armadillojackal.bsky.social

If the answer is “political constraints” would make the above a bridge too far after packing the court, pushing through cases to overturn precedent, then stripping SCOTUS of jx to revisit, I can sell you that bridge.

What happens when a state Supreme Court or applicable federal circuit determines that with JX stripped, the court-packed decisions that SCOTUS no longer has JX to revisit aren’t binding? A minority view, but who fixes it?

Well deserved.

(Also I did start by talking about Houck it’s in my first comment)

Yeah, Houck was acquitted almost certainly because the jury found his intent in the assault of the clinic volunteer was based on the volunteer insulting his son. I think there are similar intent issues with Lemon (his intent was to document)

Take this situation, if probable cause is established, are you comfortable saying Trump DOJ then is not motivated by the speech and the fact that they targeted a church as opposed to an abortion clinic?

Ok so to clarify my previous statement—I think it wouldn’t have happened absent them being pro-life activists (this is the use of 241), but obviously prosecutors are also motivated by being able to establish probable cause.

Which of my characterizations is wrong? I thought all I said was that the jury acquitted in the Houck case because of intent issues and in the section 241 case (not talking about the FACE charges) the Biden DOJ used section 241 in this context for the first time because of who the defendants were.

For sure, I think that’s a different issue from what I’m saying (using it to defeat a prosecution predicated on probable cause)

But I think getting a conviction is very much in question.

I think there’s enough for probable cause. Told to leave by pastor, doesn’t leave, and I think his “don’t touch me” and demeanor when he said it creates a fact question as to force since the pastor has a legal right to use reasonable force to remove him. Plus parishioners say he blocked them.

True but no 1A protected activity here either. I thought you were making more of a selective prosecution argument based on speech of the speaker. As far as I know, you can’t collaterally attack a criminal prosecution with a 1A retaliation claim?

Kind of feels like Wurman’s birthright citizenship argument to me. At least as politically motivated, and probably even thinner on any kind of support in law, history, text, or really anything other than policy. And I have read the thin literature!

As to the “what is a journalist” question, I don’t see that as relevant but I admittedly follow the traditional rule on 1A press freedoms, and haven’t seen a compelling argument to depart from it.

time under Biden for any reason other than Biden DOJ civil rights division hates pro-life activists and their speech? Seems pretty clear there too, but not a real defense.

I don’t see this as a case that touches on the 1A really at all. I understand the 1A retaliation argument, but I don’t think that’s a great defense to advance in defense of a criminal prosecution. I mean, does anybody think the pro-life activists weren’t prosecuted under section 241 for the first

For insulting his son, not to disrupt or interfere with reproductive healthcare. Similar potential issue at play here with regard to Lemon. Probably a jury question though.

I think the intent argument as to Lemon alone is that he wasn’t there to disrupt religious service, even though he incidentally did, but to document what happened. While it was a jury and not a judge, in Biden’s Houck prosecution under FACE they essentially said no intent because he punched a guy

I actually read this when Schafer shared in on X a while ago. I read it with an open mind, along with a couple other articles on this subject, to try to test my priors on the press. I find this article very unconvincing.

But there is still nothing there about some special institutional press protection, which is ahistorical, atextual, and against common sense.

And I’d add that though the caselaw may have been making stuff up post-ratification until the 14A, the debates reveal that the 14A may have added broader 1A protections beyond prior restraints. This is similar to some 2A arguments under the 14A.

At least as to prior restraints, Scalia’s footnote in his Citizens United concurrence as to the institutional press argument is historically, textually, and common sensically correct. Stevens’ “well, maybe with the institutional press…” is baseless drivel.

Specifically, reversing Citizens United is more palatable to liberals if they can come up with a way to carve out the institutional press, which otherwise would have its speech/press restricted under the framework liberals otherwise advocate for.

I think it was making shit up, but with the goal of expanding rights. The goal of giving special protections for the institutional press is to restrict rights for normal citizens.

Lemon’s conduct very well may not fall under the FACE Act. His intent to document the events may negate the requisite mens rea of disrupting a service. But this simply isn’t a first amendment issue under existing law at all.

There’s no doubt we’ve expanded the scope of first amendment protections for all citizens, but there’s absolutely no basis other than “making shit up” to give special treatment to institutional press. And when Stevens advanced this baseless argument, it was for the goal of limiting rights of others.

Anyway, on the birthright citizenship case, can’t help but laugh that Sauer said maybe they wouldn’t follow COA opinions as to new parties (but would follow SCOTUS), and also told Kagan he would seek cert to her satisfaction, and then people are criticizing SCOTUS for granting it.

The tariffs case for sure is something the anti-juristocracy people need to be quiet on. And a handful of district court injunctions (thinking of the SNAP one, among others).

Steve Sachs

Imagine not being able to eat horse in America.