gracias!

go.bsky.app/4XmN14ihttps...

Spanglish es my language del thought.

Two reviews, one talk, one abstract, one revision, and my birthday on a single week. Never again.

What makes it a bit funnier is that my PhD thesis was also titled 'Life and Mind'. But in my defense, that wasn't the title I wanted. For bureaucratic reasons, I had to submit a 'preliminary title' in a rush for the university to contact potential examiners, and then they didn't let me change it :(

I find it hilarious that Springer allowed two books in the same series to have essentially the same title.

(PDF) Where There Is Life There Is Mind… And Free Energy Minimisation? PDF | This chapter explores the possibility of integrating the enactive and the Free Energy Principle’s (FEP) approaches to life and mind. Both... | Find, read and cite all the research you need on Re...

Here is an open-access, pre-print version of the paper: www.researchgate.net/publication/...
But if anybody wants the pdf of the published version, reach out to me and I'll send it over.

There is also a nice discussion about why I think that sense-making does not fall into the 'hard problem of content' that radical enactivists talk about. Cognition requires a non-representational form of content, and sense-making is just that.

Drawing from the latest literature, I show that even if the FEP by itself doesn't say much about life or mind specifically, it can be used to model the sense-making dynamics of organisms as described by the enactivists. The point is not to conflate operational, cognitive, and statistical boundaries.

Where There Is Life There Is Mind… And Free Energy Minimisation? This chapter explores the possibility of integrating the enactive and the Free Energy Principle’s (FEP) approaches to life and mind. Both frameworks have been linked to the life-mind continuity ...

New paper: I explore the possibility of integrating enactivism and the Free Energy Principle to address life and mind. I examine some of the arguments in favour and against their integration, and claim that something close to it is possible.
link.springer.com/chapter/10.1...
#philosophy #philsky

It’s so heartbreaking when you’re reading a manuscript you are reviewing that at first shows a lot of promise, but then starts falling apart when the authors are developing their own proposal

📣Calling all enactivists and critics!

Russell Meyer, Marilyn Stendera and myself are guest editing a special issue for Adaptive Behaviour called "Prospects for the science of Enaction" and are looking for contributions!

You can read more about our call here: listserv.liv.ac.uk/cgi-bin/wa?A...

Oh yes. I just noticed that. I have no idea how or why that happened. Anyhow, thanks! :)

Nope, I’m not . What makes you think so?

I tend to tell myself that I am first and foremost a phenomenologist and that is all I want to write about, but then I go on to write 3000 words about the distinction between causal and constitutive scientific explanations. Oh well

In a nutshell, phenomenologically, organisms are disclosed as such from the empathic perspective of the biologist. Phenomenology can analyse this empathic constitution providing an explanatory basis for a non-objectivist biology and for a phenomenological conception of cognition

Understanding living systems as sense-making agents (in a phenomenological sense) requires rethinking biology as a non-objectivist science. That project can be grounded on the explanatory potential of phenomenology, and Husserl's views on transcendental phenomenology and biology.

I argue that, while the two characterisations must be seen as two complementary perspectives on a single phenomenon (i.e., cognition), it is the phenomenological characterisation the one that allows for sense-making to be understood as an intentional openness to the world.

In my paper, I distinguish two characterisations of sense-making (the enactive concept for cognition) that, thus far, haven't been disentangled in the enactive literature: an operational one (adaptive behaviour, agency) and a phenomenological one (subjective perspective).

More specifically, I believe that the charge of anthropomorphism within the enactive framework is the result of a lack of clarity concerning the role that phenomenology may play when discussing basic life and cognition.

Life, sense-making, and subjectivity. Why the enactive conception of life and mind requires phenomenology - Synthese One of the ideas that characterises the enactive approach to cognition is that life and mind are deeply continuous, which means that both phenomena share the same basic set of organisational and pheno...

Recently, an alleged anthropomorphism at the core of enactivism has been discussed given the reliance on phenomenology when examining life and mind. In a new paper, I address the role that phenomenology can play concerning biology within enactivism.
link.springer.com/article/10.1...

New preprint: “Deep computational neurophenomenology: A methodological framework for investigating the how of experience”

Exciting collaboration with Lars Sandved Smith, @antoinelutz.bsky.social, Julian Kiverstein, @jdbogotaj.bsky.social

osf.io/preprints/os...

I'm very proud of this paper. It brings together ideas I've been developing since my MA dissertation, and it's now one of the chapters of my PhD thesis (which I'll be defending in a couple of weeks). I hope you enjoy it!

Those dynamics jointly constitute (i.e., disclose) the world as a horizon of possibilities and impossibilities suffused with general feelings of, say, familiarity, trust, or distrust.

This form of intentionality (operative intentionality, as phenomenologists call it) can be understood as a general openness to the world. Here, I thematize such openness as a bodily form of intentionality that is defined by affective and anticipatory dynamics.

In this paper, I provide phenomenological reasons to believe that temporality and affectivity are co-emergent. In fact, it is in the interplay between affectivity (affection) and temporality (protention), that the most basic and general form of intentionality arises.

In contrast to such phenomenological ideas, but certainly inspired by them, some enactivists (most notably, Varela) link affectivity and temporality, claiming that the former 'precedes' the latter. But this view risks conflating explanatory levels (transcendental and empirical).

Something that I find quite interesting about classical phenomenologists is how, in some way or another, they give temporality some sort of primacy. As Husserl puts it, time-consciousness is the 'A' in the ABCs of consciousness. But this view is too formal to fully succeed.